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I. INTRODUCTION
A. Policymaking Principles
"Let's enact a new rule." That's a tempting approach to solve many
kinds of policy problems. It is especially tempting for legislators, judges,
lawyers, and legal scholars to propose new rules. Rules are our tools. Rules
have the potential to encourage or discourage behavior in desired ways,
allocate benefits and sanctions, protect individual rights and freedoms,
establish regimes of fairness and predictability, express social values, and
educate people about all this. Thus, legal rules can be excellent tools for
achieving a variety of important goals.
While appreciating the valuable benefits of using rules as policy
instruments in many situations, this Article argues that we should normally
resist the temptation to make policies governing "alternative dispute
resolution"' (ADR) processes merely or primarily by adopting new rules.2
1 The term "alternative dispute resolution" is generally used to refer to a set of
dispute resolution processes, including mediation and arbitration, as well as a wide range
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Strategies that rely exclusively or primarily on regulation 3 can create
significant problems. In the name of promoting uniformity, regulation can
restrict or discourage legitimate choices by disputants and dispute resolution
of others such as early neutral evaluation, summary jury trials, and ombuds work. The
term is conceptually problematic but it is embedded in the vernacular and hard to avoid.
It raises empirical issues about which processes are most common and philosophical
issues about which processes do or should have greater value than others. These
discussions often seem unproductive and it is generally preferable to use the term
"dispute resolution," referring to all dispute resolution processes, including litigation. See
John Lande, Getting the Faith: Why Business Lawyers and Executives Believe in
Mediation, 5 HARV. NEGOT. L. REv. 137, 140 n.5 (2000) [hereinafter Lande, Getting the
Faith]; John Lande, Toward More Sophisticated Mediation Theory, 2000 J. Disp. RESOL.
321, 324-25 [hereinafter Lande, Sophisticated Theory]. Because this Article makes
distinctions based on use of court adjudication processes, it uses "ADR" in its
conventional meaning of processes other than traditional litigation. From this perspective,
one can think of ADR as a set of innovations intended to provide advantages over the
contemporary legal system. Past ADR experiments that were once radical (e.g., workers'
compensation, small claims courts, juvenile courts, arbitration, mediation, and even
medieval courts of equity) have become incorporated into the legal system and are now
generally taken for granted as normal parts of that system. See generally Thomas 0.
Main, ADR: The New Equity, 74 U. CiN. L. REv. 329 (2005) (arguing that ADR provides
relief from hardships of formal litigation similar to old courts of equity).
2 In this Article, legal rules refer to generalized prescriptions (and related provisions)
enforceable through court or other governmental processes. In the ADR context, this
obviously includes such things as laws requiring use of ADR procedures and rules
establishing evidentiary privileges and ethical requirements. Rules or standards adopted
by private professional associations may be used in court as evidence of the standard of
care in malpractice lawsuits. See Kathleen J. McKee, Annotation, Admissibility and
Effect of Evidence of Professional Ethics Rules in Legal Malpractice Action, 50 A.L.R.
5TH 301, 309 (1997) ("Although it is generally recognized that the intent of professional
ethical codes is to establish a disciplinary remedy rather than to create civil liability,
many courts have determined that pertinent ethical standards are admissible as evidence
relevant to the standard of care in legal malpractice actions..."); A.B.A., AM. ARB.
Ass'N. & ASs'N. FOR CONFLICT RESOL., MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR
MEDIATORS, NOTE ON CONSTRUCTION (Sept. 2005),
http://www.abanet.org/dispute/documents/modelstandardsconduct april2006.pdf
[hereinafter A.B.A. ET AL., MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS] ("[T]he
fact that these Standards have been adopted by the respective sponsoring entities, should
alert mediators to the fact that the Standards might be viewed as establishing a standard
of care for mediators."). The discussion of rules in this Article includes quasi-regulatory
policies-such as standards of private associations-that can be used to establish a legal
standard of care. For discussion of the consequences of enforceability of rules in crafting
policy through regulation, see infra Part II.C.2.
3 In this Article, "regulation" means use of rules as policy instruments.
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professionals.4 This would undermine a fundamental value of the ADR field
in promoting increased choice between dispute resolution alternatives. 5 Of
course, rules vary in the degree that they impose requirements and the degree
of uniformity or choice involved. Some rules impose complex and
demanding requirements and provide for substantial penalties for
noncompliance. Other rules do not impose any requirement of compliance
but rather offer opportunities for certain benefits for those who choose to
take advantage of the rule. Some rules operate as default conditions and
permit people to choose other options. Even the less-demanding rules
typically establish specified conditions to obtain the legally sanctioned
benefits. 6 In addition to affecting behavior by creating actual or potential
consequences, rules can also affect behavior by changing people's cognitive
patterns. Professors Paul DiMaggio and Walter Powell describe "coercive
isomorphism" as a form of institutionalization based on government rules or
practices.7 Institutional theories of organizations analyze how conceptions
become taken-for-granted notions with a "rule-like status in social thought
and action."8  DiMaggio and Powell write that "[i]nstitutionalized
arrangements are reproduced because individuals often cannot even conceive
of appropriate alternatives (or because they regard as unrealistic alternatives
they can imagine)." 9 When dealing with institutionalized ideas, people
operate based more on taken-for-granted understandings of the world than
4 The legal system and the ADR field have increasingly overlapped in recent years
so that they are inextricably intertwined in many places. In my view, litigation is an
important dispute resolution process and lawyers and judges are, by definition, dispute
resolution professionals even if they do not identify as part of the ADR field or support
use of ADR processes. See generally BERNARD S. MAYER, BEYOND NEUTRALITY:
CONFRONTING THE CRISIS IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION (2004) (arguing that ADR should not
be limited to functioning of professionals as neutrals). The ADR field is not limited to the
legal system, however. Many important ADR processes take place outside the legal
system and are conducted by professionals in other fields and by some people who do not
provide ADR services for a living.
5 For further discussion, see infra Part ll.B.
6 See infra notes 127-34 and accompanying text.
7 See Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional
Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields, 48 AM. Soc. REv. 147,
150-51 (1983).
8 See Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell, Introduction to THE NEW
INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS 1, 7-9 (Walter W. Powell & Paul J.
DiMaggio eds., 1991). For discussion of the related phenomenon of a "constitutive"
function of law, see infra notes 118-19.
9 DiMaggio & Powell, supra note 8, at 10-11.
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self-conscious analyses.' 0  Thus, rather than promoting "reflective
practice,""l l regulation can promote unreflective practice, when practitioners
increasingly operate "on automatic." This real problem was recently
described as the "capitulat[ion] to the routine" in ADR.12
In addition, invoking government power to establish ADR policy can
increase the risk of developing orthodox dispute resolution ideologies by
officially favoring certain procedures and disfavoring others. This risks
inhibiting the development of innovations and the availability of a variety of
options. This risk is heightened when rules are developed by experts based
more on their own philosophies than a systematic assessment of disputants'
needs and interests.13
Of course, some regulation of ADR is quite appropriate, including some
rules that limit certain choices and authorize serious legal consequences. This
Article argues that it is appropriate in some circumstances to regulate use of
ADR communications in court, regulate the relationship between ADR
processes and the courts, protect dispute resolution consumers, and establish
default rules. 14 For example, rules are appropriate to prohibit admissibility in
court of certain mediation communications, require parties to attend
mediation (and punish noncompliance), require that dispute resolution
practitioners obtain informed consent from clients in many situations, and
establish default procedures based on experience with problems due to lack
of established procedures.' 5
Just as society encourages people to use trials only after exploring other
processes for resolving disputes, ADR policymakers 16 should adopt new
10 For further discussion of institutional theory, see Lande, Getting the Faith, supra
note 1, at 153-55.
1 'See infra Part II.C.5.
12 See Christopher Honeyman, Prologue: Observations of Capitulation to the
Routine, 108 PENN ST. L. REV. 9 (2003); see generally Symposium, Interdisciplinary
Collaboration and the Beauty of Surprise: A Symposium Introduction, 108 PENN ST. L.
REV. 1 (2003) (discussing problems related to routinization of ADR).
13 See infra Part II.C.
14 See infra Part II.C.4.
15 Id.
16 For the purpose of this Article, policymakers include, but are not limited, to
rulemakers. Thus this includes legislatures, courts, government agencies, and
authoritative professional organizations (such as the American Bar Association Section of
Dispute Resolution and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws) whose policies may be implemented through government processes. See Dispute
Resolution Policies, A.B.A. SEC. DisP. RESOL.,
http://www.abanet.org/dispute/webpolicy.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2007) (listing ADR
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rules only after analyzing the applicable dispute system and considering the
benefits and limits of nonregulatory means of achieving ADR policy goals. 17
Nonregulatory approaches include training for disputants and professionals,
dispute referral mechanisms, technical assistance for ADR organizations, and
grievance mechanisms for parties in ADR processes, among others. 18 The
most effective strategies are likely to involve a coordinated combination of
such options. 19 ADR policymakers should generally begin by considering
nonregulatory options and adopt regulatory options only to the extent needed
to accomplish desired goals.20
In addition to describing types of substantive policy options that
policymakers should adopt, this Article outlines a general approach to
policymaking, including the following principles. Policymakers should use a
dispute system design framework in analyzing policy options, which includes
assessment of disputants' needs and interests. 21  Practitioners and
policymakers should generally provide a range of suitable choices of dispute
resolution processes for individual disputants and system stakeholders. 22
Dispute resolution professionals should maintain appropriate relationships
between innovative ADR processes and the contemporary dispute resolution
system. 23 These recommendations are intended to promote the related values
of process pluralism 24 and good decisionmaking about dispute resolution by
parties and professionals.
policy recommendations). Recommendations in this Article directed to policymakers also
apply to proponents of ADR policies.
17 See infra Part II.C.
18 For a more detailed list, see infra note 91 and accompanying text.
19 See infra Part II.C.
20 See infra Part II.C.
21 See infra Part II.A.
22 See infra Part ll.B.
23 See infra Part II.D.
24 See Lande, Getting the Faith, supra note 1, at 147-51, 227-29 (describing
"process pluralist" ideology consisting of an "interrelated set of beliefs that embrace the
availability and acceptability of a wide range of goals, norms, procedures, results,
professional roles, skills, and styles in handling disputes involving legal issues" so that
"many different features of disputing processes can be manipulated and customized for
each dispute"). For further discussion of process pluralism, see infra notes 56, 94, and
accompanying text.
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B. Collaborative Law
To illustrate the preceding principles, this Article analyzes Professor
Christopher Fairman's proposal 25 for a new ethical rule 26 for "Collaborative
Law"27 (CL) and contrasts it with a proposal by Professor Scott Peppet.2 8
25 See Christopher M. Fairman, A Proposed Model Rule for Collaborative Law, 21
OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 73 (2005). Others share Fairman's position advocating new
rules for CL. For example, Zachery Annable argues that "it would probably be best to
push for the implementation of new ethical standards to accommodate ADR processes
like collaborative lawyering." Zachery Z. Annable, Comment, Beyond the
Thunderdome-The Search for a New Paradigm of Modern Dispute Resolution: The
Advent of Collaborative Lawyering and its Conformity with the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, 29 J. LEGAL PROF. 157, 168 (2004-2005). Elizabeth Strickland
advocates adoption of CL statutes arguing that this "would further legitimize the process
and address some of these ethical problems by providing procedures for limiting the
scope of representation, guaranteeing confidentiality, and obtaining informed consent, to
name a few." Elizabeth K. Strickland, Comment, Putting "Counselor" Back in the
Lawyer's Job Description: Why More States Should Adopt Collaborative Law Statutes,
84 N.C. L. REV. 979, 1001 (2006). Professor Larry Spain "questions whether current
ethical rules can accommodate this new collaborative law model of practice." Larry R.
Spain, Collaborative Law: A Critical Reflection on Whether a Collaborative Orientation
Can Be Ethically Incorporated into the Practice of Law, 56 BAYLOR L. REV. 141, 156
(2004). Spain does not express a definite conclusion but suggests that "[i]t may be that
the existing rules of professional conduct for lawyers must be redefined... ." Id. at 172-
73. Fairman makes an important contribution to the literature by articulating a detailed
rationale for and proposed text of a new rule.
26 In this Article, "ethical rules" or "general ethical rules" refer to rules adopted by
states or state bar associations governing the conduct of lawyers generally, such as rules
following the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. Ethical rules adopted by other
entities, such as specialized professional associations, for example, supra note 2, are not
included in generic references to "ethical rules."
27 "Collaborative Law" is actually a multi-disciplinary process that often involves
professionals working in teams that include financial, mental health, and child
development experts. See generally Susan Gamache, Collaborative Practice: A New
Opportunity to Address Children's Best Interest in Divorce, 65 LA. L. REV. 1455 (2005)
(describing the functioning of a team of Collaborative professionals). Thus, it is often
more appropriate to refer to "Collaborative Practice" rather than "Collaborative Law."
Nonetheless, the term "Collaborative Law" is generally used in this Article because it
focuses primarily on the regulation of lawyers in the Collaborative Process.
This Article also adopts the convention of capitalizing these terms to distinguish the
formal process from processes that are generally collaborative but that do not include the
formal elements of Collaborative Practice as described, infra, at notes 29-31 and
accompanying text.
28 See Scott R. Peppet, Lawyers' Bargaining Ethics, Contract, and Collaboration:
The End of the Legal Profession and the Beginning of Professional Pluralism, 90 IOWA
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This Article argues that Professor Peppet's proposal is generally preferable
because it is more consistent with the principles presented in this Article,
though both proposals would benefit by following those principles to a
greater extent.
In CL, the lawyers and clients sign a "participation agreement"
committing to use an interest-based approach to negotiation 29 from the outset
of the case and provide full disclosure of all relevant information. 30 A key
element of the participation agreement is the "disqualification agreement,"
which stipulates that both CL lawyers would be disqualified from
representing the clients if the case is litigated.31 The disqualification
L. REv. 475 (2005). Peppet's proposal would apply to CL as well as many other
lawyering arrangements. See infra Part III.B.
29 An interest-based approach-sometimes called a "problem-solving" approach-
involves identification and selection of options maximizing the interests of all the parties.
People begin by identifying interests and developing options for mutual gain and then
select the best option. See ROGER FISHER ET AL., GETTING TO YES 40-80 (2d ed. 1991);
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of
Problem-Solving, 31 UCLA L. REv. 754, 794-829 (1984). This contrasts with a
traditional, positional-or adversarial-approach, in which each side sets extreme
aspiration levels and makes a series of strategic offers and counter-offers intended to
result in a resolution as close as possible to that side's initial aspiration. Typically, each
side makes small concessions to maximize its adversarial advantage. See FISHER ET AL.,
supra, at 4-7. An interest-based approach relies more on reason than threat and has the
potential to "create value" by identifying and satisfying the interests of all the parties. See
id. at 81-84. For additional cites, see John Lande, Possibilities for Collaborative Law:
Ethics and Practice of Lawyer Disqualification and Process Control in a New Model of
Lawyering, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1315, 1319 n.6 (2003).
30 See Lande, supra note 29, at 1318-28.
31 See id. at 1322 n.20. Some CL practitioners prefer the term "withdrawal
agreement" or "collaborative commitment" instead of "disqualification agreement,"
believing that those terms more accurately reflect the arrangement, avoid confusion with
disqualification under conflict of interest rules, or project a more positive image.
Although the two CL statutes that have been enacted to date use the term "withdraw"
instead of "disqualification," the court would effectively disqualify the lawyers if CL
lawyers attempted to represent CL clients in court. See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50-76(c)
(West 2006) ("If a civil action is filed or set for trial .... the attorneys representing the
parties in the collaborative law proceedings may not represent either party in any further
civil proceedings and shall withdraw as attorney for either party."); TEx. FAM. CODE
ANN. § 6.603(b) (Vernon, 2006) ("The parties' counsel may not serve as litigation
counsel .... "); id. at § 6.603(c)(4) ("A collaborative law agreement must include
provisions for... withdrawal of all counsel involved in the collaborative law procedure if
the collaborative law procedure does not result in settlement of the dispute."). This
Article uses the term "disqualification agreement" to reflect this reality as well as
common usage in the CIL community, ethics opinions, and published literature. See, e.g.,
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agreement is intended to motivate lawyers and clients to focus exclusively on
negotiation, as the termination of a CL negotiation ends the CL lawyers'
engagement and requires both clients to hire new lawyers (if they want legal
representation). 32 Although CL doctrine could apply in many types of cases,
virtually all of the cases have been in family law matters.33 The Collaborative
Movement has grown dramatically since its founding in 1990 and has
developed an impressive infrastructure of local practice groups, 34 general and
specialized trainings, 35 law school course offerings, 36 ethical codes, 37
NANCY J. CAMERON, COLLABORATIVE PRACTICE: DEEPENING THE DIALOGUE 276-77
(2004); SHEILA M. GUTrERMAN, COLLABORATIVE LAW: A NEW MODEL FOR DISPUTE
RESOLUTION 52-54 (2004); RICHARD W. SHIELDS ET AL., COLLABORATIVE FAMILY LAW:
ANOTHER WAY TO RESOLVE FAMILY DISPUTES 246 (2003); PAULINE H. TESLER,
COLLABORATIVE LAW: ACHIEVING EFFECTIVE RESOLUTION IN DIVORCE WITHOUT
LITIGATION 6, 146 (2001).
32 See Lande, supra note 29, at 1322-24. Fairman and CL practitioners argue that
the disqualification agreement is the central source of power of their process. See
Fairman, supra note 25, at 80 (arguing that "the disqualification provision provides the
real force behind collaborative law"). The development of local practice culture through
the operation of local CL groups may be even more significant in producing good effects
than the disqualification agreement. Practitioner David Hoffman, who has handled cases
with and without a disqualification agreement, argues that the "chemistry, intentions, and
skill of the participants" is more critical to the success of a negotiation process than
whether the parties use the disqualification agreement or not. See David A. Hoffman,
Cooperative Negotiation Agreements: Using Contracts to Make a Safe Place for a
Difficult Conversation, in INNOVATIONS IN FAMILY LAW PRACTICE (Nancy ver Steegh &
Kelly Browe Olson eds., forthcoming 2007). See also infra note 62 and accompanying
text (describing Cooperative Law, which does not use disqualification agreements).
33 For an excellent analysis explaining why parties have not used CL in business
cases, including resistance to the disqualification agreement, see David A. Hoffman,
Collaborative Law in the World of Business, COLLABORATIVE REV., Winter 2004, at 1.
For suggestions to adapt CL for civil cases, see John Lande, Negotiation: Evading
Evasion: How Protocols Can Improve Civil Case Results, 21 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH
COST LITIG. 149 (2003). For further discussion, see infra Part III.C. 1.d.
34 See Int'l Acad. Collaborative Prof., Locate a Collaborative Practice Group,
http://www.collaborativepractice.com/t2.asp?T=LocateGroup (last visited Feb. 5, 2007).
35 See Int'l Acad. Collaborative Prof., Collaborative Practice Events and Trainings,
http://www.collaborativepractice.com/t2.asp?T=Calendar (last visited Feb. 5, 2007). CL
practice groups typically provide regular continuing education and require members to
attend such sessions. See Lande, supra note 29, at 1326 n.29.
36 See Lande, supra note 29, at 1327-28 (identifying earliest law school courses on
CL).
37 See, e.g., Int'l Acad. Collaborative Prof., Standards, Ethics and Principles,
http://www.collaborativepractice.com/t2.asp?T=Ethics (last visited Feb. 5, 2007).
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professional associations,38 websites,39 articles,40 and books.41 Collaborative
practice groups have developed public relations strategies 42 and have
received much favorable publicity. 43
Many CL practitioners have devoted great effort to develop this
significant new model of practice, which is designed to make the interest-
based approach the norm in negotiation. Getting people to use an interest-
based approach instead of the traditional, positional approach has been a
difficult problem. ADR experts have provided helpful suggestions for
"changing the game," though these are usually limited to case-by-case efforts
within a culture of adversarial negotiation." CL is an ingenious mechanism
to generally reverse the traditional presumption that negotiators will use
adversarial negotiation. In addition, it develops a new legal culture by
institutionalizing local practice groups and has great potential to develop
more reflective practice.45 The ADR field has much to learn from CL's
achievements and challenges.
Professor Fairman proposes that the American Bar Association (ABA)
adopt a new ethical rule specifically for CL.46 This Article argues that a new
rule is not necessary and that adopting such a rule prematurely may actually
inhibit useful innovations in practice. It argues that Professor Fairman's
proposal assumes that adopting a new rule is the best way to regulate
behavior in ADR processes, even though ADR is generally intended to
promote greater freedom in decisionmaking rather than greater reliance on
38 See Int'l Acad. Collaborative Prof., Collaborative Practice Events and Trainings,
http://www.collaborativepractice.com/t2.asp?T=Calendar (last visited Feb. 5, 2007).
39 See Int'l Acad. Collaborative Prof., Links,
http://www.collaborativepractice.com/t2.asp?T=LinksPro (last visited Feb. 5, 2007).
40 See Lande, supra note 29, at 1326 n.30; Int'l Acad. Collaborative Prof.,
Resources: Articles, http://www.collaborativepractice.com/t2.asp?T=ArticlesPro (last
visited Feb. 5, 2007).
41 See CAMERON, supra note 31; GUTTERMAN, supra note 31; SHIELDS ET AL., supra
note 31; TESLER, supra note 31.
42 See Int'l Acad. Collaborative Prof., Public Education Committee,
http://www.collaborativepractice.com/t2.asp?T=PublicEd (last visited Feb. 5, 2007).
43 A search for the term "collaborative law" in the "allnews" database in Westlaw
yielded 162 documents (last visited Feb. 5, 2007).
44 See, e.g., FISHER ET AL., supra note 29, at 107-28; ROBERT H. MNOOKIN ET AL.,
BEYOND WINNING: NEGOTIATION TO CREATE VALUE IN DEALS AND DISPUTES 207-20
(2000); WILLIAM L. URY, GETTING PAST NO: NEGOTIATING YOUR WAY FROM
CONFRONTATION TO COOPERATION 67 (1993).
45 See infra Part II.C.5 for discussion of reflective practice.
46 See Fairman, supra note 25, at 116-22.
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legal rules. 47
Some rules are necessary and appropriate in policymaking about CL, and
thus the issue is not whether to have rules. Indeed, as Professor Fairman
demonstrates, many ethical rules already regulate lawyers' CL services, and
bar association ethics committees have applied those rules to CL.4 8 Thus the
issue is whether it is necessary or wise to adopt a new and uniform rule now.
This Article argues that other, nonregulatory mechanisms are likely to be
more appropriate in managing people's behavior in CL. Establishing new
rules may have the unintended effect of inhibiting people from developing
and using appropriate techniques because certain issues will have been
settled by official rules.
Though much of the second half of this Article consists of a detailed
critique of Professor Fairman's proposal, it is useful to begin by highlighting
some areas of agreement. We both share a strong commitment to the goals of
the CL movement. We want to encourage lawyers to help clients negotiate
constructively and to make informed agreements that address clients' most
important concerns. We believe that it is important to provide appropriate
processes to help clients work through difficult conflicts to achieve these
goals. We agree that it is important that CL practice is well-grounded in
ethical rules within the legal profession, which provides an important
foundation for legal practice. However, we agree to disagree, in part, about
the best way to practically accomplish these goals-and we hope that this
discussion will help the CL movement and ADR field develop wise and
effective policies to achieve them.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part II outlines a general approach to
policymaking about ADR, articulating four general principles for designing
dispute systems and optimal procedures and processes for disputants
involved in these systems. Part III illustrates these principles by applying
them to Professor Fairman's and Professor Peppet's proposals. Part IV offers
a brief conclusion.
II. RECOMMENDED PRINCIPLES FOR POLICYMAKING ABOUT ADR
A. Use of Dispute System Design Analysis with an Ecological
Perspective of Dispute Resolution
One can think of policymaking as planning to manage a class of
47 See infra Parts II.B, III.C. 1, 3.
48 See Fairman, supra note 25, at 84-116. For discussion of the ethics committee
opinions about CL, see infra Parts III.C. 1 .b, c.
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situations in the future. The ADR field has developed a subfield for
policymaking about disputing, called "dispute system design" (DSD).49 DSD
focuses on systematically managing a series of disputes rather than handling
individual disputes on an ad hoc basis. Private businesses use it to manage
conflicts with employees, customers, and suppliers. 50 Courts and government
agencies use similar processes as well.51 In general, DSD involves assessing
the needs of disputants and other stakeholders 52 in the system, planning a
system to address those needs, providing necessary training and education for
disputants and relevant dispute resolution professionals, implementing the
system, evaluating it, and making periodic modifications as needed.53 A full-
fledged DSD effort may not be feasible in many situations because it would
require more time, effort, and other resources than available or appropriate.
ADR policymakers should consider using DSD procedures and principles as
much as feasible given their circumstances.
Policymakers should analyze potential policies in the context of the
overall dispute resolution system and not merely focus on the policies in
49 For a brief overview of DSD, see John Lande, Using Dispute System Design
Methods to Promote Good-Faith Participation in Court-Connected Mediation Programs,
50 UCLA L. REV. 69, 112-17 (2002). Important recent contributions to this field include
Lisa B. Bingham, Control over Dispute-System Design and Mandatory Commercial
Arbitration, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 221 (2004); Amy J. Cohen & Ellen E. Deason,
Comparative Considerations: Toward the Global Transfer of Ideas About Dispute System
Design, DIsP. RESOL. MAG., Spring 2006, at 23; Richard C. Reuben, Democracy and
Dispute Resolution: Systems Design and the New Workplace, 10 HARv. NEGOT. L. REV.
11(2005).
50 For example, General Electric, Shell Oil, and Halliburton companies used DSD
procedures to revise their dispute systems. See KARL A. SLAIKEU & RALPH H. HASSON,
CONTROLLING THE COSTS OF CONFLICT: HOW TO DESIGN A SYSTEM FOR YOUR
ORGANIZATION 64-74 (1998).
51 See Lande, supra note 49, at 110-16.
52 Stakeholders are those whose interests would be affected by a decision or action.
In the context of dispute resolution, stakeholders might include, but are not necessarily
limited to, disputants, dispute resolution professionals, public or private organizations,
and communities. Dispute resolution professionals might include lawyers, neutrals,
judges, and other court personnel, among others. See generally CATHY A. COSTANTINO &
CHRISTINA SICKLES MERCHANT, DESIGNING CONFLICT MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS: A GUIDE
TO CREATING PRODUCTIVE AND HEALTHY ORGANIZATIONS 49-66 (1996) (describing
stakeholders generally).
53 See generally id.; DAVID B. LIPSKY ET AL., EMERGING SYSTEMS FOR MANAGING
WORKPLACE CONFLICT: LESSONS FROM AMERICAN CORPORATIONS FOR MANAGERS AND
DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROFESSIONALS (2003); SLAIKEU & HASSON, supra note 50;
WILLIAM L. URY ET AL., GETTING DISPUTES RESOLVED: DESIGNING SYSTEMS TO CUT THE
COSTS OF CONFLICT (1988).
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isolation. In developing ADR policies, the goal should be to improve the
system as a whole rather than promote a particular ADR process. 54 Marc
Galanter and Mia Cahill illustrate a systemic perspective using the concept of
"ecology" of disputing,55 noting that "all components of the intricate ecology
of disputing are linked in complex and sometimes paradoxical ways to what
courts do."'5 6
Unfortunately, many dispute resolution professionals do not have such a
systemic mindset. Some of us promote our favorite processes as if the goal is
to compete in a contest for best process rather than to develop a good overall
system. For example, some generally favor ADR over litigation and others
have the opposite preferences. There is similar competitiveness between
families and species of ADR processes, with passionate fans touting
mediation over arbitration or facilitative mediation over evaluative mediation
(and vice versa).57 Some Collaborative practitioners, proclaiming that CL
54 Costantino and Merchant advocate a systems perspective in DSD, focusing on the
full range of processes within a given organization that is designing a system. See
COSTANTINO & MERCHANT, supra note 52, at 22-24. This Article proposes expanding
that notion to encompass relevant processes outside the organization as well. For
example, if a business is designing a system to handle employee complaints, it should
consider the range of external processes available (such as litigation and private ADR) in
addition to the processes within the business.
55 See Marc Galanter, Adjudication, Litigation, and Related Phenomena, in LAW
AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 160-64 (Leon Lipson & Stanton Wheeler eds., 1986). For
further discussion of this concept, see generally John Lande, Shifting the Focus From the
Myth of "The Vanishing Trial" to Complex Conflict Management Systems, or I Learned
Almost Everything I Need to Know About Conflict Resolution From Marc Galanter, 6
CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 191 (2005) (describing an "ecological" perspective of
dispute resolution).
56 Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, "Most Cases Settle": Judicial Promotion and
Regulation of Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1339, 1391 (1994). An ecological
perspective is related to calls for "pluralistic" approaches to dispute resolution. See e.g.,
Robert A. Baruch Bush, One Size Does Not Fit All: A Pluralistic Approach to Mediator
Performance Testing and Quality Assurance, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 965 (2004);
John Lande, How Will Lawyering and Mediation Practices Transform Each Other?, 24
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 839, 874-78 (1997) (advocating a pluralistic approach to mediation);
Lande, Getting the Faith, supra note 1, at 147-51, 227-29 (defining "process
pluralism"); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Peace and Justice: Notes on the Evolution and
Purposes of Legal Processes, 94 GEO. L.J. 553 (2006) (favoring "process pluralism").
Sociologist Andrew Abbott provides a helpful theoretical framework, describing an
interdependent "system of professions" which focuses on the jurisdictional boundaries
between related professions in analyzing the system as a whole. See ANDREW ABBOTT,
THE SYSTEM OF PROFESSIONS: AN ESSAY ON THE DIVISION OF EXPERT LABOR (1988).
57 See Lande, Sophisticated Theory, supra note 1, at 325-330.
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represents a "paradigm shift," 58 assert its general superiority over mediation
and traditional litigation-and some CL practitioners describe litigation as if
it is a plague. 59 This is part of a general pattern within the dispute resolution
field in which people promote orthodoxies that portray disputing processes as
carriers of good or evil.60 Although these views are generally quite sincere
and are often framed in terms of disputants' interests, that is beside the point.
The point is that, using an ecological mindset, we should focus on promoting
a healthy system with a variety of desirable dispute resolution species to
choose from. Although some might use the ecology metaphor to suggest a
vicious jungle where species ruthlessly compete for survival, we should
instead choose a concept of creating and managing an environment where
species generally coexist harmoniously. 61 From the latter perspective, the
dispute resolution field should nurture all of the species (including litigation)
to function optimally. In more concrete terms, the goal should be to maintain
a system that offers many different high-quality processes including
mediation, arbitration, Collaborative Law, Cooperative Law,62 and court
58 See Lande, supra note 29, at 1317 n.2 (collecting references to claims that CL
represents a "paradigm shift").
59 See JULIE MACFARLANE, THE EMERGING PHENOMENON OF COLLABORATIVE
FAMILY LAW (CFL): A QUALITATIVE STUDY OF CFL CASES 5-6, at 24 (2005), http://
canada.justice.gc.ca/en/ps/pad/reports/2005-FCY-l/2005-FCY- 1.pdf (stating that the
"intensity of the revulsion expressed toward litigation is sometimes startling").
Macfarlane also describes a "sibling rivalry" that many Collaborative practitioners feel
toward mediation. See id. at 73-75.
60 See Lande, supra note 56, at 854-58 (criticizing "single-school" philosophies of
mediation and advocating, instead, a pluralist approach). Macfarlane raises a similar
concern about CL, arguing that "if CFL [collaborative family law] is to develop integrity
as a process choice for family transitions-particularly as a process that trumpets the
autonomous decisionmaking role of the client-it is critical to remove the taint of
ideology...." MACFARLANE, supra note 59, at 35-36.
61 Abbott's description of an ongoing series of competitions between occupational
groups to control professional jurisdictions is more consistent with the jungle than the
stewardship metaphor. See ABBOTT, supra note 56, at 69-79. He describes contests
between professionals who normally assume a single role, such as in competition
between doctors and nurses or lawyers and accountants. By contrast, in the dispute
resolution field, practitioners often assume multiple roles, which might include two or
more of the following roles, among others: traditional lawyer, Collaborative Lawyer,
Cooperative Lawyer, neutral evaluator, mediator, arbitrator, and private judge. The fact
that dispute resolution practitioners need not operate solely in a single professional role
creates opportunities for greater identification with the overall dispute resolution field
and can lessen the competitive pressures to some extent.
62 Cooperative Law is a process that includes the features of CL other than the
disqualification agreement. See John Lande & Gregg Herman, Fitting the Forum to the
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services (including trials), among others, so that parties can choose between
good alternatives that have varying advantages and disadvantages, as
described in the next Part.63 It is unrealistic to expect that every proposal for
ADR policy will include a systemic analysis of how the proposed policy
would fit into or affect the relevant dispute resolution system. Nonetheless, it
is an ideal worth striving to achieve when feasible.
B. Provision of a Variety of Desirable Processes for Disputants and
System Stakeholders
As a corollary to the principle that the ADR field should provide a
variety of desirable options, it should engage representatives of parties and
other stakeholders in decisions about dispute resolution processes as much as
appropriate. This principle applies to handling individual cases as well as
developing general ADR policies.
1. Provision of Procedural Options for Disputants in Individual
Cases
Dispute resolution professionals serving clients should help the clients
evaluate process options that might reasonably satisfy the clients' interests
Family Fuss: Choosing Mediation, Collaborative Law, or Cooperative Law for
Negotiating Divorce Cases, 42 FAM. CT. REV. 280 (2004); MID-MO. COLLABORATIVE &
COOPERATIVE L. Ass'N, CHOOSING COLLABORATIVE OR COOPERATIVE LAW (2006),
http://www.mmccla.org/choosingccl.pdf. For examples of Cooperative Law
participation agreements, see BOSTON L. COLLABORATIVE, COOPERATIVE PROCESS
AGREEMENT (2006), http://www.bostonlawcollaborative.com/documents/2006-02-
cooperative-process-agreement.pdf; DIVORCE COOPERATION INST., COOPERATIVE
DIVORCE AGREEMENT, http://cooperativedivorce.org/members/cdagreement04.pdf (last
visited Feb. 5, 2007); MID-MO. COLLABORATIVE & COOPERATIVE L. ASs'N,
PARTICIPATION AGREEMENT IN COOPERATIVE LAW PROCESS,
http://www.mmccla.org/cooppartic.pdf (last visited Feb. 5, 2007). This author has
advised the Mid-Mo. Collaborative & Cooperative L. Ass'n.
Some CL practitioners dismiss Cooperative Law as being no different than
traditional practice, which is obviously untrue considering that lawyers do not
traditionally use written participation agreements, lawyers traditionally use positional
negotiation rather than interest-based negotiation, and the parties generally are not
actively involved in traditional negotiation.
63 See generally Lande & Herman, supra note 62 (analyzing advantages and
disadvantages of various dispute resolution processes).
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and should not simply steer clients to the professionals' favorite process.64
Moreover, within a given process, dispute resolution professionals should
encourage party decisionmaking as much as the parties desire and is
appropriate in particular circumstances. 65
Standard I.A of the recently revised Model Standards Practice for
Mediators nicely articulates the principle of promoting procedural
decisionmaking in individual cases. It states that:
A mediator shall conduct a mediation based on the principle of party self-
determination. Self-determination is the act of coming to a voluntary,
uncoerced decision in which each party makes free and informed choices as
to process and outcome. Parties may exercise self-determination at any
stage of a mediation, including mediator selection, process design,
participation in or withdrawal from the process, and outcomes. 66
Professor Leonard Riskin's recent revision of his grid provides an
elaborate framework for such decisionmaking, including decisions about
substantive and procedural issues as well as what he calls "meta-procedural"
64 This recommendation reflects a general policy value and not an opinion about
professional ethical duties, which involve many issues beyond the scope of this Article.
Professor Marshall Breger provides a thoughtful analysis of ethical authorities throughout
the U.S. about whether lawyers have an ethical duty to advise clients about ADR options.
See Marshall J. Breger, Should an Attorney be Required to Advise a Client of ADR
Options?, 13 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 427 (2000). See also Robert F. Cochran, Jr., ADR,
The ABA, and Client Control: A Proposal That the Model Rules Require Lawyers to
Present ADR Options to Clients, 41 S. TEX. L. REv. 183 (1999). Breger argues that the
language of the authorities is often unclear and that some establish explicit or implicit
duties and other authorities are merely "precatory." See Breger, supra, at 428-36, 452-
57.
65 See Lande, supra note 55, at 857-79 (recommending a process for identification
and analysis of appropriate options to promote "high-quality consent"); Lande,
Sophisticated Theory, supra note 1, at 325 n.25 (suggesting the term high-quality
"decisionmaking" rather than "consent").
6 6 A.B.A. ET AL., MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS, supra note 2
(emphasis added). As the Reporter's Notes to the Model Standards indicate, this new
version of the standards makes an important addition to the prior version which "focuses
exclusively on exercising self-determination with respect to outcome; it is silent with
regard to such matters as mediator selection, designing procedural aspects of the
mediation process to suit individual needs, and choosing whether to participate in or
withdraw from the process." Joseph P. Stulberg, Reporter's Notes, Model Standards of
Conduct for Mediators (Sept. 9, 2005),
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/programs/adr/msoc/pdf/reportersnotes-092005final.pdf.
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issues (i.e., decisions about how procedural decisions will be made). 67
Riskin's new grid recognizes that mediation involves decisions about many
procedural issues and that the parties may be more or less involved in those
decisions. Procedural decisions include: (1) the purposes of the mediation
and definition of the problems to be mediated; (2) roles of mediators,
lawyers, and clients; (3) logistics of the mediation (e.g., location, time, use of
pre-mediation submissions, availability of food); (4) attendance of particular
individuals; and (5) procedures used during mediation (e.g., use of positional
or interest-based approach, use of opening statements, caucuses, process for
developing and exchanging offers, evaluative statements by mediators,
drafting agreements). 68 As Riskin points out, it is not always appropriate or
desirable for parties to make all the procedural and meta-procedural
decisions in their cases, but it is appropriate to consider engaging them in
procedural decisionmaking. 69 For some mediators (and advocates in
mediation) this would represent a significant shift because they have narrow
views about the legitimacy of various procedures and client participation in
67 See Leonard L. Riskin, Decisionmaking in Mediation: The New Old Grid and the
New New Grid System, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 34-51 (2003).
68Id. at 35-37 (categorization and numbering added). Somewhat similarly,
Professor Michael Moffitt proposes to increase procedural decisionmaking in litigation.
See Michael L. Moffitt, Customized Litigation: The Case for Making Civil Procedure
Negotiable, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2007), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cftn?abstractid=88822 1.
69 Riskin, supra note 67, at 49. Riskin writes:
I believe there is often much to be gained-in terms of self-determination and
the quality of process and outcome--fiom establishing an explicit decisionmaking
process that offers the opportunity for all, or most, participants to influence
important substantive, procedural and meta-procedural issues. And I hope that this
Article encourages such processes by enhancing awareness of decisionmaking
options. But many mediations that lack explicit decisionmaking about procedural
and meta-procedural issues work fine. A choice to make procedural and meta-
procedural decisionmaking more open and inclusive carries costs in terms of time,
energy and financial expenditures. It also presents risks of undermining the
efficiency and focus of a mediation and the ability of a mediator to act quickly. So
resolving the issue of openness in decisionmaking requires a delicate balance. I do
not seek to make that balance, only to mention it.
Id. at 49. See also Chris Guthrie, Panacea or Pandora's Box?: The Costs of Options in
Negotiation, 88 IOWA L. REV. 601 (2003) (arguing that people may make poor decisions
when presented with too many options or irrelevant options if it causes them to become
overwhelmed or confused).
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procedural decisionmaking. 70  As an example of soliciting parties'
participation in procedural decisionmaking, Professor Lela Love and
mediator Jack Cooley propose a process for eliciting parties' consent for
mediators to give evaluative input in a mediation.7 1
Professor Julie Macfarlane found that CL practitioners vary in the extent
to which they encourage clients to consider other processes. Some
practitioners make a point of providing a balanced analysis of the process
options, sometimes even expressing a preference for mediation, whereas
others "candidly acknowledge that they do not really think about mediation
any longer as an alternative."'72 Very few CL practitioners suggest that clients
consider a Cooperative Process even though it might better serve interests in
speedy resolution of some issues, reduction in risk of increased cost in the
event of litigation, and maintaining a relationship with their lawyers.73
Practitioners should exercise their professional judgment, which can
appropriately involve general preferences for some processes over others in
particular situations. Practitioners should, however, give clients advice based
primarily on the clients' particular circumstances and interests and not as
much based on the practitioners' values.
2. Design of Dispute Systems to Provide Choices of Process
Options
When developing dispute resolution processes generally (i.e., not
selecting procedures in particular cases as described in the preceding Part),
professionals should consider a variety of processes to satisfy parties'
varying interests and preferences. In an open letter to members of the
International Academy of Collaborative Professionals (IACP), practitioner
David Hoffman expresses this principle vividly:
70 See supra note 60 and accompanying text (discussing orthodoxy about dispute
resolution processes).
71 See Lela P. Love & John W. Cooley, The Intersection of Evaluation by Mediators
and Informed Consent: Warning the Unwary, 21 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 45 (2005).
72 MACFARLANE, supra note 59, at 74.
73 See Hoffman, supra note 32. Hoffman describes one case he handled in which the
parties used CL but would have been better served by a Cooperative Process so that they
could have retained their lawyers and gotten an expeditious decision on a critical issue.
He describes two other cases where the parties were well served by using a Cooperative
Process because they were not confident whether they could reach agreement or wanted
to avoid the risk of hiring new lawyers if they needed to go to court. Id
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As professionals, . . . we have a duty to inform our clients about the full
range of options, and as a professional organization, we should be helping
our members carry out that responsibility.... Let a thousand flowers bloom
and let IACP be the garden in which the best of those flowers are nurtured
and grown. To say that our garden should grow only one variety-even if it
is a strikingly attractive bloom-will simply force those who want to
cultivate a wider variety to create other gardens.
74
Uniformity of dispute resolution practices is the opposite of providing
variety. Some people believe in a value of uniformity of practices
generally, 75 which limits choices by definition. Uniformity is certainly
appropriate in some situations. For example, when the government imposes
criminal sanctions, it is quite appropriate to use fairly uniform standards.76 In
an ADR context, the drafters of the Uniform Mediation Act made a
74 David Hoffman, An Open Letter to the Collaborative Practice Community and
IACP (International Academy of Collaborative Professionals) (Sept. 2006),
http://www.bostonlawcollaborative.com/documents/Letter-toCPCommunity and IAC
P.doc (last visited Feb. 5, 2007).
75 For many people, especially lawyers, uniformity has an intuitive symbolic value.
Professor Thomas Main describes it this way: "Whether because of the lure of simplicity,
the appearance of neutrality, the likeness to science, the feel of efficiency, the imprimatur
of professionalism or some combination of these, the norm of procedural uniformity
enjoys virtually universal approval." Thomas 0. Main, Procedural Uniformity and the
Exaggerated Role of Rules: A Survey of Intra-State Uniformity in Three States That Have
Not Adopted the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 46 VILL. L. REV. 311, 311-12 (2001)
(footnotes omitted). Such uniformity of rules is frequently illusory, however. Professor
Marc Galanter writes that our legal system is structured to "permit[ ] unification and
universalism at the symbolic level and diversity and particularism at the operating level."
Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves " Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal
Change, 9 LAW & SOc'Y REV. 95, 148 (1974).
In the mediation context, an impulse for uniformity often arises as a desire for a
single, uniform definition of mediation. For example, Professors Kimberlee Kovach and
Lela Love argued for a single standard of acceptable mediation as follows. "To develop
rules, standards, ethical norms and certification requirements, legislators and
administrators need well-defined and uniform processes. Similarly, meaningful program
evaluations require uniformity .... 'Mediation' should mean the same thing from state to
state, and from one court to another within a state." Kimberlee K. Kovach & Lela P.
Love, "Evaluative" Mediation is an Oxymoron, 14 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG.
31, 32 (1996). In the CL context, Strickland advocates adoption of CL statutes to promote
uniformity of practices. See Strickland, supra note 25, at 999, 1002.
76 See, e.g., Frank 0. Bowman III, Mr. Madison Meets a Time Machine: The
Political Science of Federal Sentencing Reform, 58 STAN. L. REV. 235, 246-47 (2005)
(noting that Congress intended to tightly limit judicial discretion in criminal sentencing,
though it still left some discretion to judges in individual cases).
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compelling case for some uniform rules governing mediation, citing
proliferation of more than 2500 mediation statutes, with tremendous
variations of mediation rules within and between jurisdictions.77
Uniformity imposes costs, however, and should be used in ADR policies
only if the benefits outweigh the costs.78 Potential costs of uniformity include
increased risk of orthodox ideologies 79 as well as reductions of individual
judgment, diversity of practices, and potential for innovation. For example,
the mediation field periodically has considered proposals for uniform
certification systems. 80 I believe that these proposals have foundered, in part,
77 UNIF. MEDIATION ACT, Prefatory Note 3 (2001). See generally Ellen E. Deason,
The Quest for Uniformity in Mediation Confidentiality: Foolish Consistency or Crucial
Predictability?, 85 MARQ. L. REv.79 (2001) (describing rationale for Uniform Mediation
Act).
78 The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws has
established a balancing test for determining whether a matter is suitable for a uniform or
model act. The Conference's policy for considering possible acts includes the following
requirement:
[Tihe subject of the Act shall be such that uniformity of law among States will
produce significant benefits to the public through improvements in the law (for
example, facilitating interstate economic, social or political relations, or responding
to a need common to many States as to which uniform legislation may be more
effective, more efficient, and more widely and easily understood) or will avoid
significant disadvantages likely to arise from diversity of state law (for example, the
tendency of diverse laws to mislead, prejudice, inconvenience or otherwise
adversely affect the citizens of the States in their activities or dealings in other States
or with citizens of other States or in moving from State to State).
NAT'L CONF. OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM ST. LAWS, REFERENCE BOOK 119 (2005-
06) (Statement of Policy Establishing Criteria for Designation and Consideration of
Acts). The policy states that the Conference should avoid subjects that are:
(i) entirely novel and with regard to which neither legislative nor administrative
experience is available;
(ii) controversial because of disparities in social, economic or political policies or
philosophies among the various States; and
(iii) of purely local or state concern and without substantial interstate implications
unless conceived and drafted to fill emergent needs or to modemize antiquated
concepts.
Id. at 120. For a thoughtful discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of uniformity,
see Peppet, supra note 28, at 501-503, 511-14, 518-19.
79 See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
80 The Association for Conflict Resolution Mediator Certification Task Force
recently issued a proposal for certification of mediators. See ASS'N FOR CONFLICT
RESOL., REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE ACR BOARD OF DIRECTORS (2004),
http://www.acrnet.org/about/taskforces/certification.htm.
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because many mediators worried that the costs of a uniform system would
outweigh the benefits.
In designing ADR processes, policymakers should normally solicit input
from key stakeholder groups. 81 The process of eliciting input may take
various forms and depend on the resources available. In some cases, it may
involve formation of a committee that includes representatives of the various
stakeholder groups. It is valuable to convene a group of stakeholders,
including practitioners, as well as independent analysts. Being human, all of
us have blind spots and biases. Convening a representative group with
diverse perspectives can help identify such biases and lead to a better policy
than what like-minded experts or a single stakeholder group might devise.
Collecting data from stakeholders can be especially helpful. For example, the
ABA Section of Dispute Resolution's Task Force on Improving Mediation
Quality conducted a series of focus groups with various stakeholder groups
to learn what they find particularly helpful (and unhelpful) in mediation. 82
After assessing stakeholders' interests, policymakers should develop
policies to satisfy those interests, engaging stakeholder representatives in the
policymaking process as much as feasible. 83 The drafting of the Uniform
Mediation Act illustrates the benefits of crafting policies to fit stakeholders'
interests. The drafting process was long and challenging and the results did
not satisfy everyone, but the final result was vastly improved as a result of
the extensive engagement of various stakeholders. 84 The Maryland Program
for Mediator Excellence provides another good example of extensive
consultation in policymaking. 85
On the other hand, the CL movement illustrates a problem of failing to
elicit stakeholders' input in designing processes. As a matter of experience
and faith, most CL practitioners believe deeply in the importance of the
81 See COSTANTINO & MERCHANT, supra note 52, at 96-116.
82 See John Lande & Rachel Wohl, Listening to Experienced Users: How Can We
Improve the Quality and Expand the Use of Commercial Mediation, DisP. RESOL. MAG.,
(forthcoming 2007) (summarizing results of focus groups with about ninety participants,
including lawyers and other repeat users of mediation). The author is the reporter for the
Task Force.
83 COSTANTINO & MERCHANT, supra note 52, at 117-33.
84 For brief descriptions of the drafting process, see UNIF. MEDIATION ACT,
Prefatory Note 5 (2001); Richard C. Reuben, The Sound of Dust Settling: A Response to
Criticisms of the UMA, 2003 J. DisP. RESOL. 99, 100-08.
85 See generally Charles Pou, Jr., Scissors Cut Paper: A "Guildhall" Helps
Maryland's Mediators Sharpen Their Skills, 26 JUST. SYs. J. 307 (2005) (describing the
Maryland Program for Mediator Excellence).
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disqualification agreement. 86 To date, they have been almost completely
unsuccessful in selling the CL process to parties in nonfamily cases, in large
part because of clients' resistance to the disqualification agreement.87
Nonetheless, some CL practitioners persist in trying to convince parties to
use CL in nonfamily cases, as if trying to fit a round peg in a square hole.
This approach turns upside down the fundamental principle of dispute system
design that disputing processes should be designed primarily to fit parties'
needs and rather than practitioners' philosophical preferences.88
C. Consideration of Wide Range of Policy Options and Recognition of
the Limits of Regulation
In devising strategies to promote goals related to ADR, policymakers
should consider a broad range of policy options and take advantage of
complementary benefits of various options. Legal rules are powerful policy
tools that are sometimes appropriate, though they can be crude instruments
that sometimes have unintended adverse effects. Before proposing new or
revised legal rules, policymakers should consider whether other tools for
achieving ADR goals would be more appropriate. Policymakers should
consider a range of policy goals, especially those promoting "reflective
practice." 89
86 For description of the disqualification agreement, see supra note 31 and
accompanying text.
87 See Hoffman, supra note 74 (describing extensive efforts in Cincinnati, Seattle,
Massachusetts, Texas, and the Canadian province of Saskatchewan to promote CL in
civil cases resulting in no more than eight civil CL cases). CL practitioners continue to
develop CL practice outside the family context, in such areas as probate, employment,
and medical malpractice cases. For example, the Electronic Data Systems Corporation
recently announced that it is exploring use of CL. See COUNSEL TO COUNSEL, BUSINESS
RELATIONSHIPS: EXPLORING COLLABORATIVE LAW (Sept. 2006),
http://www.martindale.com/pdf/c2c/magazine/2006_Sep/C2C0906_BPBranom.pdf. For
further discussion of resistance to the disqualification agreement, see infra Part II.C. 1.d.
88 Lawyers and other dispute resolution professionals normally do not conduct needs
assessments before developing or offering their services. In this respect, the failure of CL
leaders to do so is not unusual. Nonetheless, in the face of strong market resistance, it
would be appropriate and prudent for CL leaders to consider carefully why prospective
clients are not buying what they are trying to sell. See supra note 87 and accompanying
text.
89 For definition and discussion of reflective practice, see infra Part II.C.5.
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1. ADR Policy Goals and Options
In general, policymakers should explicitly identify and prioritize their
goals at the outset of an ADR policymaking process, subject to revision as
the process unfolds. Policymakers may try to achieve many possible goals,
including but not limited to: (1) substantive and procedural fairness; (2)
termination of disputes; (3) satisfaction of disputants' substantive interests;
(4) satisfaction with the ADR process; (5) efficiency in the process (for the
disputants and the public); (6) reduction of risk; (7) reduction of harm to
disputants and others (including society generally); (8) provision of greater
choice in dispute resolution processes to disputants (and dispute resolution
professionals); (9) increase of disputants' capabilities in handling other
disputes; (10) promotion of productive relationships; (11) satisfaction with
services of dispute resolution professionals; (12) improvement of the culture
of disputing for disputants, professionals, and society; and (13) compliance
with social policies expressed in law.90
There are many policy tools available to accomplish various ADR goals.
These tools include, among others: (1) use of explicit agreements about
appropriate dispute resolution goals and process in individual cases; (2)
development of general protocols in practice communities; (3) training for
disputants and professionals; (4) use of dispute referral mechanisms; (5)
improvement of dispute resolution professionals' skills through peer
consultation and mentoring; (6) provision of technical assistance for dispute
resolution organizations; (7) education of the general public; (8) use of
grievance mechanisms to deal with problems arising in ADR processes; (9)
credentialing of dispute resolution professionals; (10) adoption and
enforcement of legal rules; and (11) provision of sufficient resources to
implement policies.91 As this list shows, enacting legal rules is one of many
90 For a list of possible goals, see Robert A. Baruch Bush, Defining Quality in
Dispute Resolution: Taxonomies and Anti-Taxonomies of Quality Arguments, 66 DENV.
U. L. REv. 335, 349-50 (1989) (listing standards of quality of dispute resolution); Marc
Galanter & John Lande, Private Courts and Public Authority, 12 STUD. L., POL'Y &
Soc'y 393, 395-97 (1992) (listing potential benefits of private courts); John Lande,
Mediation Paradigms and Professional Identities, MEDIATION Q., June 1984, at 19, 43-
44.
91 For a list of possible policy options, see Lande, supra note 90, at 44; Charles Pou,
Jr., Assuring Excellence, or Merely Reassuring? Policy and Practice in Promoting
Mediator Quality, 2004 J. DisP. RESOL. 303, 309-12 (providing an excellent history and
analysis of efforts to promote quality of mediation); Charles Pou Jr., Enough Rules
Already! Making Ethical Dispute Resolution a Reality, DisP. RESOL. MAG., Winter 2004,
at 19, 20-22 [hereinafter Pou, Enough Rules Already!].
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
possible ADR policy options.
2. Problems in Using Legal Regulation to Manage ADR
Policymakers should be cautious in using rules to govern ADR
processes, especially in nonadjudicatory processes. A major benefit of
alternative dispute resolution processes is to provide people with greater
freedom to choose alternatives to court adjudication. 92 As Professor Carrie
Menkel-Meadow noted, ADR is a "field that was developed, in part, to
release us from some-if not all-of the limitations and rigidities of law and
formal legal institutions ... ."93 Nonetheless, many members of the current
ADR movement operate implicitly based on "legal centralist" assumptions
that society is and should be ordered primarily by state-created and enforced
rules. 94 Law is only one means of social control-and often a relatively
In the context of governmental use of ADR, Charles Pou described "an ideal ADR
world" as one that includes: (1) creativity, energy and leadership, (2) a predictable,
accommodating legal framework, (3) understanding and acceptance of ADR, (4)
adequate resources to experiment with useful process alternatives, (5) decisions that
reflect sound dispute systems design theory and practice, and (6) long-term design and
resource decisions that are based upon solid evaluation data. Charles Pou Jr., Legislating
Flexibility: Things that ADR Legislation Can and Cannot do Well, DisP. RESOL. MAG.,
Summer 2001, at 7, 8. This list of goals and policy options is generally appropriate in
other contexts as well.
92 See supra Part II.B.
93 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Pursuing Settlement in an Adversary Culture: A Tale of
Innovation Co-Opted or "The Law of ADR ", 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1, 1 (1991). Menkel-
Meadow rues the development of a 'common law' or 'jurisprudence' of ADR." Id. at 2.
She seems primarily concerned about the potential for the legal system to legalize ADR
and focus on promoting efficiency and rather than depriving people of the benefits of
having options for producing better quality processes and outcomes. She writes that
"[l]awyers may use ADR not for the accomplishment of a 'better' result, but as another
weapon in the adversarial arsenal to manipulate time, methods of discovery, and rules of
procedure for perceived client advantage." Id. at 3. I share concerns about the risks of
legalization of ADR processes. See John Lande, How Much Justice Can We Afford?:
Defining the Courts' Roles and Deciding the Appropriate Number of Trials, Settlement
Signals, and Other Elements Needed to Administer Justice, 2006 J. Disp. RESOL. 213,
246-47 [hereinafter Lande, How Much Justice Can We Afford?]; John Lande, Failing
Faith in Litigation? A Survey of Business Lawyers' and Executives' Opinions, 3 HARV.
NEGOT. L. REv. 1, 61-65 (1998); Lande, Getting the Faith, supra note 1, at 222-27. Of
course, some legal regulation is appropriate, as discussed infra in Part II.C4, and
regulation per se does not necessarily result in legalization.
94 For an excellent summary of legal centralism, see ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER
WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE DIsPuTEs 138-140 (1991). See also Marc
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ineffective one. Professor Robert Ellickson describes five types of control,
including personal ethics, contracts, social norms, organizational rules, and
law.95 He reviews empirical research refuting legal centralist assumptions in
a wide range of situations, including studies finding that neighbors, business
executives, insurance claims adjusters, housemaids, and retailers routinely
ignored the law and, instead, used market interests, social norms, and self-
help to deal with recurring problems. 96 Many dispute resolution professionals
hold legal centralist assumptions, which may be due to the fact that many are
law-trained and operate in and around the legal system. The fundamental
ADR value of providing people with a range of alternatives to choose from-
particularly alternatives to the legal system-suggests that policymakers
should limit regulation of ADR to the minimum justified by a comprehensive
policy analysis.
In addition to this philosophical value, there are many pragmatic reasons
to limit regulation of ADR. The nature of ADR activities, especially in
nonadjudicatory processes, is so complex and subject to so many contextual
factors 97 that regulatory policies are often likely to have limited and
unpredictable effects. Professor Macfarlane's excellent analysis of the limits
of ethical codes in regulating mediation behavior is especially instructive. 98
She writes "[t]he current approach-largely limited to the development of
Galanter, The Portable Soc 2; or, What to Do Until the Doctrine Comes, in GENERAL
EDUCATION IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES: CENTENNIAL REFLECTIONS ON THE COLLEGE OF THE
UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO, 246, 250-53 (J.J. MacAloon ed., 1992); Marc Galanter, Justice
in Many Rooms: Courts, Private Ordering, and Indigenous Law, 19 J. OF LEGAL
PLURALISM, 1, 1-3 (1981). An alternative perspective is "legal pluralism," which
recognizes that government courts are not the only or primary system of adjudication. See
generally Sally Engle Merry, Legal Pluralism, 22 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 869 (1988).
95 See ELLICKSON, supra note 94, at 130-32.
96 Id. at 141-47.
97 For a fine analysis of the complexity and contextual nature of mediation, see
Michael L. Moffitt, Schmediation and the Dimensions of Definition, 10 HARV. NEGOT. L.
REV. 69 (2005). Professor Lisa Blomgren Bingham makes a compelling argument that the
growth in ADR use is related to a great expansion in the availability of information in
disputes and reduction in confidence in a single, official mechanism for analyzing the
information and determining the truth. See generally Lisa Blomgren Bingham, When We
Hold No Truths to be Self-Evident: Truth, Belief Trust, and the Decline in Trials, 2006 J.
DIsP. RESOL. 131 (tracing roots of modem ADR to increasing epistemological
complexity).
98 See generally Julie Macfarlane, Mediating Ethically: The Limits of Codes of
Conduct and the Potential of a Reflective Practice Model, 40 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 49
(2002). Although many of these ethics codes are promulgated by private professional
associations rather than government entities, the same logic applies to legal rules.
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voluntary codes of conduct for mediators-consistently underestimates and
oversimplifies the complexities of what it means to mediate ethically." 99 The
codes "reduce ethical choices to a set of generic principles, fastening- on
relatively uncontentious virtues for the mediation process, which appear in a
virtually identical form across numerous codes of conduct."' 00 She argues
that these codes embody at least three unrealistic assumptions about the
nature of ethical dilemmas and the ways they actually arise in mediation.
First, the codes assume that there are generally "right" and "wrong"
responses across contextual settings. In practice, many of the challenging
problems involve managing relationships rather than complying with
specified requirements, there are wide variations in philosophy about what
goals and techniques are appropriate and desirable, and there is great need for
individual discretion.' 0 She writes that the "centrality of personal discretion
to mediation practice means that ethical practice must respond to the unique
situational constraints and possibilities of each mediation, whereas ethical
standards are unable to do so."'1 02 Moreover, "a search for 'right answers' or
'moral solutions' to ethical dilemmas may undermine the hallmarks of
facilitative mediation practice, namely contextual responsiveness, openness,
and flexibility."' 1 3 Second, she argues that ethical codes generally focus on
"snapshots" of the process and particularly the outcome, overlooking the
ethical challenges in numerous "micro" decisions throughout a process. 104 As
99 Id. at 50-51.
100Id. at 60. In their extensive critiques of the Model Standards of Conduct for
Mediators, Jamie Henikoff and Michael Moffitt criticize the vagueness of the provisions.
See Jamie Henikoff & Michael Moffitt, Remodeling the Model Standards of Conduct for
Mediators, 2 HARv. NEGOT. L. REv. 87, 91-94 (1997); see also Michael L. Moffitt, The
Wrong Model, Again: Why the Devil is not in the Details of the New Model Standards of
Conduct for Mediators, Disp. RESOL. MAG., Spring 2006, at 31; Moffitt, supra note 97, at
83-85, 96-97, 101-02 (criticizing "prescriptive acontextual" definitions); Pou, Enough
Rules Already!, supra note 91, at 20 (arguing that "we should accept that handling
complex ethical issues will seldom involve 'looking up the answer."'). For a defense and
celebration, respectively, of the revised Model Standards, see Joseph B. Stulberg, The
Model Standards of Conduct: A Reply to Professor Moffitt, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Spring
2006, at 34; Paula M. Young, Rejoice! Rejoice! Rejoice, Give Thanks, and Sing: ABA,
ACR, and AAA Adopt Revised Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators, 5
APPALACHIAN J. L. 195 (2006).
101 Macfarlane, supra note 98, at 61-65 (giving an example of differences between
mediators in ways of defining and dealing with coercion).
102 Id. at 64.
103 Id. at 65. I would argue that in virtually all approaches to mediation there is a
need for responsiveness, openness, and flexibility.
104 Id. at 65-68.
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an example, she points to the difficulties in assessing parties' self-
determination throughout the process, suggesting that parties may feel
coerced by mediators' encouragement to stay in the process during difficult
negotiations even though the parties may assent to the ultimate result. Third,
she argues that the codes are unable to manage conflicts between principles
such as between self-determination and impartiality, when a mediator's
action to help one party analyze a problem may be interpreted as bias against
another party.' 0 5 Conceivably, the codes might offer a hierarchy of values to
prioritize conflicting principles, but she argues that the complex nature of the
interactions and mediators' roles makes that unworkable. ' 06
Since legal rules involve the potential for legal consequences, the scope
of behavior to be regulated must be limited because of practical problems of
enforcement. Professor Gerald Wetlaufer gives the following description
about the limitations of using legal rules to prohibit lawyers from lying in
negotiation:
[E]thics is different from and more demanding than law, including the law
of professional self-regulation. This difference can readily be understood
because law, unlike ethics, must be implemented from a perspective
external to the individual and must deal with all of the problems related to
such implementation. Law must, for instance, come to terms with the
problem of what can be known about past events or about the motives of a
person charged with breaching some legal duty. It must take account of the
possibility of error and, because it is invoked after the fact, law must take
account of such values as the stability of transactions. It must also take
account of the transaction costs associated with doing justice. Accordingly,
the law may permit certain deceits that have had little or no effect, or that
are difficult or impossible to prove. The fact that the law permits these
deceits is not an authoritative pronouncement that these lies are ethically
unobjectionable. It is, instead, an accommodation to those costs and
practicalities that bear upon the law but not upon ethics. 107
Thus, the scope of effective regulation is limited by difficulties
implementing enforceable rules. Moreover, people-especially lawyers-do
not simply respond to rules by behaving as intended by the rulemakers.
Professor Stewart Macaulay writes that people:
[C]ope with law and cannot be expected to comply passively. Many people
105 Id. at 68-70.
106 Id. at 69-70.
107 Gerald Wetlaufer, The Ethics of Lying in Negotiations, 75 IOWA L. REV. 1219,
1234-35 (1990) (footnotes omitted).
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are able to ignore most legal commands, or redefine them to serve self-
interest or "common sense" ... Sometimes, however, the command of the
law rings loud and clear and has direct impact on behavior. In short, the role
of law is not something that can be assumed but must be established in
every case. 108
"Thinking like a lawyer" does not refer to lawyers pondering how they
can assure that their clients obey the law. Rather, it generally means that
lawyers strategize how they can accomplish their clients' objectives to the
greatest extent possible without running afoul of the law. This approach to
advocacy is embodied in the ethical rules and legal culture in the US. Thus
would-be ADR regulators should consider how lawyers are likely to react
to-and possibly "game"--any new rules as they try to accomplish their
clients' goals.
Rules are easiest to enforce when the behaviors to be regulated are easily
detectable and objectively determinable. When behaviors are complex and
ambiguous, rules are harder to enforce effectively. Consider the issue of
"good faith" in mediation. Good faith is like mom and apple pie-it's hard to
be against them. But that does not mean that it is a good idea to legislate
them. Various statutes and rules require people to mediate in good faith,
almost always without defining the term.10 9 Many people think that they
know bad faith when they see it. They "know" that bad faith in mediation is
when one side-the other side-refuses to make a new offer or what they
view as a "reasonable" offer. 1 0 This conduct clearly grieves some litigants,
lawyers, and judges who would like the courts to sanction the alleged
offenders. In virtually all the final reported opinions on this issue, however,
the courts have decided that this conduct is not sanctionable bad faith."I ' The
courts have decided that it would be inappropriate to sanction this behavior,
which is impossible to adjudicate without evidence about communications in
108 Stewart Macaulay, Law and the Behavioral Sciences: Is There Any There
There?, 6 LAW & POL'Y 149, 153-54 (1984).
109 See Lande, supra note 49, at 77-81. Similarly, Fairman's proposal would require
CL lawyers to act in "good faith" and use "cooperative strategies," without defining these
terms. See Fairman, supra note 25, at 117-19 (proposed rule 2.2(a), (d) and comments
(3), (8)). Peppet's proposal also uses the problematic term "good faith." See Peppet,
supra note 28, at 523 (permitting lawyers to commit to "negotiate in good faith by,
among other things, abstaining from causing unreasonable delay and from imposing
avoidable hardships on another party for the purpose of securing a negotiation
advantage").
110 Lande, supra note 49, at 92.
111 Id. at 82-85.
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mediation and the participants' state of mind. 12 Even proponents of good
faith rules recognize that judicial second-guessing of participants' states of
mind would be an inappropriate judicial encroachment into the mediation
process. 13 As a result, the judicial interpretation of "good faith" has come to
mean attendance at mediation (possibly with a representative having
"sufficient" negotiation authority) and submission of any required pre-
mediation materials.1 4 The result is that the good faith rules do not prohibit
what people think of as bad faith. Ironically, because of the vagueness of the
concept and problems of enforcement, parties who intend to act in bad faith
are unlikely to be deterred and could actually use the rule to harass others
who act appropriately.' 15 The ABA Section of Dispute Resolution
appropriately adopted a resolution recommending that to address problematic
behavior in mediation, courts should not adopt rules that would prohibit
conduct that is not objectively determinable. In addition, the resolution
recommends that courts affirmatively engage in nonregulatory activities
including collaborative system design efforts and establishment of
educational programs for participants about mediation procedures. 16 Thus,
rather than using the legal centralist assumption that courts should try to stop
"bad faith" merely by imposing sanctions for violation of rules, the ABA
Section of Dispute Resolution wisely recommends a more comprehensive
approach that includes limited regulation along with important nonregulatory
policies.
3. Problems with Legal Definitions
Some people suggest that regulation is appropriate to establish ADR
process definitions and thus create legitimacy and build a sense of security
about particular dispute resolution processes. 117 In my view, these can be
desirable benefits of appropriate regulation but do not justify regulation by
themselves. Dean Bryant Garth and Professor Austin Sarat distinguish
112 Id. at 86-89.
113 Id. at 82-92.
114 Id. at 82-85.
1 5 1d at 98-102.
116 Resolution on Good Faith Requirements for Mediators and Mediation Advocates
in Court-Mandated Mediation Programs, A.B.A. SEC. Disp. RESOL.,
http://www.abanet.org/dispute/webpolicy.html#9 (last visited Feb. 5, 2007). This author
helped draft the resolution.
117 This idea was suggested by several people who had read earlier drafts of this
Article or heard presentations about it.
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"instrumental" and "constitutive" approaches in analyzing law. An
instrumental approach focuses on the results attributable to law, whereas a
constitutive approach "sees law more as a pervasive influence in structuring
society than as a variable whose occasional impact can be measured." 118
From a constitutive perspective:
[L]aw is seen as a way of organizing the world into categories and concepts
which, while providing spaces and opportunities, also constrains behavior
and serves to legitimate authority. Rather than asking what the Clean Air
Act accomplished, this approach focuses more on what it means to frame
the problem of air quality in legal terms, and how that framing structures
both thought and action with respect to the quality of the air that we
breathe I19
The two analytic approaches are not mutually exclusive. Indeed, one can
identify both instrumental and constitutive impacts of many laws such as the
Clean Air Act. In the dispute resolution context, a rule authorizing courts to
order cases to participate in ADR processes may have both the instrumental
impact of inducing people to use the ADR processes as well as a constitutive
impact of creating definitions of the processes and legitimizing them. As a
matter of policymaking, this Article argues that we should enact rules only if
there is a legitimate instrumental purpose for the rules and that a constitutive
purpose by itself is an insufficient justification. Governmental authority is a
powerful and precious resource that is easily subject to abuse. Thus it should
be used cautiously and only when justified.
Consider some problems of definitions that might be enacted purely for
constitutive value. In the dispute resolution field, there are great ideological
conflicts over process definitions. 120 A definition carved into the "stone" of a
118 Bryant G. Garth & Austin Sarat, Studying How Law Matters: An Introduction, in
How DOES LAW MATTER? 2 (Bryant G. Garth & Austin Sarat eds., 1998). A constitutive
approach reflects the insights of sociological theorists of institutionalism. See supra notes
7-10 and accompanying text.
119 Garth & Sarat, supra note 118, at 2-3.
120 See, e.g., Lande, supra note 56, at 854-57. Lande writes:
[T]he mediation market is quite diverse and currently in the process of
institutionalization. Theorists and market participants are struggling to develop what
they hope will become taken-for-granted definitions. These arguments over
terminology are not "just' academic exercises; these debates shape the practices of
mediators and lawyers regarding what it means to be a "good" practitioner, referring
to shared meanings and norms within one's practice community.
Id. at 857.
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rule is likely either to be so vague as to be meaningless or to favor some
ideological contestants over others and thus legalize an orthodoxy.' 2 '
Presumably, many proponents of a legalized definition hope to have some
instrumental impact on practice. For example, proponents of facilitative
mediation who disapprove of evaluative mediation have long pleaded, "Just
don't call it mediation."' 122 If a rule would define mediation solely as
facilitative mediation, it is hard to believe that most evaluative mediators
would change their practices to conform to the legal definition or that most
people would stop recognizing their work as mediation.123 Although some
practitioners are obviously very attentive to the rules, undoubtedly many
others are not and respond more to demands for evaluation by mediation
users and norms of local mediation culture.' 2 4 Professor Riskin writes that
"[i]t is too late for commentators or mediation organizations to tell
practitioners who are widely recognized as mediators that they are not, in the
same sense that it is too late for the Pizza Association of Naples, Italy to tell
Domino's that its product is not the genuine article. ' 125 Rulemakers are
likely to be similarly unsuccessful in adopting definitions of dispute
resolution processes. Although it may be tempting to try to harness the power
121 Sociologist Andrew Abbott argues that legal definitions of professional
boundaries are quite rigid and "[a]s a result of this extreme formality, the legally
established world of jurisdiction is a fixed, static world that rejects the living complexity
of professional life." ABBOT, supra note 56, at 64; see also supra notes 60, 97-106 and
accompanying text for discussion of problems related to vagueness and orthodoxy in
dispute resolution doctrine.
122 See Lande, supra note 56, at 855.
123 For a fascinating account of Florida's and Minnesota's efforts to grapple with the
difficulties of writing rules to define and regulate evaluative mediation, see Nancy A.
Welsh, The Thinning Vision of Self-Determination in Court-Connected Mediation: The
Inevitable Price of Institutionalization?, 6 HARV. NEGOT. L. REv. 1, 33-59 (2001).
124 See Lande, supra note 56, at 881-86.
125 Leonard L. Riskin, Understanding Mediators' Orientations, Strategies, and
Techniques: A Grid for the Perplexed, 1 HARV. NEGOT. L. REv. 7, 13 (1996). Professors
Kovach and Love respond that France clarified the definition of what is required for a
bakery to be a "real" boulangerie. See Kimberlee K. Kovach & Lela P. Love, Mapping
Mediation: The Risks of Riskin's Grid, 3 HARv. NEGOT. L. REv. 71, 76 (1998). As noted
above, regulation is likely to be more effective if the subject is easily observable and
objectively determinable, such as with food standards. See supra notes 109-16 and
accompanying text. Even when those conditions apply, as with pizza and bread, it may be
hard for a legal definition to change deeply embedded cultural practices and terminology.
It is especially hard to create practical and meaningful definitions of complex dispute
resolution processes that unfold over time. See supra notes 106-16 and accompanying
text.
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of legal authority solely for constitutive purposes, policymakers should avoid
that temptation. Nonregulatory policies to promote reflective practice' 26 are
more likely to be effective in causing dispute resolution practices to conform
with professional norms.
A more pragmatic problem is that legislative drafting is often crude and
prone to unintended consequences. Professor Michael Moffitt argues that
rulemakers sometimes use broad "prescriptive-acontextual" definitions of
processes (e.g., "mediation") when they would do better to focus specifically
on what procedures are (or are not) entitled to regulatory benefits such as
confidentiality, immunity, or access to courts. 127 Although definitions might
seem innocuous, they can have major impact on the nature of the process
being regulated. The drafting of the Uniform Mediation Act provides a good
example of how a definitional issue became very controversial. Many
mediators take it for granted that mediators must be impartial and, thus,
impartiality should be an essential element of a legal definition of
mediation. 128 After extensive consultation with various stakeholders, the
drafters of the Act determined that "some mediators preferred to be partial,..
. impartiality is difficult to define and to achieve, and.., mediators might be
liable if they failed to be impartial."'1 29 Thus, the drafters decided that "an
operative term such as impartial should not be a part of the definition and, if
included, should be addressed later in the Act;" in addition, "including
impartiality in the definition of mediator might cause the parties to lose the
confidentiality of the Act if it was later determined that the mediator was
partial and the court concluded therefore that a mediation did not occur. '130
Thus, including an apparently innocuous element in a definition could have
significant legal consequences.
In the CL context, the two CL statutes enacted to date both include "good
faith" requirements.' 3 1 As noted above, this seemingly innocuous provision
could be very problematic.132 Another example is that the definition of CL in
the North Carolina statute refers to a procedure involving a husband and
126 See infra Part II.C.5.
127 Moffitt, supra note 97, at 94-97.
128 See Gregory Firestone, An Analysis of Principled Advocacy in the Development
of the Uniform Mediation Act, 22 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 265,280-82 (2002).
129 Id. at 280-81.
130 Id. See also Reuben, supra note 84, at 130-31.
131 See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-71 (2006); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.603(b) (Vernon
2006).
132 For discussion of problems arising from a "good faith requirement" in mediation,
see supra notes 109-16 and accompanying text.
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wife. 133 Thus, this statutory definition effectively denies unmarried couples
the legal benefits that are provided to married couples. 134
Although some problems of legal definitions could be solved through
thoughtful drafting using dispute system design principles, the legislative
process is often not conducive to such a careful procedure. It is possible to
correct legislative mistakes, but the consequences of regulatory errors can be
substantial and the amendment process is often difficult. This suggests the
wisdom in exercising great caution in the use of regulation as an ADR
policymaking tool.
4. Appropriate Regulation of ADR
Although nonregulatory policy options are often optimal, regulatory
options are appropriate in several types of situations. 135 First, rules are
needed to regulate-and restrict-the use of information generated during
ADR processes in litigation. For example, statutes like the Uniform
Mediation Act are needed to protect the integrity of both mediation and
litigation by restricting use of certain mediation communications in litigation.
Without such a legal restraint, many litigants and lawyers would be less
likely to share information needed to reach agreement in mediation.
Moreover, use of mediation communications at trial would taint the legal
process and results by basing court decisions on inappropriate evidence. 136 In
133 See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-71(1) (2006).
134 Similarly, the definition of CL in the Texas statute refers to a process for
dissolution of marriage. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.603(b) (Vemon 2006). Another
Texas statute sanctions CL in cases involving parent-child relationships, but it does not
affect unmarried couples who want to use CL to address other issues. See TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 153.0072 (Vernon 2006).
135 The principles proposed in this Article parallel Moffitt's proposal for increased
customization of litigation procedures. See Moffitt, supra note 68. Both are designed to
increase choice of dispute resolution procedures. Both recognize that there are
appropriate limits to the choices that should be permitted. The limits are designed to
protect the fundamental integrity of the structure and operation of the respective dispute
resolution systems. Moffitt argues that litigants' discretion to customize litigation
procedures should be limited to (1) be consistent with constitutional and statutory limits
of the legal system, (2) protect the public's interest in litigation, and (3) prevent harm to
nonlitigants. See id.
136 Of course the protection is not absolute because statutes permit use of mediation
communications at trial in limited circumstances. See, e.g., UNIF. MEDIATION ACT § 6
(2001) (exceptions to mediation privilege). Professors James Coben and Peter Thompson
found 1,223 cases in Westlaw databases that involved significant mediation issues
between 1999 and 2003. See James R. Coben & Peter N. Thompson, Disputing Irony: A
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the arbitration context, Professor Richard Reuben argues that arbitration
communications should normally be inadmissible in court and
nondiscoverable, subject to certain exceptions. 137 In the context of
Collaborative and Cooperative Law, it may be appropriate for states and
courts to adopt evidentiary rules regulating use of information produced in
those processes.138
A second, related category of issues appropriate for regulation involves
rules governing the relationship between ADR processes and the courts. For
example, the Federal Arbitration Act and the Revised Uniform Arbitration
Act (RUAA) regulate the nature of contracts to arbitrate that the courts will
enforce and what actions the courts will take in relation to the arbitration
process.' 39 These provisions might include definitions of enforceable
agreements, provisional remedies the courts could grant, qualifications of
arbitrators, and the nature of awards. 140 Arbitration generally involves legally
binding adjudication. Therefore, it is appropriate for laws to provide greater
regulation of those processes than nonadjudicatory processes because parties
have greater control over the result in the latter. Even in mediation, however,
it is necessary and appropriate to establish rules about compliance with duties
to mediate and enforcement of agreements purportedly reached in
Systematic Look at Litigation About Mediation, 11 HARv. NEGOT. L. REV. 43, 51-52
(2006). They found that 130 cases involved issues of whether to permit testimony or
discovery from mediation participants and that the courts declined to protect
confidentiality in 60 of those cases. Id. They also found that in 30% of all the cases in the
database, there were mediation disclosures that were not apparently contested by the
parties, mediators, or courts. Id. at 58-59. It is not clear what proportion of these
disclosures were appropriately permitted under applicable laws or agreement of the
parties. If litigants and lawyers come to believe that mediation communications are
inappropriately used in litigation on a regular basis, they are likely to lose confidence in
the mediation process and behave more defensively.
137 See generally Richard C. Reuben, Confidentiality in Arbitration: Beyond the
Myth, 55 U. KAN. L. REV. 1255 (2006) (proposing to raise the burden of proof for
admission of evidence sought from arbitration proceedings).
138 Two states have already adopted such statutes regarding Collaborative Law. See
Fairman, supra note 25, at 105-07. For further discussion of confidentiality issues in CL,
see infra note 253 and accompanying text. For definition of Cooperative Law, see supra
note 62.
139 See Fed. Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006); REV. UNw. ARB. ACT § 6 (2001).
140 See generally Fed. Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (2006); REV. UNIF. ARB.
ACT (2001).
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mediation. 14' For example, rules prohibiting enforcement of settlements
obtained through coercion are important to protect the integrity of
negotiation processes as well as the court system. 142 Similarly, in CL, it is
appropriate to enact rules if courts create exemptions from normal court case
management systems 143 or to prescribe conditions for enforcing agreements
reached in CL processes. 44Third, it is appropriate to legally regulate
141 In a comprehensive review of litigation about mediation, Coben and Thompson
found the largest categories of litigation involved enforcement of mediated settlement
agreements and duties to mediate. See Coben & Thompson, supra note 136, at 56-57.
142 A new rule in the Model Code of Judicial Conduct states, "A judge may
encourage parties to a proceeding and their lawyers to settle matters in dispute but shall
not act in a manner that coerces any party into settlement." MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT Canon 2, R. 2.6(B) (Report Feb. 2007),
http://www.abanet.org/judicialethics/house-report.pdf (last visited Jan. 15, 2007). A
comment to that rule emphasizes the importance of protecting the right to trial: "The right
to be heard is an essential component of a fair and impartial system of justice.
Substantive rights of litigants can be protected only if procedures protecting the right to
be heard are observed." Id. at cmt. 1. Similarly, Standard I of the Model Standards of
Conduct for Mediators states, "A mediator shall conduct a mediation based on the
principle of party self-determination. Self-determination is the act of coming to a
voluntary, uncoerced decision in which each party makes free and informed choices as to
process and outcome." ABA ET AL., MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS,
supra note 2. These provisions in the Model Code and Model Standards are appropriate
statements of principle, but are unlikely to reduce coercion by themselves because it is
hard to define coercion-which is not defined in these provisions. Moreover, many
people believe that some degree of pressure is acceptable and even desirable. See
generally Timothy Hedeen, Coercion and Self-Determination in Court-Connected
Mediation: All Mediations Are Voluntary, But Some Are More Voluntary Than Others, 26
JUST. SYs. J. 273 (2005) (analyzing coercion in mediation); Peter N. Thompson,
Enforcing Rights Generated In Court-Connected Mediation-Tension Between The
Aspirations of a Private Facilitative Process and the Reality of Public Adversarial
Justice, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 509, 527-35 (2004) (analyzing duress and undue
influence in mediation); Welsh, supra note 123, at 59-78.
143 See, e.g., TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.603(e) (Vernon 2006) (stating that when
notified that a case is a CL case at least 30 days before trial, courts may not "(1) set a
hearing or trial in the case; (2) impose discovery deadlines; (3) require compliance with
scheduling orders; or (4) dismiss the case").
144 Despite the fact that CL theory prescribes use of interest-based negotiation, the
disqualification agreement creates pressures to settle that could easily devolve into
coercion at "crunch time." See Lande, supra note 29, at 1364 ("CL theory calls for
interest-based negotiation, but the disqualification agreement increases the incentive to
continue negotiations and reach any agreement, not merely agreements satisfying the
parties' interests."). The courts should not enforce agreements reached as a result of
coercion in CL. Although it may be appropriate to adopt a rule precluding enforcement of
coerced agreements, it may be difficult to enforce and may not be as effective as
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professional conduct in ADR processes to protect consumers' interests by
defining the professionals' duties, dealing with issues such as requirements
of informed consent and prohibitions against conflicts of interest. Similarly,
regulation to protect the interests of nonlitigants is appropriate, such as
requirements to avoid taking advantage of nonlitigants.145 Issues of consumer
protection are appropriate for regulation because consumers rely on
professionals and may need the power of government (including enforcement
of professional associations' rules) to prevent and remedy exploitation by the
professionals. For some issues, such as requirement of informed consent and
avoidance of conflicts of interest, it may be appropriate to rely primarily on
regulation because the behavior involved can often be determined objectively
without great difficulty. Although other issues, such as prevention of
coercion, may be appropriate for regulation, a strategy relying exclusively on
regulation may not be effective because of difficulties in detection and
enforcement. In such situations, it may be appropriate to develop a strategy
that combines regulation and other policy tools.
Fourth, it is appropriate to adopt default rules when a substantial number
of people have actually encountered significant problems because their ADR
agreements were silent or ambiguous about particular issues. It may be
tempting for some policymakers (and commentators) to prescribe default
rules to reflect their own values and interests even when there is no record of
significant problems that would be solved by such rules. In general, under
our common law system for developing legal rules, it is generally better for
policymakers to refrain from adopting such ADR rules unless and until there
is demonstrated need. The RUAA is a good example of appropriate use of
default rules. The Prefatory Note states that "[i]n most instances the RUAA
provides a default mechanism if the parties do not have a specific agreement
on a particular issue" 146 and specifies fourteen issues requiring such default
rules. 147 For example, Section 10 of the RUAA includes a default provision
nonregulatory policies in achieving the desired policy goals. See supra note 142 and
accompanying text.
145 See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.1-4.4 (2002) (regulating
truthfulness of statements to third parties, communication with represented and
unrepresented parties, and respect for rights of third persons); MODEL STANDARDS OF
CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS Standard VH.A (2005) (prohibiting misleading advertising).
146 REv. UNIF. ARB. ACT Pref. Note (2001).
147 Referring to the Uniform Arbitration Act, the predecessor to the RUAA, the
Prefatory Note states:
The UAA did not address many issues which arise in modem arbitration cases.
The statute provided no guidance as to (1) who decides the arbitrability of a dispute
and by what criteria; (2) whether a court or arbitrators may issue provisional
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authorizing arbitrators to consolidate separate arbitration proceedings.148 The
comment to that section states that the RUAA includes this because "it is
likely that in many cases one or more parties, often non-drafting parties, will
not have considered the impact of the arbitration clause on multiparty
disputes." 149 Similarly, Sections 15 and 17 establish default rules authorizing
arbitrators to regulate discovery, issue subpoenas, make protective orders,
conduct various pre-hearing proceedings to rule on evidentiary issues, and
make summary dispositions. 150 Arbitration agreements may not address these
issues and thus the default provisions are useful to fill such gaps in those
agreements.
5. Policies Promoting Reflective Practice
If ADR policymakers should consider legal regulation as a limited and
last resort for developing new policies, what should be the initial and primary
approach? In general, this Article recommends using system design
processes that engage interested stakeholders to consider a wide range of
policy options as described above.151 It is beyond the scope of this Article to
provide a general analysis of all those options. One policy goal and
associated set of policy options are worth special mention here because they
remedies; (3) how a party can initiate an arbitration proceeding; (4) whether
arbitration proceedings may be consolidated; (5) whether arbitrators are required to
disclose facts reasonably likely to affect impartiality; (6) what extent arbitrators or
an arbitration organization are immune from civil actions; (7) whether arbitrators or
representatives of arbitration organizations may be required to testify in another
proceeding; (8) whether arbitrators have the discretion to order discovery, issue
protective orders, decide motions for summary dispositions, hold prehearing
conferences and otherwise manage the arbitration process; (9) when a court may
enforce a preaward ruling by an arbitrator; (10) what remedies an arbitrator may
award, especially in regard to attorney's fees, punitive damages or other exemplary
relief; (11) when a court can award attorney's fees and costs to arbitrators and
arbitration organizations; (12) when a court can award attorney's fees and costs to a
prevailing party in an appeal of an arbitrator's award; and (13) which sections of the
UAA would not be waivable, an important matter to insure fundamental fairness to
the parties will be preserved, particularly in those instances where one party may
have significantly less bargaining power than another; and (14) the use of electronic
information and other modem means of technology in the arbitration process.
Id.
148 See id. § 10.
149 Id. at cmt 3.
150 See id. §§ 15, 17.
151 See supra Part II.A.
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are particularly relevant to CL. Professor Macfarlane advocates promotion of
"reflective practice," as conceptualized by Donald Schrn:
This approach to professional education and training attempts to bridge the
gulf between the acquisition of professional knowledge and competence in
practice. It does so by challenging the traditional assumption that
professional knowledge can be systematized and taught as facts, rules, and
procedures which can then be instrumentally applied to practice situations.
Instead, what Schon describes as "professional artistry" requires the
capacity to deal with unique and uncertain areas of practice by drawing on
past experiences and by constantly experimenting and revising. A
reflective-practice model requires each practitioner to develop a capacity for
reflective self-analysis of their effectiveness in practice situations and to
adopt a systematic approach to the learning that accrues. Reflective practice
increases professional effectiveness by enhancing awareness of the impact
of contextual factors and constraints, raising the level of responsiveness and
flexibility, and emphasizing self-growth which builds on experience.
Research consistently demonstrates that the individual practitioners
considered by their peers to exemplify excellence are significantly better
than both novices and their more experienced colleagues at successfully
integrating their new experiences into their existing models of action and
knowledge. Simply put, they are better at learning from their experiences
because of their superior ability to analyze and synthesize those lessons. 152
She concludes that:
[P]utting the principles of reflective practice into practice requires the
conscious nurturing of a collaborative professional environment in which
personal experiences and choices are shared in a continuous, self-critical,
non-defensive, and open dialogue. It needs practitioners-new and old,
152 Macfarlane, supra note 98, at 72-73 (footnotes omitted). Mediator Howard
Bellman makes a similar point in a lovely essay analyzing the "improvisational art" of
mediation by comparing it to improvisational jazz music. See Howard Bellman,
Improvisation, Mediation, and All That Jazz, 22 NEGOT. J. 325, 325-27 (2006) (book
review). In both contexts, performers work "in the moment" in ensemble settings. The
performers must have a good "ear" to hear what is going on so they can choose
appropriate responses, sometimes creating new moves that have not been done before.
Although performers work from a set of conventions that are often learned over long
periods of study and practice, skillful performances require quick intuition and judgment
that cannot be set out in advance like a musical score or procedural script for mediators.
See id.; see also Special Section, Improvisation and Negotiation, 21 NEGOT. J. 411
(2005); BRINGING PEACE INTO THE ROOM: How THE PERSONAL QUALITIES OF THE
MEDIATOR IMPACT THE PROCESS OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION (Daniel Bowling & David A.
Hoffman eds., 2003).
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experienced and less experienced-to talk and write analytically and self-
critically about their approaches to ethical dilemmas. 
153
This is similar to Professor Craig McEwen's description of
"communities of practice" that exercise "collegial control" in using various
policy tools to improve the quality of practice. 154 For example, the
community mediation field has institutionalized continuous reflective
educational development.' 55 Private professional mediators generally do not
participate in such continuous reflective education, although some courts and
practitioners have developed a few peer consultation programs. 156 Part of the
genius of CL is its institutionalization of continuous training, in part through
requirements of some groups that members attend local group meetings.' 57
153 Macfarlane, supra note 98, at 87.
154 See Craig McEwen, Giving Meaning to Mediator Professionalism, DisP. RESOL.
MAG., Spring 2005, at 3 (distinguishing collegial control from control by organizations,
markets, and rules).
155 The National Association for Community Mediation (NAFCM) issued the
following statement:
NAFCM believes that quality assurance is a process rather than an end and is best
supported through organizational self-reflection, careful systems design,
collaboration with the community, and continuous improvement.
1. NAFCM believes that the most crucial skill of mediators is found in their ability
to apply theoretical knowledge in a variety of diverse, live, real-world situations....
2. NAFCM believes that a whole-systems approach to quality assurance is the best
possible method. Community mediation centers provide that approach through: (a)
The center's on-going relationship with the trained volunteer mediators, the
community, and referral sources; (b) A commitment to a continuous growth and
learning process for the volunteers, centers and the community; and (c) The
translation of current mediation theory and methodology into quality practice that is
congruent with the diverse cultures it serves.
National Association for Community Mediation, Quality Assurance Statement,
http://www.nafcm.org/pg9.cfm#statement (last visited July 15, 2006).
156 See, e.g., Edward Blumstein & Patricia B. Wisch, Who Nurtures the Nurturer? A
Model of a Peer Support Group, 9 MEDIATION Q. 267 (1992) (describing operation of
mediators peer support group); Howard Herman & Jeannette P. Twomey, Training
Outside the Classroom: Peer Consultation Groups, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Fall 2005, at 15
(describing Mediator Peer Consultation Groups developed by the Virginia Mediation
Network and the Virginia Association for Community Conflict Resolution as well as the
Advanced Mediation Practice Groups operated by the ADR Program of the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of California).
157 See MACFARLANE, supra note 59, at 6. Of course the existence of such groups is
no guarantee that they will provide the kind of reflective practice that Macfarlane
advocates and, indeed, she found that in "each [CL] centre, there appears to be a strong
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Such efforts to promote reflective practice seem very promising and should
be considered whenever training of dispute resolution professionals is likely
to be a major factor in the success of a policy strategy.
Considering the subtle, complex, and contextual nature of ADR
processes and major differences of philosophy within the field, 158 no single
policy tool will be completely effective in solving major problems. To be
most effective, policymakers should start with an assumption that they will
need a comprehensive strategy combining various policy tools. In the context
of such a strategy, problems of over-reliance on legal rules can be reduced.15 9
D. Development of Appropriate Relationship Between ADR
Innovations and the Contemporary Dispute Resolution System
Members of the ADR field should acknowledge and appreciate the
significant social value that the legal system contributes to U.S. society. They
should help to correct problems in the legal system by helping develop
innovations in legal processes and offering a range of distinct ADR
alternatives to meet the needs of litigants and society.160
Professor David Luban catalogs a variety of public goods produced
through the legal system, including development of legal rules and
precedents, discovery and publication of important facts, opportunities for
intervention by persons not party to lawsuits, structural transformation of
commitment to establishing a uniformity of practice-whatever the practice model is for
that particular group." Id. at 7. Hopefully various CL groups will increase their
appreciation of the complexities of the problems and legitimate variations in philosophy
and practice. For a thoughtful analysis of CL training, see Richard William Shields,
Collaborative Family Law Training: From Making the Paradigm Shift to Experiencing
Transformative Learning (forthcoming 2007) (unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University
of Toronto) (on file with author).
158 For example, in mediation, three major philosophies are reflected in the
facilitative, evaluative, and transformative approaches. See Bush, supra note 56, at 982-
84; LEONARD L. RISKIN ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND LAWYERS 286-307 (3d ed.
2005). Similarly, Macfarlane found differences in approach between CL lawyers which
she described as: (1) traditional legal advisors who commit to cooperation, (2) lawyers as
"friend and healer," and (3) "team players." MACFARLANE, supra note 59, at 7-12.
159 McEwen recognizes the value of quasi-regulatory policy tools such as practice
standards but argues that they should be "the starting rather than the ending point."
McEwen, supra note 154, at 6. In a reflective practice process, CL practitioners can use
general prescriptions in legal ethics and CL practice standards to grapple with the
complexities of CL practice.
1 6 0 See generally David A. Hoffman, Courts and ADR: A Symbiotic Relationship,
Disp. RESOL. MAG., Spring 2005, at 2.
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public and private institutions, and promotion and enforcement of private
settlements. 161 The legal system promotes economic activity, deters health
and safety hazards, compensates for injuries, protects basic civil rights, and
provides an important forum for debating and establishing social norms. It is
also a critical alternative to negotiation when parties need to threaten use of
state power to resolve their disputes privately. 162 Indeed, much private
negotiation occurs only because parties can threaten to use the courts to
validate and enforce legal claims.
Many of us take the benefits of our legal system for granted and
appreciate them only when our legal protections seem to be threatened.
Taking these benefits for granted contributes to an imbalanced understanding
of the legal system with excessive focus on its shortcomings. Moreover, it
reinforces an orchestrated campaign to undermine the legitimacy of the legal
system, which is essential for the system to function properly. 163 There
certainly are significant shortcomings in the legal system that deserve
attention and correction. Indeed, much of the motivation for development of
the ADR field has been to provide dispute resolution options that avoid these
shortcomings. 164 Unfortunately, a significant subset of the ADR field-
161 See David Luban, Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 GEO. L.J.
2619, 2622-26 (1995).
162 Id.; see also ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY
OF LAW (2001); Lande, supra note 55, at 205-06.
163 Professor Marc Galanter uses the term the "jaundiced view" to describe the
following distorted and corrosive image of the legal system:
Our civil justice system was widely condemned as pathological and destructive,
producing untold harm. A series of factoids or macro-anecdotes about litigation
became the received wisdom: America is the most litigious society in the course of
all human history; Americans sue at the drop of a hat; the courts are brimming over
with frivolous lawsuits; resort to courts is a first rather than a last resort; runaway
juries make capricious awards to undeserving claimants; immense punitive damage
awards are routine; litigation is undermining our ability to compete economically.
Marc Galanter, Predators and Parasites: Lawyer-Bashing and Civil Justice, 28 GA. L.
REV. 633, 644-45 (1994). This jaundiced view results from a combination of sources,
including self-interested campaigns of economic interests trying to limit the control of
their activities through the legal system. See generally Marc Galanter, The Turn Against
Law: The Recoil Against Expanding Accountability, 81 TEX. L. REV. 285 (2002)
(describing recent critiques of law); Robert M. Hayden, The Cultural Logic of a Political
Crisis: Common Sense, Hegemony and the Great American Liability Insurance Famine
of 1986, 11 STUDIES IN LAW, POL. & Soc'Y 95 (1991) (describing concerted campaign to
demonize litigation).
164 See RISKIN ET AL., supra note 158, at 12-14.
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including some CL practitioners-denigrate the courts and litigation. 165 For
example, some mediators exaggerate problems with litigation to press parties
to settle, which is inappropriate and should be discouraged.' 66 In the CL
context, Professor Macfarlane found that the most commonly expressed
motivation of CL practitioners was an "abhorrence of litigation.', 67 She
quotes a CL lawyer describing as typical a situation in court where "an
idiotic jerk of a judge who probably has an IQ of about 10 decides what
should happen to this family."'1 68 Although this certainly does not reflect the
views of all CL practitioners, CL leaders should discourage practitioners
from treating lawyers and judges disrespectfully and from describing
litigation as inevitably harmful. Litigation and court adjudication can
certainly create or exacerbate problems for disputants-especially in family
cases-and should normally be used as a last resort. Unfortunately, some
cases are not appropriate for other processes-for example, where parties are
seriously dangerous or untrustworthy and seek advantage through
intimidation. We must rely on judges and other dispute resolution
professionals needed to make the legal system function properly, and we
should treat them with respect. This would be easier if dispute resolution
professionals would identify themselves as members of the system as a
whole and not merely as members of their preferred part of it. 169
Policymakers should also be attentive to the opposite problem-
cooptation of ADR innovations by the legal system. 170 The legal system is
remarkably flexible and capable of absorbing innovations, which is a mixed
blessing. This has led to incremental improvements in the legal system as it
has adopted ADR innovations as part of the system. 171 However, this
incorporation of ADR creates risks that the alternative processes will lose the
distinctive features that make them valuable as alternatives. 172
165 See Hoffman, supra note 160, at 2.
16 6 Id. (magazine column by chair of the ABA Section of Dispute Resolution urging
dispute resolution professionals to support the court system despite its imperfections).
167 MACFARLANE, supra note 59, at 17.
16 8 Id.
169 See supra Part II.A.
170 See, e.g., Patrick G. Coy & Timothy Hedeen, A Stage Model of Social Movement
Co-Optation: Community Mediation in the United States, 46 Soc. Q. 405 (2005);
Menkel-Meadow, supra note 93.
171 See supra note 1.
172 See Leonard L. Riskin, Mediation and Lawyers, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 29, 43-48
(1982) (describing the lawyer's "standard philosophical map"); see also Lande, How
Much Justice Can We Afford?, supra note 93, at 246-47 (describing risks that courts will
unconsciously apply Riskin's "standard philosophical map" in setting ADR policy).
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Simply opposing all potential cooptation by retaining the original
features of an innovative model is not a good approach, however, as this is
unlikely to continue satisfying the original needs or to assure the survival of
the ADR process. In the CL context, this is related to the claim by many
Collaborative practitioners that their model is a "paradigm shift,"'1 73 a term
from Thomas S. Kuhn's book, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.174 In
this historical analysis of the development of scientific knowledge, Kuhn
found that the science progressed through a succession of paradigm shifts.
Communities of scientists developed models (or "paradigms") 175 which the
scientific authorities of the time established as orthodoxies. Over time,
scientists found "anomalies" (i.e., findings that were not explained by the
accepted paradigms), and they developed fixes to work around the problems
within the accepted paradigms. 176 Eventually anomalies accumulated to the
point where innovative scientists developed new theories to resolve persistent
problems that could not be explained adequately by the prevailing
contemporary paradigm. Thus, once-new paradigms were discarded in favor
of newer and better paradigms. 177 Ironically, the "revolutionaries" who
advanced new paradigms sometimes became reactionary enforcers of new
scientific orthodoxies, which were overthrown by a later generation of
revolutionaries. 178 This analysis counsels against developing narrow, brittle,
and static ADR models and suggests the value of broad, flexible, and
dynamic models.
For true believers of a given paradigm, 179 it is tempting to deny the
existence of the paradigm's anomalies. Candid acknowledgment of problems
is not only intellectually honest, but it also helps to promote the paradigm's
survival by encouraging fixes to avoid or minimize the problems. Though the
accumulation of a large number of fixes may lead to the eventual
replacement of a paradigm, the failure to deal directly with anomalies is
173 See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
174 THoMAs S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REvOLUTIONS (2d ed. 1970).
175 Id. at 175 (defining "paradigm" as "entire constellation[s] of beliefs, values,
techniques, and so on shared by the members of a given community" and also as "one
sort of element in that constellation, the concrete puzzle-solutions which, employed as
models or examples, can replace explicit rules as a basis for the solution of... puzzles of
normal science").
176 See id. at 52-65.
177 See id. at 66-135.
178 See id. at 144-59.
179 Some practitioners identify as "true believers" in mediation or CL. See Lande,
supra note 29, at 1317-18 n.3.
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likely to lead to a more rapid demise. We can already see an accumulation of
anomalies in the Collaborative paradigm. The fact that there has been so
much resistance to the Collaborative paradigm outside the family context is a
major anomaly. 180 Some people have suggested fixes to the problems that
Collaborative theory does not seem to solve well. For example, some have
suggested: (1) delay in signing the participation agreement until they are
confident that the CL process will work,181 (2) provision of special cautions
to clients who cannot afford hiring another set of attorneys;182 (3) use of time
limits on disqualification, such as one year; and (4) use of arbitration or
private judging options to resolve disputed issues. 183 Cooperative practice
(i.e., dispensing with the disqualification agreement) itself is another
attempted fix.' 84 If CL is not flexible enough to solve a range of practical
problems, any shift to this paradigm may soon be succeeded by a new
paradigm that is better able to handle its anomalies. In that situation,
Collaborative practice would become a footnote in ADR history as a "failed
experiment."1 85
There is no simple formula for the success of ADR innovations. Hostility
180 See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text; infra Part III.C. 1 .d.
181 Collaborative lawyer David Hoffman has occasionally waited until the second or
third meeting with the other side "to make sure that my client and I feel confident that the
other party is willing and able to collaborate." See posting of David A. Hoffman,
dhoffman@BostonLawCollaborative.com, to CollabLaw@yahoogroups.com (Oct. 2,
2005) (on file with author) (responding to listserv query about "clients resistance to
Collaboration because of lawyer withdrawal" provision). In addition, when it is unclear if
parties can succeed in Collaborative Law, he suggests using Cooperative Negotiation
Agreements without a disqualification agreement. See Hoffman, supra note 32.
182 See Hoffman, supra note 181 (recommending deferring signing CL participation
agreement for a few meetings when the "parties' resources are so limited that they cannot
afford a second set of lawyers"). Hoffman argues that "CL attorneys need to warn clients
with modest resources in the clearest possible terms of the risks presented by an impasse
on a critical issue." David A. Hoffman, Collaborative Law: A Practitioner's Perspective,
Disp. RESOL. MAG., Fall 2005, at 25, 26.
183See TESLER, supra note 31, at 61 n.8 (recommending provision in CL
participation agreement allowing "limited, carefully controlled use of a third-party
decision maker").
184 For the definition of Cooperative Law, see supra note 62.
185 Fairman describes the development of CL as following a "predictable path."
Fairman, supra note 25, at 78. With the benefit of hindsight, innovation may seem
predictable or even inevitable. Of course, many innovations are not widely adopted or are
merely fads, i.e., popular innovations that are generally discontinued after a time. See
EVERETT M. ROGERS, DiFFusIoN OF INNOVATIONS 275 (5th ed. 2003). Although CL is
now a vibrant movement, it did not "catch on" widely for about a decade and there is no
guarantee that it will continue to be vibrant a decade from now.
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to the existing legal system is inappropriate and unlikely to be sustainable
over an extended time. Leaders of ADR movements should create a careful
balance between maintaining the essential values of their innovations and
being flexible enough to satisfy needs of leaders of the legal system,
practitioners, and the public. Professor Dorothy Della Noce and her
colleagues studied mediation programs in Florida and grouped them into
three general categories: assimilative, autonomous, and synergistic. 186
Programs that generally used an assimilative approach adapted mediation to
the underlying values and norms of the court system by emphasizing case
processing, "using practices that imbue mediation with the authority and
formality of the courts" and "mapping... legal language onto mediation."' 187
On the other end of the continuum, autonomous programs sought to maintain
a separate identity from the court by establishing a separate identity for the
mediation program, maintaining flexibility in process design, and structuring
the mediation process to focus on conflict interaction as opposed to case
disposition.188 Programs using a synergistic approach valued the benefits of a
court connection and also honored mediation values of preserving party
voice and choice as much as possible within the court system. Synergistic
programs balanced their mediation values with the courts' needs, engaged
community members and agencies as stakeholders in the program, and used
mediation practices that preserved the integrity of the mediation process. 189
Professor Della Noce found that the assimilative programs gained the
benefits of court support but failed to produce the distinctive advantages of
mediation. 190 On the other hand, autonomous programs maintained their
purity of values, but failed to receive the benefits of collaboration with the
courts including a substantial number of cases to mediate. 191 The synergistic
programs created the best of both worlds by developing productive
relationships with the courts and also maintaining their values about dispute
resolution.192  Moreover, synergistic programs developed structural
partnerships between the courts, mediation programs, and other elements of
the community that can have some intrinsic value in building a stronger
186 Dorothy J. Della Noce et al., Assimilative, Autonomous, or Synergistic Visions:
How Mediation Programs in Florida Address the Dilemma of Court Connection, 3 PEPP.
DISP. REsOL. L.J. 11 (2002).
187 Id. at 21-23.
188 Id. at 23-25.
189 Id. at 25-27.
190 Id. at 29-32.
191 Id. at 34-35.
192 Della Noce et al., supra note 186, at 32-38.
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
society. 193
ADR innovations are likely to fail to fulfill their potential if they do not
create a proper balance of connection with and autonomy from the courts.
Professor Della Noce and her colleagues provide a useful framework for
analyzing ADR systems and their relationships with the courts as well as
system stakeholders. In general, a synergistic approach seems optimal and
system planners should consider using that approach before trying an
assimilative or autonomous approach.
III. APPLICATION OF POLICYMAKING PRINCIPLES TO PROPOSALS FOR
NEW ETHICAL RULES FOR NEGOTIATION
This Part uses the principles outlined in the preceding Part to analyze
Professor Christopher Fairman's proposal for a new ethical rule for CL
lawyers. To highlight key elements of Professor Fairman's proposal, this Part
compares it with Professor Scott Peppet's proposal for new ethical rules to
enable lawyers to practice more collaboratively. No proposal is perfect or
comprehensive, and the primary purpose of this analysis is to illustrate the
principles rather than to promote or oppose these particular proposals.
Although this Article argues that Professor Peppet's proposal is generally
preferable to Professor Fairman's, the following analysis suggests that both
proposals have merits and both could be modified to be more consistent with
the principles described in the preceding Part. In particular, this Article
argues that both proposals would be improved by crafting strategies that rely
more heavily on nonregulatory policies to achieve their goals. 194
193 See Jaimie C. Kent, Getting the Best of Both Worlds: Making Partnerships
Between Courts and Community ADR Programs Exemplary, 23 CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 71
(2005) (ADR experts were interviewed to identify factors that lead to synergistic
relationships between community mediation programs and courts.). For discussion of
courts' efforts to collaborate with other entities to promote justice, see Lande, How Much
Justice Can We Afford?, supra note 93, at 243-47.
194 In response to this Article, Fairman describes my analysis as follows:
Having fully developed a DSD paradigm, Professor Lande proceeds to compare my
Proposed Model Rule 2.2 to his DSD rubric, followed by a comparison of Professor
Scott Peppet's Proposed Model Rule 4.1 to DSD and, ultimately, a direct
comparison between the two proposed Model Rules. Having changed not just the
rules of the game-but the game itself-it is not surprising that my plan may fall
short by comparison.
Christopher M. Fairman, Why We Still Need a Model Rule for Collaborative Law: A
Reply to Professor Lande, 22 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 731 (2007). Fairman's
statement mischaracterizes this Article, which does not compare Fairman's and Peppet's
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A. Summary of Fairman 's Proposal for New Rule for Collaborative
Law
Professor Fairman's article provides an extensive analysis of regulation
of CL, reviewing statutes, ethical rules, legal ethics opinions, and efforts at
self-governance in the Collaborative movement. 195 Based on this detailed
analysis, he concludes that a new ethical rule is needed now to educate CL
lawyers about ethical issues in CL. 196 To frame his argument, he cites criteria
that Dean Rapoport proposed for determining whether new ethical rules are
needed:
Dean Nancy Rapoport has developed a helpful test for determining if new
and distinct ethical rules are warranted in a specific area of legal practice.
First, the test for new separate rules includes a baseline assessment of
whether there is a poor fit with the practice area and the generalist models
of ethics rules. This assessment is followed by "second order" questions.
These include: (1) the degree to which repeat players interact with novices,
(2) the existence of different jurisdictional layers, (3) ease of enactment of a
uniform code, and (4) benefits of a single code for the practice area
balanced by disadvantages of abandoning uniform state regulation. 19 7
Applying Rapoport's test,198 Professor Fairman concludes that a new
ethical rule is needed for CL. He writes:
Collaborative law's glass ceiling is legal ethics. Unlike other forms of
alternative dispute resolution, collaborative law's growth is hampered by
proposals to a DSD framework, but rather uses this framework to analyze both proposals.
Although this is not a game, Fairman is correct that this framework is quite different from
the one that he and many policymakers and commentators use.
195 Fairman, supra note 25, at 84-116.
196 Id. at 74-77, 116-22 (proposing text of draft rule). He writes that the "shallow
pool of advisory opinions.., reflects the need for a more dramatic rule-based solution."
Id. at 107.
197 Id. at 76 (citing Nancy B. Rapoport, Our House, Our Rules: The Need for a
Uniform Code of Bankruptcy Ethics, 6 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 45 (1998)).
198 Fairman briefly discusses the "second order questions," supra note 25, at 77, but
devotes most of his article to arguing that there is a poor fit between CL and the
traditional model of lawyering. This Article stipulates the presence of the first two of
Rapoport's "second order" conditions. One could argue about the ease of enactment of a
uniform code, though it is not central to the ultimate issue. This Article argues vigorously
that there is no great benefit to enacting a uniform code now, and indeed, that premature
enactment of a uniform rule could be counterproductive. See infra Part III.C.3.
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questions of compatibility with rules of professional ethics. Critics,
including some collaborative law practitioners, find it difficult to square the
principles and practices of collaborative law with the professional rules of
ethics concerning everything from zealous advocacy to confidentiality to
terminating representation. Hence, the ideals of legal ethics collide with the
ideals of collaborative law. 19
9
He states:
Like mediation, collaborative law is another good candidate for its
own, new ethical rules. With predictions of collaborative law jettisoning to
the forefront of dispute resolution techniques, many lawyers new to the
concept are confronting it. They will need education on the underlying
ethical principles of the collaborative process. Indeed, the fundamental
paradigm shift from adversarial to collaborative makes this field one of the
most appropriate for new ethical guidelines. Purely from an educational
perspective, new rules for collaborative law seem warranted.
Applying the Rapoport test to collaborative law leads to the same
conclusion. There is an obvious problem of "fit" between the current codes
of ethics and collaborative law. Practitioners and academics point to the
disconnect between the fundamental premise of adversarial representation
embodied in the model codes and rules and the cooperative approach of
collaborative law. Just as Dean Rapoport concluded in the bankruptcy
context, the adversarial model "completely misses the boat."2 ° °
In addition to arguing that the collaborative and traditional paradigms are
generally incompatible, Professor Fairman identifies four specific problems
that he believes are problematic for the collaborative model under the ethical
rules governing lawyers generally:
First, concerns exist about whether collaborative law is consistent with the
duty of loyalty-often labeled as "zealous advocacy." Second, as with
mediation, concerns about the duty of candor and truthfulness to others are
present with collaborative law. Third, questions about the compatibility of
the disqualification provision with the rules governing termination of
representation continue. Finally, fears over potential breaches of the duty of
confidentiality also remain. Collaborative law faces challenges with each of
these ethical hurdles for a common reason. General rules of ethics
governing traditional practice were drafted without collaborative law in
199 Fairman, supra note 25, at 74 (footnotes omitted).
200 Id. at 76-77 (footnotes omitted).
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mind and are ill-suited to the new collaborative process.2 01
He concludes that: (1) CL lawyers have different conceptions of their
roles than traditional lawyers and that CL is incompatible with some
interpretations of ethical rules governing loyalty and zealous advocacy; 20 2 (2)
the duty of candor in the general model of lawyering, which permits
"puffing," is inconsistent with the duty of full disclosure in the CL model;20 3
(3) the CL disqualification agreement would need to be "force-fit" into the
general model; 2° 4 and (4) CL procedures are "riddled with risks to
confidentiality. 205
Analyzing ethical rules and opinions issued by state bar associations, he
writes that "they reflect the ongoing struggle collaborative law faces under
the current ethical rules."20 6 He argues that various ethical opinions merely
flag the key issues rather than resolve them,20 7 are "cryptic" and provide
"little concrete analysis," 208 and are only advisory. 20 9 The small body of
opinions address a "striking" number of rules with a "notable lack of
consensus as to which specific rules are implicated. . . . [T]he limited
analysis by state ethics committees fails to yield consensus on even what
questions to ask, much less the answer."2 10
Professor Fairman argues that CL participation agreements and
statements of principle issued by CL organizations are inadequate to regulate
201 Id. at 84.
202 Id. at 84-86.
203 Id. at 87-91. Puffing refers to misleading statements in negotiation that are
generally acceptable. Rule 4.1(a) of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct prohibits
lawyers from knowingly making false statements of material fact to a third party. MODEL
RuLEs OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4. 1(a) (2004). However, a comment to the Rule states that
"[u]nder generally accepted conventions in negotiation, certain types of statements
ordinarily are not taken as statements of material fact. Estimates of price or value placed
on the subject of a transaction and a party's intentions as to an acceptable settlement of a
claim are ordinarily in this category ... " Id. at cmt. 2. Such statements are commonly
called "puffing."
204 Fairman, supra note 25, at 94 (arguing that "attempts to force-fit the
disqualification agreement into the current ethical regime will continue to be
unsatisfying").
205 Id.
206 Id. at 108.
207 Id. at 110.
208 Id. at 111.
209 Id. at 115.
210 Fairman, supra note 25, at 115.
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the ethical issues involved. He says that the participation agreements are
silent on some key issues, are sometimes vague and inconsistent with each
other, and cannot adequately address the ethical issues inherent in CL.211
Similarly, he contends that statements of principle issued by CL
organizations (such as the widely used "Principles and Guidelines for
Collaborative Law") are inadequate as they "contain a mixture of procedural
rules and aspirational ethical goals limited exclusively to family law
matters." 212 Although some provisions are clear, some are imprecise or
"micro-manage" behavior.213 In general, he finds that standards and
guidelines issued by CL organizations are "underdeveloped, excessively
detailed, or internally confusing" regarding legal ethics.2 14 He cites research
indicating that many CL practitioners do not recognize ethical issues and
argues that it would be unwise to rely too much on local CL practice groups
to police ethical requirements. 215
He concludes, "[w]ith major ethical questions remaining unanswered, the
stage is set for a superior approach to resolve the ethical issues surrounding
collaborative law-an amendment to the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct. '216 He has an extremely broad conception of the scope of problems
that are ethical problems or that justify the adoption of new ethical rules for
CL lawyers. 217 Professor Fairman's proposal is intended to educate
211 Id. at 97.
2 12 Id. at 98.
213 Id. at 98-99.
214 Id. at 103.
2 15 Id. at 96-97.
216 Fairman, supra note 25, at 115-16.
217 The following three arguments illustrate Fairman's vast conception of the
legitimacy of and need for ABA's adopting ethical rules to regulate CL lawyers. First,
Fairman justifies the need for his proposed ethical rule by noting the fact that the
National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) has convened
a drafting committee for CL:
[Lande] mentions that NCCUSL is not in the business of drafting Model Rules [of
Professional Conduct for lawyers], that is the role of the ABA. He is certainly right
on that account. However, the Uniform Mediation Act was a joint effort between the
ABA and NCCUSL and its end product was clearly in the realm of ADR ethics.
Another joint effort is certainly not foreclosed.
Fairman, supra note 194, at 729 n. 112. This statement is puzzling for two reasons. First,
since Fairman acknowledges that NCCUSL does not draft the Model Rules, it seems
inconsistent to say that a joint effort with the ABA to draft such rules is not foreclosed.
More generally, he implies that it would be appropriate for the ABA to adopt ethical rules
for anything within a vague "realm of ADR ethics." Id. This is implausible.
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lawyers 218 and he argues that the educational function of ethical rules is
"sufficient in itself to justify creation of a new rule." 219 He proposes the text
of a rule including commentary. 220 The proposed rule codifies a combination
of general CL practice22 1 and ethical rules governing lawyers generally. 222 It
defines CL, states that CL lawyers represent their own clients, provides that
information relating to CL representation is confidential, and requires CL
lawyers to be competent. 223 The changes in the rules require lawyers to:
negotiate in good faith using cooperative strategies (and refrain from
Second, he writes:
Professor Lande also takes issue with the notion that questions of ethics surrounding
the withdrawal agreement have stunted collaborative law's growth outside the
family law area. Specifically, he contends that while the disqualification agreement
is a major barrier to expansion, it is not due to the "ethical aspects" of it. This
misunderstands my point: Any issue surrounding withdrawal of counsel involves
legal ethics rules. Whether the motivation to eschew the withdrawal agreement is
also economic does not change its inherent ethical character.
Id. at 717 n.49 (citation omitted). Thus, Fairman apparently suggests that anything
"surrounding" a procedure that has an ethical aspect justifies adoption of legal ethics
rules, regardless of whether the ethical aspect causes problems or whether a proposed rule
would prevent or solve any problems. Fairman's statement suggests that ethical rules are
appropriate if the causes of a problem are "also economic," indicating that he might
believe that ethical rules are not justified if a problem is caused exclusively by economic
factors. In this instance, however, he offers no evidence that the problems are caused by
the ethical aspects of the procedure. For further discussion of this issue, see infra Part
III.C. 1 .d.
Third, citing an appellate case that focuses exclusively on the enforceability of an
arbitration clause in a CL participation agreement, he suggests that ethical rules are
needed because of disputes unrelated to the essential features of CL. See Fairman, supra
note 194, at 718 n.54 (citing Kiell v. Kiell, 633 S.E.2d 827 (N.C. App. 2006)). He writes:
While the legal issue presented in this case is independent of collaborative law, the
district court must still determine whether to enforce the collaborative law
agreement and plainly illustrates that a break-down in the collaborative process can
place the participation agreement squarely before the a trial court-exactly what the
agreement is designed to prevent.
Id. The fact that some parties in CL do not reach agreement is not persuasive evidence of
the need for a new ethical rule. See infra Part III.C. 1.
218 See Fairman, supra note 25, at 74-77, 116-22.
219 Fairman, supra note 194, at 709.
220 See Fairman, supra note 25, at 117-21.
221 See supra notes 27-45 and accompanying text.
222 See infra Parts III.C. .a, III.C. .b.
223 See Fairman, supra note 25, at 117-18.
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threatening contested court proceedings), make full and voluntary disclosure
of all relevant information (and refrain from puffing), and withdraw from
representation if the CL process terminates.224 Although Professor Fairman is
primarily concerned about educating CL lawyers, violators of the proposed
rule would be subject to professional discipline administered by courts or
state bar associations and might also be subject to malpractice liability.225 He
concludes, "I believe it is freedom from choice, not freedom of choice that
collaborative law needs. '226
B. Summary of Peppet's Proposal for New Rule for Collaborative
Negotiation
Professor Peppet recently proposed revising the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct to accomplish goals similar to Professor Fairman's. 227
Professor Peppet's proposed rules would permit-and thus hopefully
encourage-lawyers to opt for higher ethical standards governing their
dealings with opposing parties.228 He contends that lawyers who make
credible commitments of cooperation to opposing parties can increase the
likelihood of reaching agreements that benefit their clients (as well as
themselves and opposing parties). 229 He argues that ethical rules are needed
when opposing counsel know little about each other so that they can make
such credible commitments of cooperation by subjecting themselves to
substantial professional discipline if they do not live up to those
commitments.230 His proposal would permit lawyers to choose particular
224 See id. For definition of puffing, see supra note 203.
225 For a discussion of how ethical rules are used to establish the standard of care in
legal malpractice cases, see McKee, supra note 2.
226 Fairman, supra note 194, at 738 n.153 (citing song lyric by 1980s New Wave
band, Devo).
227 Peppet, supra note 28, at 514-38.
228 See id.
229 Id. at 478-79.
230 Id. at 485-86, 494-98. He argues that in many cases merely signing an
agreement to be cooperative with an adversary-such as a CL participation agreement-
is unlikely to be effective in convincing the adversary of this commitment:
If an adversary knows that signing such an agreement is "cheap" and that the lawyer
has little to lose if the client later wants to secretly renege, the agreement is worth
very little. Again, this is particularly true in contexts that lack strong reputational
markets where reputational or informal sanctions might counteract the desire to
cheat.
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elements of the CL model and thus they (and their clients) would not be
limited to an all-or-nothing choice of either the full CL model or the existing
model of legal representation.
Professor Peppet proposes amendments to Model Rule 4.1 that would
enable lawyers to make separate "bundles" of commitments (each with the
clients' written informed consent) including: (a) proposed Rule 4.1(2)--to be
truthful, disclose all material information (without the current exceptions for
"puffing" etc.), and negotiate in good faith; (b) proposed Rule 4.1(3)-to
refuse to assist in negotiation "that works substantial injustice upon another
party;" and (c) proposed Rule 4.1(4)(b)-to be bound to withdraw from
representation if unable to comply with the obligations under Rules 4.1(2) or
4.1(3).231 Lawyers could terminate these obligations by giving notice, signed
by the lawyer and client, to all affected parties.232 Professor Peppet also
proposes an addition to Rule 7.4(e) permitting lawyers or law firms to
designate themselves as "Collaborative" or "Problem-Solving" if they
"primarily practice[] subject to the provisions of Rule 4.1(2) or 4.1(3)."233
Collectively, Professor Peppet's proposed provisions reflect key
elements of the general CL model. His proposal would enable lawyers and
clients to commit to the entire set of provisions at the outset of a case, which
would yield real advantages in many cases. Professor Peppet's proposal
would also permit unbundling of CL (which is, itself, an example of
"unbundled" legal services). 234 Thus lawyers and clients could commit to be
Id. at 496 (footnote omitted).
231 Id. at 523-24. The proposal would also amend Rule 1.6 to permit corresponding
modification of the lawyers' obligations of confidentiality. Id at 524.
232 Id. at 523.
233 Peppet, supra note 28, at 524. Peppet also refers to lawyers designating
themselves as "Rule 4.1(2)" or "Rule 4.1(3)" attorneys on a case-by-case basis. See id. at
528. The collaborative movement is virtually unanimous that the term "collaborative"
should be reserved for agreements involving the disqualification agreement. For example,
Pauline Tesler writes, "There is really only one irreducible minimum condition for
calling what you do 'collaborative law': you and the counsel for the other party must sign
papers disqualifying you from appearing in court on behalf of either of these clients
against the other." TESLER, supra note 31, at 6 (emphasis in original); see also Lande,
supra note 29, at 1324. Given the substantial and increasing recognition of CL as a
distinct practice, it would be appropriate to use terms other than "collaborative" in
Peppet's proposed Rule 7.4(e).
234 The practice of lawyers offering a limited scope of services is referred to as
"unbundling" or "discrete task representation." See generally N.C. St. B., Formal Ethics
Opinion 10, 2006 WL 980309 (2005) (approving limited scope of representation if the
lawyer fully explains it and the client consents); FORREST S. MOSTEN, UNBUNDLING
LEGAL SERVICES: A GUIDE TO DELIVERING LEGAL SERVICES A LA CARTE (2000) (manual
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truthful and fair in negotiation without committing to withdrawal, thus
encompassing Cooperative Law.235 Similarly, Professor Peppet's proposal
would not require a mutual commitment by all sides in a dispute, thus
facilitating the practice of "settlement counsel," 236 in which one party can
unilaterally decide to use a lawyer who is solely committed to negotiation. 237
Moreover, lawyers and clients would not need to make commitments about
negotiation at the outset of a case as they might prefer to wait until after they
have a chance to gauge each others' trustworthiness. 238
Professor Peppet's proposal certainly is not perfect. He identifies various
potential problems in getting the proposal adopted and implemented
effectively. 239 As compared with Professor Fairman's proposal, however, it
seems particularly appealing because of the greater potential impact (by
affecting a much wider range of the legal profession and the legal culture
generally) and for better following the principles set out above. The
following Part focuses primarily on Professor Fairman's proposal to illustrate
the principles in Part II and discusses Professor Peppet's proposal for
comparison.
published by the ABA Law Practice Management Section); Forrest S. Mosten,
Unbundled Legal Services and Unrepresented Family Court Litigants, 40 FAM. CT. REV.
(Special Issue) 10 (2002).
235 For definition of Cooperative Law, see supra note 62.
236 This is sometimes called "resolution counsel."
237 One party in a case may use settlement counsel without other parties doing so,
and settlement counsel need not withdraw if the party chooses to proceed in litigation.
Indeed, settlement counsel and litigation counsel may work simultaneously on the same
case. See generally William F. Coyne, Jr., The Case for Settlement Counsel, 14 OHIO ST.
J. ON Disp. RESOL. 367, 369-70 (1999); Roger Fisher, What About Negotiation as a
Specialty, 69 A.B.A. J. 1221, 1221-24 (1983); James E. McGuire, Why Litigators Should
Use Settlement Counsel, ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG., June 2000, at 107, 120-23;
Lande, supra note 29, at 1322-23 n.20.
238 See Peppet, supra note 28, at 528. Parties typically begin a CL process from the
outset of a case, though parties sometimes switch from traditional representation to CL in
the middle of a case.
239 Id. at 533-38. For discussion of additional problems with Peppet's proposal, see
infra Part III.C.3.
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C. Analysis of Fairman's Argument (Including Comparison with
Peppet's Argument)
1. Problematic Assessment of Need for New Ethical Rule
This Part argues that Professor Fairman's article does not persuasively
demonstrate the need for a new ethical rule for CL, as contemplated by
dispute system design theory. 240 His argument is based on the following
faulty premises. First, a new specific ethical rule for CL is needed to protect
CL users. 241 Second, CL is generally incompatible with the general model of
lawyering. 242 Third, CL does not fit very well within current codes of
ethics. 243 Fourth, the lack of an ethical rule specifically regulating CL
constitutes a "glass ceiling" that hampers the growth of CL.24 4
By contrast, Professor Peppet's proposal is based on a more persuasive
identification of a problem with the current ethical regime. Professor Peppet
argues that negotiators who want to be "small c" collaborative245 in
negotiations have a problem because they fear that their negotiating partners
would secretly take advantage of their honesty:
A negotiator must try to determine the "type" of her counterpart-is the
counterpart an honest, collaborative type or a more hard-bargaining,
deceptive type? The counterpart, meanwhile, may be sending off misleading
signals about his type. He may present himself as a collaborative, honest
type in order to mask that he actually plans to deceive for personal gain.246
Professor Peppet cites substantial research, which is consistent with
common experience, to show that this situation is a widespread problem.247
240 For discussion of dispute system design, see supra Parts II.A, II.B.2.
241 See infra Part III.C. 1.a.
242 See infra Part III.C. 1 .b.
243 See infra Part III.C. 1 .c.
244 See infra Part III.C. 1 .d.
245 See supra note 27 for description of a convention regarding capitalization of
"collaborative."
246 Peppet, supra note 28, at 482.
247 See id at 483 nn.22-24; Milton Heumann & Jonathan M. Hyman, Negotiation
Methods and Litigation Settlement Methods in New Jersey: "You Can't Always Get What
You Want", 12 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 253, 255 (1997) (survey of lawyers finding
that 71% of their cases were settled using positional negotiation despite the fact that 61%
of the respondents said that interest-based negotiation should be used more often); see
also Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Shattering Negotiation Myths: Empirical Evidence on the
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This problem is clearly related to the fact that lawyers are authorized to use
"puffing," 248 thus misrepresenting some of the most critical facts in
negotiation, including the parties' perceptions, interests, and intentions. His
proposal to amend the rules permitting these practices is designed to address
this real problem in traditional negotiation.
a. Lack of Demonstrated Harm to Clients Requiring New
Ethical Rule
Ethical rules are primarily intended to protect clients from harm that
might be caused by their lawyers and to provide legal sanctions when
lawyers violate the rules.249 There is no evidence that any CL clients have
been harmed by the lack of a special ethical rule for CL. As far as I know,
there have been no complaints against CL lawyers to bar associations and no
malpractice claims against CL lawyers. Five state ethics committees have
issued opinions about CL, which have all been in response to queries about
CL practice generally rather than allegations of particular misdeeds.250
Professor Fairman's article identifies several problems that CL clients
have experienced, but they all can be readily addressed under existing ethical
rules. He cites Professor Macfarlane's study of CL practice, noting that some
clients have not been given adequate disclosure of waiver of
confidentiality251 and attorneys' fees.252 He acknowledges, however, that
waiver of confidentiality would be covered under current Model Rule 1.6,253
Effectiveness of Negotiation Style, 7 HARV. NEGOT. L. REv. 143, 167 (2002) (survey of
lawyers in which 54% rated opposing counsel using a problem-solving approach as
effective and 4% as ineffective compared with 9% of lawyers who rated an adversarial
approach as effective and 53% as ineffective); Lande, supra note 29, at 1318-20 n.9.
248 See supra note 203 for definition of puffing.
249 Typically, the sanctions involve professional discipline. In addition, in suits
alleging professional malpractice, most courts will admit evidence of professional rules
as evidence of the standard of care for liability even though "[m]ost preambles contain
language specifically disclaiming any intention of undertaking to define standards for
civil liability of lawyers." See McKee, supra note 2, § 2.
250 For discussion of the state bar ethics opinions, see infra Part III.C. 1.c.
251 See Fairman, supra note 25, at 95.
252 Id. at 121-22 (citing research finding that some clients did not realize that their
lawyers would charge for discussions between members of the Collaborative team that
did not take place during meetings with the clients).
253 Id. at 95. He argues that Rule 1.6 offers a "framework" for handling this issue
but argues that it would require lawyers to do "a tremendously thorough job of obtaining
informed consent." Id. It is not clear how his proposed rule-which primarily states that
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and Rule 1.5 is quite adequate to regulate ethical issues about attorneys'
fees. 254 He also cites findings that the disqualification agreement caused
some clients to fear being stuck in CL 255 or losing their CL lawyers' services
"all information arising from and relating to a collaborative representation is
confidential"--would improve the situation. See id. at 117. The current Model Rules
contain a similar provision about the applicability to all sources of information. A
comment to Rule 1.6 states, "The confidentiality rule, for example, applies not only to
matters communicated in confidence by the client but also to all information relating to
the representation, whatever its source." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 3
(2004). In response to this Article, he argues that his proposed confidentiality provision
"extends the reach to third party experts and imposes a duty on counsel to ensure
compliance by both clients and consultants." Fairman, supra note 194, at 720-21 n.61.
Although it is good practice for lawyers to discuss confidentiality obligations with their
clients and the experts they hire, it seems odd, to say the least, to subject lawyers to
professional discipline if they fail to ensure the clients' or experts' compliance. His
proposed rule would also create confusion as it provides no exceptions to the
confidentiality obligation as provided in Rule 1.6(b), so lawyers and regulators would be
uncertain whether the exceptions applicable to lawyers generally also apply to CL
lawyers. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b).
Fairman notes that confidentiality is related to the duty of full disclosure in CL and
that clients effectively waive attorney-client privilege in CL as to communications in the
presence of the other lawyer or party. See Fairman, supra note 25, at 94-95. He is right to
be concerned about waiver of the attorney-client privilege, which protects against
compulsion of lawyers to disclose information conveyed to the attorney by the client,
whereas the ethical duty of confidentiality does not protect against compulsion of such
testimony. See Lande, supra note 29, at 1341-42 n.88. However, it is clearly possible to
advise clients about waiving attorney-client privilege. The Mid-Missouri Collaborative
and Cooperative Law Association's addendum to the CL lawyer retainer agreement
states:
Client understands that the Collaborative Law Process requires the Client to disclose
all relevant information to the other party and the other party's lawyer, subject to the
confidentiality provisions of the Collaborative Law Agreement between the parties.
Client understands that this constitutes a waiver of attorney-client privilege
regarding such disclosures. Client consents to this waiver.
MID-MISSOURI COLLABORATIVE AND COOPERATIVE LAW ASSOCIATION, ADDENDUM TO
LAWYER RETAINER AGREEMENT FOR PARTICIPATION IN COLLABORATIVE LAW PROCESS
3 (2006), http://www.mmccla.org/collabretainer.pdf. Lawyers should discuss this with
clients to make sure that they understand it.
254 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.5 (2003) (regulating attorneys' fees,
including requirement that lawyers communicate with client about basis of fees). Fairman
acknowledges that his proposed rule does not address disclosures about attorneys' fees.
See Fairman, supra note 25, at 121.
255 Fairman, supra note 25, at 91.
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because the other party decided to litigate.256 Ethics committees have found
that existing rules permit CL lawyers to use the disqualification
agreement, 257 but Professor Fairman's proposal authorizes it as well,258 so
his proposed rule would not solve problems caused by a disqualification
agreement. Moreover, existing rules require lawyers to obtain clients'
informed consent to use a disqualification agreement, 259 thus it is not clear
why a new rule is needed to address this concern.
Professor Fairman argues that the CL process requires full disclosure of
information by the parties and that existing ethical rules are inadequate to
govern this situation because they permit lawyers to engage in puffing.260
Asserting that "lawyers lie," Professor Fairman cites a survey of lawyers
finding that 61% of the respondents believe that it is ethically permissible to
use puffing in negotiation and that 73% actually did so. 26 1 It is not clear,
however, how often CL lawyers engage in puffing, if at all. If it is a problem
calling for a new ethical rule, Professor Peppet's proposal solves this
problem more directly and would be useful to a much larger class of lawyers
than Professor Fairman's proposal.262 In addition, states could enact statutes
establishing requirements for candor in CL, as Texas has done,263 and
lawyers would be ethically required to comply with those laws.264 Even
without a specific statute or ethical rule, CL participation agreements
typically include provisions establishing duties of full disclosure by lawyers
256 Id. at 93.
257 See infra notes 315-20 and accompanying text.
258 See Fairman, supra note 25, at 117-18.
259 See infra notes 305, 315-20 and accompanying text.
260 Fairman, supra note 25, at 87-91. For definition of puffing, see supra note 203.
261 Fairman, supra note 25, at 88 n.96. For discussion of puffing, see supra notes
203, 246-48 and accompanying text. Analysis of ethical issues relating to puffing is
beyond the scope of this Article. For the purpose of this discussion, this Article assumes
that puffing generally is problematic.
262 See supra notes 234-38 and accompanying text.
263 Texas Family Code § 6.603(c)(1) states that "A collaborative law agreement
must include provisions for: (1) full and candid exchange of information between the
parties and their attorneys as necessary to make a proper evaluation of the case ......
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.603(c)(1) (Vernon 2006). In addition to requiring lawyers to
communicate truthfully, such statutes would require CL clients to do so as well.
264 A comment to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct states that "A lawyer
should pursue a matter on behalf of a client despite opposition, obstruction or personal
inconvenience to the lawyer, and take whatever lawful and ethical measures are required
to vindicate a client's cause or endeavor." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmt.
1 (2004) (emphasis added).
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(as well as clients). 265 Thus it is not clear that puffing by CL lawyers is a
problem and, if so, that Professor Fairman's proposal would be the best way
to address it.
Professor Fairman quotes Professor Macfarlane's study which states,
"[o]utside a small group of experienced practitioners, the study has found
little explicit acknowledgment and recognition of ethical issues among CL
lawyers." 266 She also found that "[m]ore experienced collaborative attorneys
and [CL] groups are becoming increasingly conscious of the range of
unfamiliar ethical dilemmas raised by [CL] practice. ' 267 Moreover, the field
has developed and practitioners have gained some experience since she
collected her data. 268 Thus, although the CL field certainly needs to improve
its handling of ethical issues, the present and foreseeable future situation is
not quite as dire as Professor Fairman suggests. He also cites Professor
Macfarlane's statement that "CL lawyers manage the day-to-day and
meeting-by-meeting dynamics of their cases within a context of almost
unconstrained professional discretion." 269 This statement may be accurate to
the extent that CL cases, like most legal matters, are conducted "below the
radar" of professional monitoring and enforcement unless something goes
seriously awry. Regardless of the level of actual enforcement, CL lawyers
certainly are subject to a set of ethical constraints on their conduct, as
demonstrated below.270
265 For example, the standard participation agreement approved by the Texas
Collaborative Law Council states, "The Parties and Lawyers understand and agree that
the essential elements of the collaborative process are: ... Full and complete disclosure
of relevant information .. " See Texas Collaborative Law Council, Participation
Agreement,
http://www.collaborativelaw.us/articles/TCLCParticipation-AgreementWithAddendu
m.pdf (last visited July 1, 2006).
266 Fairman, supra note 25, at 77 (citing Julie Macfarlane, Experiences of
Collaborative Law: Preliminary Results from the Collaborative Lawyering Research
Project, 2004 J. DISP. RESOL. 179, 208).
267 MACFARLANE, supra note 59, at 64.
268 The study was conducted from 2001 to 2004, at an early stage of development of
the CL field, and many of the CL lawyers interviewed for her study had "limited practical
experience." Id. at 13-15, 63-64. Although the pioneer CL practitioners began in the
1990s, the vast majority of the growth occurred since 2000. At the time of the study, little
material had been published and CL organizations had done much less work to develop
their own ethical codes.
269 Fairman, supra note 25, at 77.
270 See infra Part III.C. 1 .c.
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b. Compatibility of Collaborative Law with the General Model
ofLawyering271
CL fits in the general model of lawyering better than Professor Fairman
contends. He describes the traditional model as operating under "an
inherently adversarial duty of zealous advocacy. '272 However, the general
model of legal ethics clearly permits lawyers to act collaboratively when it is
in their clients' interests that they do so. According to the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, lawyers have an obligation to "protect and pursue a
client's legitimate interests," 273 and lawyers do not have a duty to take
advantage of others or behave badly.274 The traditional model is certainly
adversarial in the sense that all parties are expected to act in their self-
interest, and their lawyers are required to represent clients' interests
diligently and loyally. In that structural sense, CL is also adversarial because
CL lawyers are obligated to represent their clients' interests. 275 Consider the
following CL case I recently heard about. A couple had a nasty and
271 The analysis in this Part is adapted from Lande, supra note 29, at 1331-38.
272 Fairman, supra note 25, at 86.
273 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. pmbl. 9 (2004).
274 See id. (lawyers have an obligation to "maintain[ ] a professional, courteous and
civil attitude toward all persons involved in the legal system"). The Preamble also states
that, "[a]s negotiator, a lawyer seeks a result advantageous to the client but consistent
with requirements of honest dealings with others." Id. 2.
275 Although there are some views in the CL community inconsistent with
traditional notions of lawyers' duties to represent their clients, these seem to represent a
minority view. See Lande, supra note 29, at 1331-38. For example, in a recent survey of
CL lawyers, 84.1% of respondents disagreed with the statement that CL lawyers are
"more like neutrals than like counsel for individual clients." See William H. Schwab,
Collaborative Lawyering: A Closer Look at an Emerging Practice, 4 PEPP. DIsp. RESOL.
L.J. 351, 380 (2004). Although this survey suggests that there is a relatively small
minority of CL lawyers who believe that they function as neutrals, the ethical opinions
that have addressed this issue are completely clear that the ethical rules require them to
function as advocates. See infra note 311 and accompanying text. In response to this
Article, Fairman writes, "[i]t is interesting that on this ethical topic where over 15% of
collaborative lawyers disagree with Lande, he does not advocate experimentation,
percolation, variety, choice, or systems design; instead he resolves the conflict by fiat."
Fairman, supra note 194, at 722. In fact, this Article argues that the existing rules and
opinions already address this issue appropriately, thus avoiding the need for a new rule to
clarify the situation. Fairman's proposal restates the view that CL lawyers represent only
their clients. It states, "[w]hile all collaborative lawyers engaged in resolving a dispute
share a common commitment to the collaborative law process, a collaborative lawyer
represents the client who has retained the collaborative lawyer's services." Fairman,
supra note 25, at 117.
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escalating conflict that resulted in a physical fight. One CL lawyer advised
her client to take photos of her bruises in case they were needed for litigation.
The person describing the case asked if that lawyer was being "truly
collaborative." The case presented a serious risk that the CL process would
terminate and that litigation might be used. It is inconceivable that the ABA
would approve an ethical rule authorizing lawyers to allow foreseeable risks
of litigation to go unheeded. Although CL lawyers themselves would not
represent CL clients in litigation, the CL lawyers' role must include an
adversarial element when needed to protect the clients' interests.27 6 In this
case, CL lawyers had a duty to take actions needed to protect the client's
interests if the case would be litigated. 277
The term "adversarial" is also used to mean use of strongly partisan
tactics to maximize one's advantage, typically harming others' interests in a
presumed zero-sum situation.278 Ethical rules do not require lawyers to be
adversarial in this sense. This meaning is often associated with a culture of
lawyers' zealous advocacy, reflected by Canon 7 of the Model Code of
Professional Responsibility, which states that a "lawyer should represent a
client zealously within the bounds of the law."'279 The ABA adopted the
Model Code in 1969, but it has been superseded by the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, which the ABA first adopted in 1983 and most
recently revised in 2003. 2 80 The Model Rules refer to the concept of zealous
advocacy only in the Preamble and comments. The Preamble to the Model
Rules states that the basic principles underlying the Rules "include the
lawyer's obligation zealously to protect and pursue a client's legitimate
276 See supra notes 273, 275 and accompanying text. A comment to the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct states, "A lawyer should pursue a matter on behalf of a
client despite opposition, obstruction or personal inconvenience to the lawyer, and take
whatever lawful and ethical measures are required to vindicate a client's cause or
endeavor." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmt. 1 (2003).
277 Some CL practitioners would argue that the lawyer was not being collaborative
because she advised her client to prepare for litigation and/or because she failed to inform
the other side that she advised her client to take the photographs. In my view, as long as
the CL lawyer takes appropriate action to protect the client's interests, in this case by
instructing the client to preserve evidence, the lawyer should comply with the CL
participation agreement. The lawyer can do this by informing the other side-if it would
not harm the client's interests to do so-and trying to protect the client's interests without
litigation if consistent with the client's interests. If the lawyer determines that it is not
possible to do so, she should terminate the CL process.
278 See MNOOKIN ET AL., supra note 44, at 17-27.
279 MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7 (1969).
280 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (2003).
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interests" 281 and that "[a]s advocate, a lawyer zealously asserts the client's
position under the rules of the adversary system. ' 282 A comment to Rule 1.3
states that a lawyer must "act with commitment and dedication to the
interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon the client's behalf."2 83
Because of such provisions and the legal culture surrounding them, some
lawyers believe that a duty of zealous advocacy requires lawyers to take
every possible action to benefit their clients that is not prohibited by law.2 84
That is not, however, an accurate reading of the requirements of the
Model Rules, which do not require lawyers to be adversarial in the sense of
being extremely partisan. A comment to Rule 1.3 states that a "lawyer is not
bound ... to press for every advantage that might be realized for a client. 285
Rather than requiring lawyers to take extreme positions, the duty of diligence
under the Model Rules requires lawyers to overcome opposition, personal
inconvenience, workload pressures, and procrastination to advance clients'
interests and complete the tasks involved in the representation. 286 Moreover,
under Rule 1.2(a), lawyers must consult clients about the means of pursuing
clients' objectives, which could involve clients' preferences about the degree
of the lawyers' zeal. 287 Some clients may have a strong and legitimate
objective to minimize conflict and, to achieve this objective, they may want
their lawyers to avoid acting in a harsh partisan manner. It is inconceivable
that the Model Rules would force lawyers to use a ruthless approach in these
situations. Professor Luban argues that "it is extremely doubtful that a lawyer
who represented a client diligently and competently would be disciplined for
failure to go the extra mile in hyperzeal. ' '288 He explains that, in practice,
lawyers are expected to "satisfice"-produce a "good enough" result-rather
281 Id. 9.
282 Id. at pmbl. 2.
283 Id. at R. 1.3 cmt. 1. For further discussion, see Lande, supra note 29, at 1332
n.54.
284 See Lande, supra note 29, at 1332 n.55.
285 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmt. 1 (2003). The American
Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers published Bounds of Advocacy, an ethical guide
supplementing the Model Rules of Professional Conduct and Model Code of Professional
Responsibility. The document argues that public and professional opinion is shifting
away from a model of zealous advocacy in which the lawyer's only job is to win and
toward a counseling and problem-solving model referred to as "constructive advocacy."
AM. ACAD. OF MATRIMONIAL LAW., BOUNDS OF ADVOCACY (2000)
'http://www.aaml.org/files/public/Bounds of Advocacy.htm.
286 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmts. 1-4 (2003).
287 See id. at R. 1.2(a).
288 DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 397 (1988).
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than to produce the maximum possible result.289 He argues that "if a lawyer
obtains a satisfactory outcome for a client, it is hard to imagine the lawyer
being disciplined because, with a lot more hustle and ruthlessness, she could
have wrung out a few dollars more." 290 As a practical matter, many
lawyers-probably most-normally act reasonably and cooperatively, 291 and
no one suggests that this is unethical. Thus it is simply inaccurate, both
theoretically and empirically, to say that the general regime of legal ethics
requires lawyers to be adversarial in the sense of taking extremely partisan
positions.
In addition, the Model Rules do not require lawyers to act in an
adversarial manner. A comment to Rule 1.3 states that a "lawyer's duty to act
with reasonable diligence does not require the use of offensive tactics or
preclude the treating of all persons involved in the legal process with
courtesy and respect. '292 The Preamble reads, "A lawyer should use the
law's procedures only for legitimate purposes and not to harass or intimidate
others." 293 It further states that the "principles [underlying the Model Rules]
289 David Luban, Partisanship, Betrayal and Autonomy in the Lawyer-Client
Relationship: A Reply to Stephen Ellmann, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1004, 1012 n.32 (1990).
2 90 Id. For a thoughtful analysis of "zealous advocacy," see JULIE MACFARLANE,
THE NEW LAWYER ch. 5 (forthcoming 2007).
291 Contrary to Fairman's description of family law practice as being "hyper-
adversarial," see Fairman, supra note 25, at 78, researchers find that in many contexts-
especially divorce practice-lawyers often strive to be considered "reasonable." See
LYNN MATHER ET AL., DIVORCE LAWYERS AT WORK 48-56, 87-109 (2001) (finding a
"norm of the reasonable lawyer" in the general community of divorce law practice);
HUBERT J. O'GORMAN, LAWYERS AND MATRIMONIAL CASES: A STUDY OF INFORMAL
PRESSURES IN PRIVATE PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE 132-43 (1963) (finding that almost two-
thirds of matrimonial lawyers define their roles as counselors who try to shape clients'
expectations and achieve reasonable results through negotiation); AUSTIN SARAT &
WILLIAM L. F. FELSTINER, DIVORCE LAWYERS AND THEIR CLIENTS: POWER AND
MEANING IN THE LEGAL PROCESS 53-58 (1995) (describing lawyers' strategies to
persuade clients to accept what is legally possible in negotiations); Howard S. Erlanger et
al., Participation and Flexibility in Informal Processes: Cautions from the Divorce
Context, 21 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 585, 593, 601 (1987) (finding that divorce lawyers often
press clients to accept settlements that the lawyers believe are reasonable). Although the
empirical research finds that some lawyers do act unreasonably, this is not the norm for
family lawyers. See, e.g., MATHER ET AL., supra at 48-51, 113-14, 121-25; SARAT &
FELSTINER, supra at 108; Andrea Kupfer Schneider & Nancy Mills, What Family
Lawyers Are Really Doing When They Negotiate, 44 FAM. CT. REV. 612, 616 (2006)
(categorizing more than sixty percent of lawyers negotiating family law cases as using a
problem-solving approach).
292 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmt. 1 (2004).
293 Id. at pmbl. 5.
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include the lawyer's obligation zealously to protect and pursue a client's
legitimate interests, within the bounds of the law, while maintaining a
professional, courteous and civil attitude toward all persons involved in the
legal system."294
This analysis shows that neither the traditional model nor the CL model
is so narrow as to preclude a substantial area of overlap between them.
Professor Fairman notes that there is a scholarly consensus that lawyers need
not be zealous advocates who always must take extreme positions. 295 Citing
Professor Macfarlane's research, finding that some CL lawyers experience
role tension between traditional and CL advocacy, he argues that a new
ethical rule for CL lawyers would "benefit those conflicted by role
tension."296 This is an unconvincing empirical claim. Adversarial and
problem-solving orientations are probably elements of lawyers' identities
that are deeply imbedded. It is hard to believe that simply promulgating a
new ethical rule would have much effect on fundamental aspects of
professional roles and identities.
c. Compatibility of Collaborative Law with Existing Ethical
Rules
Bar association ethics committees or officials in five states-
Kentucky, 297  Minnesota, 298  New Jersey,299  North Carolina,30 0  and
Pennsylvania 30 '-have considered the CL model, and all of them have found
that the general model is not inconsistent with ethical rules for lawyers.302
All of these opinions responded to questions about the model generally and
294 Id. 9 (emphasis added).
295 Fairman, supra note 194, at 715.
296 Id.
297 Ky. Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm., Op. E-425, 3 (2005), available at http://
www.kybar.org/documents/ethics_opinions/kbae-425.pdf.
298 Letter from Patrick R. Bums, Senior Assistant Director, Office of Lawyers
Professional Responsibility, Minnesota Judicial Center, to Laurie Savran, Collaborative
Law Institute (Mar. 12, 1997) (on file with author) (advisory opinion regarding CL).
299 N.J. Ethics Op. 699, 14 N.J.L. 2474, 182 N.J.L.J. 1055, 2005 WL 3890576, *5
(2005).30 0 N.C. St. Bar, Formal Ethics Op. 1, 2002 WL 2029469, *2 (2002).
301 Pa. Bar Ass'n Comm. Leg. Ethics & Prof'l Resp., Informal Op. 2004-24, 2004
WL 2758094, *3-5 (2004).
302 None of these opinions have considered problems presented as actual cases.
Rather, all the opinions provide general theoretical analysis, identifying particular rules
that practitioners should take care to follow.
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prompted the opinion-writers to canvass rules governing a wide range of
aspects of lawyer-client relationships. These opinions addressed lawyers'
duties regarding competence, scope of representation, diligent advocacy in
representing clients' interests, clients' right to settle, conflicts of interest,
confidentiality, candor in negotiations, clients' waiver of liability, lawyers'
withdrawal from representation, and advertising. Although these opinions do
not apply every single rule of professional conduct, they cover a wide range
of the most important rules.
For the most part, the opinions do not require any modification or
limitation of CL practice to be consistent with the general ethical rules
governing lawyers. For example, the Kentucky opinion specifically rejects a
suggestion that CL violates a supposed (but outdated) duty of zealous
advocacy.303
The most common theme in these ethics opinions is that clients must
give informed consent,304 which is a fundamental principle of legal ethics
303 Ky. Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm., Op. E-425, supra note 297, at 4-5.
304 For example, the Kentucky opinion states that the Kentucky ethical rules
"require the lawyer to fully explain the collaborative law process so that the client can
make an informed decision about the representation." Id. at 3. The opinion elaborates as
follows:
The kind of information and explanation that is essential to informed decision
making includes the differences between the collaborative process and the
adversarial process, the advantages and risks of each, reasonably available
alternatives and the consequences should the collaborative process fail to produce a
settlement agreement. Although the collaborative law agreement may touch on these
matters, it is unlikely that, standing alone, it is sufficient to meet the requirements of
the rules relating to consultation and informed decision making. The agreement may
serve as a starting point, but it should be amplified by a fuller explanation and an
opportunity for the client to ask questions and discuss the matter. Those
conversations must be tailored to the specific needs of the client and the
circumstances of the particular representation. The Committee recommends that
before having the client sign the collaborative agreement, the lawyer confirm in
writing the lawyer's explanation of the collaborative process and the client's consent
to its use.
Id. at 4. The New Jersey opinion is similar, stating that the CL lawyer must "disclose the
potential risks and consequences of failure of the collaborative law process to the client,
and the alternatives provided by other dispute resolution mechanisms such as traditional
litigation with its risks and consequences, and thereby receive informed consent." N.J.
Ethics Op. 699, supra note 299, at 5.
To highlight the clients' attention to the risks of CL, the Mid-Missouri Collaborative
and Cooperative Law Association includes a paragraph of the participation agreement in
bold, which the clients separately initial. See Mid-Missouri Collaborative and
Cooperative Law Association, Participation Agreement in Collaborative Law Process
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generally 30 5 as well as CL doctrine. 30 6 Some of the opinions refer to specific
II.D, http://www.mmccla.org/collabyartic.pdf (last visited June 29, 2006). In addition,
the Association uses an addendum to the lawyer-client retainer agreement which states,
"Client understands that Client may incur additional expense if the Collaborative Law
Process terminates without a settlement and Client needs to hire a new lawyer." Mid-
Missouri Collaborative and Cooperative Law Association, Addendum to Lawyer Retainer
Agreement for Participation in Collaborative Law Process 4,
http://www.mmccla.org/collab retainer.pdf (last visited Jan. 30, 2007).
305 Rule 1.0(e) of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct defines informed
consent as "the agreement by a person to a proposed course of conduct after the lawyer
has communicated adequate information and explanation about the material risks of and
reasonably available alternatives to the proposed course of conduct." MODEL RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.0(e) (2004). At least ten rules include provisions requiring clients'
informed consent. See id. R. 1.2, 1.4, 1.6, 1.7, 1.8, 1.9, 1.11, 1.12, 1.18, 2.3.
306 See, e.g., TESLER, supra note 3 1, at 20 ("We [CL] family lawyers need to hold
ourselves to rigorous standards of informed consent when we advise clients about the
dispute resolution options available to them .. "). Although CL doctrine generally
requires informed consent, some CL lawyers have not provided it adequately in practice.
In Macfarlane's study, she found that some CL lawyers are "so keen to get their first
[CL] experience" that they do not make their own assessments of appropriateness. See
MACFARLANE, supra note 59, at 65. Such lawyers presumably provide little or no
education to clients about risks and alternatives that would be needed for clients to
provide informed consent. In addition, Macfarlane found that although CL lawyers
typically provide information about various elements of the process, they often use such
abstract language that some clients complained that "the process [was] not proceeding as
they had expected." Id. at 64. She summarizes clients' complaints about lack of informed
consent to various aspects of the CL process:
Such complaints cover a broad range of process issues, including disclosure
requirements (such as access to private discussions with one's lawyer and lawyer-
client privilege); the pace at which the negotiations are proceeding; compliance (that
is, the limits on overseeing interim agreements or undertakings given in the four-
ways); and the calculation of fees.
Id. at 64-65.
Statements by CL practitioners promoting CL vary in the way that they model good
informed consent. For example, one practice manual carefully identifies advantages and
disadvantages of CL. See David A. Hoffman, Rita S. Pollak & Eileen M. Shaevel,
Collaborative Family Law, in MASSACHUSETrs DIVORCE LAW PRACTICE MANUAL
(2003); see also TESLER, supra note 31, at 94-95 (describing factors affecting suitability
for CL). By contrast, the International Academy of Collaborative Professional's website
identifies advantages but no disadvantages of CL, and its section "Is [collaborative
practice] for you?" includes no cautions about contraindications. See International
Academy of Collaborative Professionals, About Collaborative Practice: Is it for You?,
http://www.collabgroup.com/t2.asp?T=IsltForYou (last visited Jan. 30, 2007). In a recent
appearance on the nationally televised Today Show, CL lawyer Neil Kozek said that
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matters that the lawyers must inform CL clients, including provisions in CL
participation agreements that prohibit use of formal discovery processes and
court hearings 307 or require (or preclude) disclosure of certain facts such as
adultery. 30 8 The North Carolina opinion states that a lawyer may represent a
spouse in a CL case where the other spouse is represented by a member of a
local practice group, "provided both lawyers determine that their professional
judgment on behalf of their respective clients will not be impaired by their
relationship to the other lawyer through the [CL] Organization, and both
clients consent to the representation after consultation." 309 In addition to
requiring that CL clients give informed consent to using a CL process, the
Pennsylvania opinion focuses on informed decisionmaking about the
substantive decisions within the CL process. The author of that opinion
states, "I think you should do whatever you can to ensure that the client
understands that it is the client's decision whether to settle." 310 In sum, if CL
lawyers do not provide informed consent, the current ethical rules, as
reflected by these opinions, should be more than adequate to address
violations of these requirements.
The few limits or cautions in the ethical opinions are modest, reasonable,
and generally consistent with CL doctrine. The Pennsylvania opinion, for
example, holds that although CL lawyers may negotiate cooperatively with
the other lawyer and client, each CL lawyer must identify his or her client
solely as the party being represented. The CL lawyer does not represent the
family and is not the "lawyer for the situation."311
there are "no real risks" in CL. See New York Collaborative Law Group, Today Show
Clip, http://www.collaborativelawny.com/todayshow.php (last visited Jan. 30, 2007).
307 See Letter from Patrick Bums, supra note 298, at 1-2.
308 See N.C. St. Bar, Formal Ethics Op. 1, supra note 300, at 2.
309 Id. at 1. See also Pa. Bar Ass'n Comm., Informal Op. 2004-24, supra note 301,
at 9-10 (reaching similar conclusion).
310 Pa. Bar Ass'n Comm., Informal Op. 2004-24, supra note 301, at 13.
311 Id. at 3-5; see also Ky. Bar Ass'n Ethics'Comm., Op. E-425, supra note 297, at
3 (opinion stating that "the lawyer has a duty to represent his or her client competently
and to exercise independent professional judgment and give candid advice"); Letter from
Patrick Bums, supra note 298, at 2 ("Great care must be taken to clarify the nature of the
relationship between the attorney and the opposing party so that there is no
misunderstanding. It must be made very clear that the attorney does not represent the
opposing party and cannot provide that person with legal advice.").
Two CL practitioners report that "[u]sually, [clients] share the dispute resolution
costs equally from the community estate, regardless of which lawyer does the bulk of the
work. " Gay G. Cox & Robert J. Matlock, The Case for Collaborative Law, 11 TEX.
WESLEYAN L. REv. 45, 52 (2004). It is not clear whether this arrangement is consistent
with ethical rules in that the lawyers are not paid solely by their respective clients or by
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The Kentucky opinion states that a CL lawyer has a "heightened
obligation to communicate with the client regarding the representation and
the special implications of collaborative law process." 312 It states that a
lawyer "cannot advise a client to use the collaborative process without
assessing whether it is truly in the client's best interest. '313 The New Jersey
opinion notes the distinctive disqualification agreement in CL and that "in
some sense the client's continuing relationship with the lawyer is at the
discretion of the opposing spouse. This could conceivably place a
considerable hardship upon a client, who would then be required to retain
new counsel to take up the case from scratch. ' 314 Applying the rule
permitting "reasonable" limitations on the scope of representation, the
opinion states that this is a:
[D]etermination that must be made in the first instance by the lawyer,
exercising sound professional judgment in assessing the needs of the client.
If, after the exercise of that judgment, the lawyer believes that a client's
interests are likely to be well-served by participation in the collaborative
law process, then this limitation would be reasonable and thus consistent
with RPC 1.2(c). 315
Noting the "harsh outcome in the event of such failure" of the CL
process, the opinion provides the following guidance:
[W]e believe that such representation and putative withdrawal is not
"reasonable" if the lawyer, based on her knowledge and experience and
after being fully informed about the existing relationship between the
parties, believes that there is a significant possibility that an impasse will
result or the collaborative process otherwise will fail. 3 16
court order. If this arrangement is inconsistent with ethical rules, there are processes for
correcting the problem, including use of alternative fee agreements.
312 Ky. Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm., Op. E-425, supra note 297, at 3.
313 Id.
3 14 N.J. Ethics Op. 699, supra note 299, at 3.
3 15 Id. at 4.
316 Id. The opinion elaborates this point as follows:
[T]here are also some disputes that may not be amenable to resolution through the
collaborative process, such as where the relationship of the divorcing parties is so
irretrievably beyond repair that cooperative dialogue between them--a prerequisite
to the negotiations that are at the heart of collaborative law-is impossible. Where
such circumstances are apparent at the outset of the representation, it is the duty of
the lawyer either to decline the representation completely or to engage in it in the
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Similarly, the Pennsylvania opinion requires CL lawyers to assess the
appropriateness of CL for particular clients. It states that a CL lawyer "must
consider each client's situation (especially those who are victims of domestic
violence) when deciding whether a Rule 1.2(c) limitation on the scope of
representation is reasonable and whether you can, indeed, provide competent
representation to a client under the limited scope of representation." 317 In
calling for a case-specific analysis, the opinion indicates that some of the
relevant factors may include the individual parties' capabilities, attitudes
about professional services, and preferences about risk.318
Only one opinion concluded that there was any question whether the
disqualification agreement is inconsistent with the ethical rules. After
detailed analysis, the author of the Pennsylvania opinion stated, "It is not
completely clear to me whether all courts would agree that Rule 1.16(b)(4)
supports withdrawal in the CL context. ''3 19 Nonetheless, the opinion advised
CL lawyers to comply with the rules governing withdrawal and memorialize
the lawyers' decisions when a CL case is terminated before the divorce is
completed.320 The analysis of CL in the five ethics opinions shows that the
CL model can fit quite well within the existing ethical rules.32'
traditional manner outside the collaborative law process and without the requirement
of withdrawal in the event of adversarial proceedings.
Id
Given CL lawyers' duty under Rule 1.0(e) to obtain informed consent after
"explanation about the material risks of and reasonably available alternatives to the
proposed course of conduct," in my view, it is not appropriate to preclude clients from
using a CL process even if there is "substantial" risk that the parties will not reach
agreement in the process. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.0(e) (2004). For
example, some might consider that a 33% chance of termination without agreement to be
a "substantial" risk, but clients should have the option of making an informed choice to
use a CL process in that situation. It is not clear that ethics committees need to pre-
designate any threshold of risk that would make it "unreasonable" to use CL. If an ethics
committee believes that such a threshold is necessary or appropriate, it should be a much
higher level of risk.
317 Pa. Bar Ass'n Comm., Informal Op. 2004-24, supra note 301, at 7. Macfarlane
found that some CL lawyers did not screen cases for appropriateness for CL (including
but not limited to issues related to allegations of domestic abuse) or did only perfunctory
assessments. MACFARLANE, supra note 59, at 65-68.
318 Pa. Bar Ass'n Comm., Informal Op. 2004-24, supra note 301, at 7.
319 Id. at 12.
320 Id.
321 Fairman correctly notes that I now have greater confidence in the compatibility
of ethical codes to collaborative law than when I published articles in 2003 and 2005. See
Fairman, supra note 194, at 714 n.33. When I published the first article, I knew of only
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Professor Fairman argues that the body of existing ethics opinions is
problematic as various opinions are advisory, cryptic, and sometimes flag
issues rather than resolve them and there is no consensus about which rules
are implicated.322 Scholars make similar criticisms about some court
opinions, which is quite common in an incremental common law process of
building doctrine over time. Even where there are conflicting court opinions,
the typical remedy is to develop future case law to resolve the conflicts rather
than to enact new statutes. In the CL context, there are no conflicting rulings
and it is premature to adopt a new ethical rule.
one ethical opinion on the subject, which provides little analysis and thus is almost
entirely conclusory. See Lande, supra note 29, at 1329 n.46. By the time I wrote the 2005
article, I knew of only two ethics opinions. See John Lande, The Promise and Perils of
Collaborative Law, Disp. RESOL. MAG., Fall 2005, at 29, 30. As described in this Part, I
now know of five ethics opinions, including several that provide substantial analysis.
This larger body of opinions is generally quite consistent with each other, which provides
much greater confidence about how the ethical rules will be applied to CL. Fairman
mischaracterizes my different statements as reflecting an "about-face" and "reversal."
Fairman, supra note 194, at 718. He writes:
Professor Lande who concluded himself in 2003 "that the traditional rules of legal
ethics do not clearly answer questions about the propriety of disqualification
agreements." In 2005, Professor Lande declared the "CL participation agreements
probably violate ethics rules if they authorize lawyers to withdraw if clients do not
follow the lawyers' advice." It is unclear what intervening circumstances have led
Professor Lande to a different conclusion today.
Id. Fairman confuses the difference between the two statements. My 2003 statement
refers to a standard CL disqualification agreement, which provides for lawyer
disqualification if a party decides to litigate. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
My 2005 statement refers to disqualification if a client fails to follow the lawyer's advice,
a circumstance which is radically different in character and ethical consequences. The
2005 article cites the analysis in the 2003 article citing extensive authority prohibiting
lawyers from using retainer agreements authorizing withdrawal if clients do not follow
their advice. See Lande, supra note 29, at 1347-49 (my 2003 article); Lande supra, at
30-31 (my 2005 article).
Fairman sees no trend toward state ethics committees generating consensus over
time. Fairman, supra note 194, at 724. I believe that the ethics opinions to date have
already achieved remarkable consensus, as described in this Part. Although some of the
opinions certainly could provide more guidance, as Fairman argues, the fact remains that
all five opinions accepted the legitimacy of CL practice---or, at least, did not find it
inconsistent with current ethical rules. A five-to-nothing record seems like consensus to
me. The fact that Fairman does not see a consensus does not mean that it does not exist.
Indeed, even if one or two new opinions would conflict with the existing body of ethical
opinions, it would still represent a strong trend supporting use of CL. Thus I reach the
opposite conclusion from Fairman.
322 See supra notes 206-10 and accompanying text.
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d. Mistaken Claim that Lack of New Ethical Rule Hampers
Growth of Collaborative Law
Professor Fairman argues that legal ethics rules act as a "glass ceiling"
that hampers the growth of the CL field, 323 but there is no evidence that the
current ethical framework has had any such effect. Professor Fairman argues
that "[w]ith its meteoric ascension, in just fifteen years[,] collaborative law
has gone from an idea in the mind of a family law practitioner, burned out by
the bitterness of his practice, to a virtual ADR movement with thousands of
practitioners stretching across North America." 324 He provides the following
account of its success:
One indication of collaborative law's success is unquestioned: it is rapidly
spreading. There are currently more than 4,500 lawyers trained in
collaborative law. Eighty-seven distinct collaborative law practice groups
exist. Collaborative law is practiced in at least 35 states. It flourishes in
certain jurisdictions including Minnesota, Ohio, Connecticut, Texas,
Georgia, and the Canadian provinces. Even cursory intemet searches return
a bevy of collaborative law websites.3 25
This does not sound like a movement whose growth has been seriously
hampered. Of course one could argue that the movement would have been
even greater but for restraints resulting from ethical rules. Indeed, Professor
Fairman notes that CL is limited almost exclusively to family law and
suggests that CL might not be used in other cases because of the ethical
323 Fairman, supra note 25, at 74.
324 Id. at 73; see also id at 103 n.195 ("The rise of collaborative family law in Texas
is truly meteoric.").
325 Id. at 83 (footnotes omitted). Although the use of CL has grown dramatically
since 1990, one should not exaggerate its potential. CL is most relevant for the population
of divorce cases in which both sides have lawyers. A study of sixteen divorce courts
found that both parties were represented by lawyers in an average of 28% of cases and
that this percentage ranged from 20% to 47% in the different courts. See John A. Goerdt,
Divorce Courts: Case Management, Case Characteristics, and the Pace of Litigation, in
16 URBAN JURISDICTIONS 48 (1992). Some CL models include routine use of individual
coaches plus jointly retained child development and financial specialists. In communities
using that model, CL is limited to clients willing and able to hire the full range of
professionals. One compilation of data from 145 CL cases found that 66% of couples
using CL had combined incomes of $100,000 or more. See Cox & Matlock, supra note
311, at 52 n. 15 (noting that the "majority of clients are still relatively affluent"); see also
Lande, supra note 29, at 1324-25.
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controversy over the disqualification agreement. 326  Although the
disqualification agreement probably is a major obstacle to such expansion,327
it is extremely unlikely that the ethical aspects of the disqualification
agreement are the source of the problem. If the ethical issues were the cause
of the problem, one would expect that lawyers would rarely use CL in family
law cases unless CL family lawyers are especially indifferent to ethical
issues. Moreover, one would expect that the ethics opinions legitimizing the
use of CL 328 would reassure lawyers worried about ethical issues.
The problem with the disqualification agreement in nonfamily cases is
that the structure of the cases and legal practice-rather than the ethical
rules-generally make disqualification extremely unattractive both to
lawyers and clients. 329 If the ABA would adopt a rule unequivocally
endorsing the ethical legitimacy of the disqualification agreement, it would
still be highly unlikely that many lawyers or clients in nonfamily cases would
use CL. In general, lawyers and clients who have actual or potential ongoing
relationships with each other are understandably wary about sacrificing those
relationships if they do not settle a given case. Using CL, with its
disqualification agreement, is especially problematic for them because it puts
the future of their relationship in the hands of an opposing party. It is not
surprising that both lawyers and clients generally would have little appetite
for ending the lawyers' representation in a case after investing a substantial
amount of time and effort into it. If a nonfamily CL case terminates without
settlement, plaintiffs' lawyers paid on contingency would have a problem
collecting fees, and defense lawyers would watch a potentially lucrative case
go to a competing lawyer or law firm. Moreover, clients would have to invest
more time and money in educating new lawyers about the case. Although this
is also true in family cases, the consequences of disqualification generally are
much greater in nonfamily cases because of the generally larger financial
stakes. In particular, civil litigators are likely to have a smaller number of
large cases, as compared with family lawyers, so the loss would be much
greater. Not surprisingly, the lawyers and clients in nonfamily cases often
326 Fairman, supra note 25, at 83
327 See Lande, supra note 29, at 1329 ("[T]he disqualification agreement is a major
barrier to acceptance by major businesses and law firms."). Accord Hoffman, supra note
33 (describing his experience with clients in nonfamily cases who "generally do not see
the advantage of the disqualification provision"); Peppet, supra note 28, at 490-92
(identifying multiple reasons why lawyers and clients in nonfamily cases would find that
the disqualification agreement would not satisfy their interests).
328 See supra Part III.C.1 .c.
329 See supra note 327 and accompanying text.
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value their relationships more than in family cases. 330 Given the greater risks,
parties and lawyers would need greater trust that the opposing side would not
abuse the process. Family lawyers tend to practice in small local professional
communities and if CL lawyers behave uncollaboratively, they face greater
risks to their reputations and potential for future cases. 33 1 In nonfamily cases,
the lawyers have much less expectation of repeat interactions with the other
lawyers in a case, thus there is greater temptation to take advantage and less
security in the process. 332 Therefore the practical and business aspects of the
disqualification agreement, rather than the ethical issues, function as a barrier
to use of CL in nonfamily cases.
2. Focus on Promoting a Single Process Rather than Improving
the System to Meet Needs of Disputants and System
Stakeholders
Professor Fairman's proposal focuses specifically on promoting CL
practice rather than dispute resolution options more generally. This is not
unusual or necessarily problematic. Indeed, it is often wise to focus
specifically on a particular issue and analyze it in depth. Improving
individual elements in a system obviously can be helpful for the entire
system. Thus there is nothing necessarily wrong with Professor Fairman's
specific focus on CL. Because of his particular focus, however, his
arguments reflect a flawed approach to policymaking and a missed
opportunity to have greater impact.
Professor Fairman's "glass ceiling" argument (that ethical rules hamper
the growth of CL)333 reflects a problematic assumption at odds with dispute
system design theory. This argument assumes that expansion of CL per se
should be the appropriate policy goal.334 ADR processes are means to an
330 Id.
331 As a practical matter, expectations of collaboration are enforced by social norms
and the market. If a CL lawyer gets a reputation for being an uncollaborative "shark,"
other lawyers in that community are less likely to refer cases to the lawyer or handle CL
cases with him or her.
332 For a comparison of dynamics in commercial and family law practice, see
Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Disputing Through Agents: Cooperation And
Conflict Between Lawyers in Litigation, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 509, 534-50 (1994).
333 Fairman, supra note 25, at 74.
334 Fairman challenges my argument that he is promoting a single ADR process and
he responds by charging that this is actually what I am doing. Citing my piece entitled,
Recommendation for Collaborative Law Groups to Encourage Members to Offer
Cooperative Law in Addition to Collaborative Law, he writes, "[i]f anyone appears to
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end-satisfaction of important interests of disputants and other
stakeholders-and promotion of these processes should not be the goal in
itself. If lawyers and clients are not choosing to use CL, dispute resolution
professionals should consider why they are making these decisions and how
to craft ADR processes that would satisfy their perceived interests. 335 By
contrast, there is evidence that a substantial set of lawyers aspire to the goal
of Professor Peppet's proposal, i.e., to increase their use of interest-based
negotiation, which is a much more generic process than CL.
The limited potential impact of Professor Fairman's proposal is a
function, in part, of the ideological commitment to a narrow model by CL
practitioners, which would be frozen in place by Professor Fairman's
proposal. Although proponents of CL aspire for its broad growth as a
movement, their orthodox commitment to their specific model severely limits
its general applicability. If Professor Fairman's proposal would be adopted,
the overwhelming majority of lawyers would find it irrelevant to their work
and thus it would have limited impact on legal practice. Based on past
experience, virtually no lawyers handling nonfamily cases would be affected
and even many family lawyers would not be engaged because they would
find the model to be too restrictive. Moreover, Professor Fairman's proposal
would signal that most lawyers are uncollaborative and that the legal
profession generally would have little to gain from CL.
By contrast, Professor Peppet's proposal has the potential for much
greater impact on legal practice. In addition to benefiting CL practice, it
would promote a range of other processes including settlement counsel,
Cooperative Law, and even ad hoc efforts to be collaborative in individual
cases.336 Rather than providing clients with a single, fixed model to accept or
promote one form of ADR over another, it would be Professor Lande's preference for so-
called 'cooperative law."' Fairman, supra note 194, at 733 (emphasis added). He explains
his reasoning as follows: "Professor Lande sees his support for cooperative law as
providing a choice, not a preference. I see accommodation for this variant as tantamount
to promotion given that cooperative law is contrary to collaborative law on the defining
element of the withdrawal agreement." Id. at 733 n. 129.
This is Alice-in-Wonderland logic. Fairman essentially argues that by suggesting
that parties have good access to processes such as Cooperative Law in addition to his
preferred process, CL, that I prefer the other processes. In fact, I have argued that parties
may well prefer CL over Cooperative Law in some situations. See Lande & Herman,
supra note 62, at 285. See also MID-MISSOURI COLLABORATIVE AND COOPERATIVE LAW
ASSOCIATION, CHOOSING COLLABORATIVE LAW OR COOPERATIVE LAW (2006),
http://www.mmccla.org/choosingccl.pdf (identifying benefits and possible risks of both
Collaborative Law and Cooperative Law).
335 See supra notes 52-53, 87-88 and accompany text.
336 See supra notes 234-38 and accompanying text.
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reject, it gives a greater variety of options of features to choose to a much
greater population of clients (as well as the dispute resolution professionals
who serve them). Although there certainly are some variations within the CL
model, 337 the range of choices is much narrower than under Professor
Peppet's proposal.
More generally, Professor Peppet's proposal focuses on systemic change
in negotiation by inviting lawyers to be as agreeable as they and their clients
deem appropriate in given cases. Because his proposal does not require
lawyers and clients to use a disqualification agreement, it would have much
greater appeal to lawyers in nonfamily cases. Moreover, rather than marking
a sharp divide between CL lawyers and other lawyers, it would indicate that
all lawyers may want to use tools to help clients negotiate more
cooperatively in some cases. The provisions creating general designations of
lawyers would also permit greater specialization, development of reputations
for cooperation, and market definition. Thus, this proposal has the potential
to stimulate broader changes in the system of legal practice.
Publication of both proposals reflects the ideas of individual scholars,
reflecting a traditional and appropriate mechanism for advancing theory and
practice. For either proposal to advance, it would be helpful and appropriate
to engage representatives of the range of affected stakeholder groups in
analyzing their interests and revising the proposals accordingly. 338
337 See Lande, supra note 29, at 1376 n.244.
338 Fairman asks who would be the stakeholders:
Who exactly are these stakeholders that should be included in collaborative law's
ethical rulemaking? Collaborative lawyers for sure, but anyone else? A cooperative
law practitioner-if one exists? General practitioners? Former clients? A triumvirate
of academics-like Lande, Peppet, and me? If these are our stakeholders, couldn't
we already identify this group and go forward? But move forward with what. Who
will set the ethical agenda and convene the stakeholders? And to what end.
Apparently there are distinct advantages to laying claim to the option to do nothing
except wait and see.
Fairman, supra note 194, at 737. In keeping with his proposal for a new rule, Fairman's
question assumes that the appropriate policy necessarily would be to develop a new rule.
My proposal would be to focus on a careful policy analysis, which might or might not
ultimately result in the adoption of a new rule, depending on the results of a needs
assessment.
For example, CL practitioners who want to encourage parties in nonfamily cases to
use CL might convene representatives of typical parties, trade association officials,
insurance company representatives, judges, court administrators, professionals in allied
professions-such as accountants or bankers, as well as CL and non-CL lawyers who
practice in the area. This might include Cooperative lawyers, who do, in fact, exist. See,
e.g., DIVORCE COOPERATION INST., COOPERATIVE DIVORCE AGREEMENT, available at
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3. Excessive Reliance on Regulation as Policy Strategy
Professor Fairman's proposal relies exclusively on adoption of a new
ethical rule as a policy strategy rather than proposing a more comprehensive
strategy that incorporates a range of policy options and that recognizes the
limits of rulemaking. His proposal assumes that promulgating an ethical rule
would be effective in changing complex behavior to adhere to the
rulemakers' intentions, 339 although there is much evidence that people often
http://cooperativedivorce.org/members/members.cfm (last visited Jan. 30, 2007) (roster
of 72 Cooperative Lawyers in Wisconsin). Although academics are not likely to be
stakeholders, it might be helpful to include some academics to contribute their knowledge
and perspective in a DSD planning committee. This list is illustrative and not intended to
be comprehensive. Some of these potential stakeholders might not be interested in
participating and there might be other groups that should be represented. The DSD
committee would do some assessment of the needs of the stakeholders for handling legal
disputes and perceived deficiencies of the status quo. Depending on the results of the
needs assessment, the planning committee might recommend adoption of rules,
educational efforts, and/or other policies to address the identified needs.
For a hypothetical example of rulemaking in the family context, if rulemakers were
to become aware of significant problems because victims of domestic abuse were not
sufficiently protected in the CL process, the rulemaking authority might convene a policy
planning committee of stakeholders. An illustrative and nonexhaustive list of potential
stakeholder groups in this context might include family court judges and other court
personnel, family mediators, mental health professionals, advocates for battering victims,
social service providers, and CL and non-CL family lawyers. Again, the convenors might
include academics if that would be helpful. The committee would do a needs assessment
to investigate the nature and extent of the problem, and if it revealed significant
problems, the committee might recommend adoption or revision of legal rules
specifically governing CL and/or other policies to address the problems.
Obviously, this is not "doing nothing" as Fairman claims.
339 For example, Fairman cites problems experienced by lower-functioning clients
and inexperienced CL lawyers regarding informed consent, and he assumes that merely
promulgating a new ethical rule would make a significant contribution to solving their
problems. See Fairman, supra note 194, at 721-22. This is a questionable assumption at
best, especially considering that the doctrine of informed consent is already well-
established in the general ethical rules.
Like many lawyers and legal scholars operating based on legal centralist
assumptions, Fairman generally assumes that rules are the right way to manage behavior
and that they necessarily have pragmatic effects. See supra note 94 and accompanying
text (describing legal centralist premises). He writes, "Professor Lande speaks of
'principles' and 'policymaking.' I prefer the practicalities." Fairman, supra note 194, at
737. Our difference, however, is not about preferences for practical results. The
policymaking principles that I propose are intended to produce very practical effects. Our
difference is about which approach to policymaking is likely to be more effective in
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ignore or "game" rules.340 To his credit, Professor Fairman identifies various
mechanisms within the CL community as a form of ethical regulation. But
his proposal does not consider those mechanisms as part of a comprehensive
strategy, in part because he believes in the value of having a uniform rule for
CL practice. As a result, his proposal would not be as effective as a
comprehensive strategy that focuses primarily on enhancing localized
capabilities for promoting good CL practice.
Noting that ethical rules are not widely enforced, Professor Fairman
bases his proposal on the premise that "[r]ules of ethics serve a vital
educational function" 34 1 which is "sufficient in itself to justify creation of a
new rule."'342 Rules are typically adopted to regulate behavior by defining
permissible behavior and using (or threatening) legal sanctions for rule
violations. Education is not the primary purpose of such rules, but rather is a
mechanism to promote compliance. 343 Ethical rules clearly can help spur
educational efforts, both as a source of motivation (i.e., to comply with
requirements and avoid adverse consequences) and as a body of material to
be learned. Certainly practitioners need continuing education, especially in
new areas of practice like CL. Adopting a special rule specifically for CL
presumably would have some educational benefit in focusing lawyers'
attention on ethical issues, though it is not clear how much additional benefit
it would provide or whether the benefit would outweigh the disadvantages of
doing so. There are many other policy options to promote education, and
policymakers are wise to develop strategies employing the most appropriate
combination of policy options. This is especially true in the CL context,
achieving our respective goals, and I submit that my approach is more likely to produce
significant practical benefits.
340 See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
341 Fairman, supra note 25, at 75. He writes, "[p]urely from an educational
perspective, new rules for collaborative law seem warranted." Id. at 76.
342 Fairman, supra note 194, at 709.
343 The Preamble to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct states that achieving
compliance "depends primarily upon understanding and voluntary compliance,
secondarily upon reinforcement by peer and public opinion and finally, when necessary,
upon enforcement through disciplinary proceedings." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT
pmbl. 16 (2004). Courts and bar associations are prudent to rely a great deal on
educational strategies to accomplish the goals of ethical rules. Educating lawyers to
comply voluntarily is likely to be an effective and efficient approach for most lawyers.
Relying primarily on enforcement would require many more resources than are likely to
be available and would probably be ineffective in preventing or addressing many
violations. Nonetheless, the potential for enforcement is an essential element of ethical
rules and distinguishes them from nonregulatory educational efforts.
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which is developing an incredible array of educational resources. 344
Professor Fairman provides an excellent overview of the multiple forms
of ethical guidance available for CL lawyers. He notes that CL lawyers are
organized into local practice groups which provide a gatekeeping function,
both for initial admission as well as for continued membership. 345 These
groups typically have membership requirements including education, basic
and continuing training, attendance at group meetings, and commitment to
use a standard CL participation agreement 346 and comply with specialized
ethical standards promulgated by CL organizations.347 Nonetheless,
Professor Fairman does not seriously consider whether direct educational
efforts using the robust CL infrastructure 348 would produce a more effective
educational strategy. For example, other options include formation of ethics
committees by CL organizations, publication of new protocols and
educational materials for CL professionals and clients about ethical issues,349
development of ethics modules for CL trainings, use of listservs or websites
to identify ethical problems and suggest ways to address them, use of peer
consultation group techniques in regular CL membership meetings, and
establishment of regular ethics tracks in CL conferences. Given the complex
nature of ethical problems that Professor Macfarlane describes, 350 these kinds
of more intense and interactive strategies seem much more likely to be
effective in addressing actual ethical problems than merely promulgating a
344 See supra notes 34-41 and accompanying text.
345 Fairman, supra note 25, at 96-98.
346 See, e.g., Collaborative Family Law Association, Application for Membership,
http://www.collaborativefamilylaw-mo.org (last visited Jan. 30, 2007).
347 Various Collaborative Practice organizations have established ethical codes and
detailed protocols, most notably the International Association of Collaborative
Professionals, which has promulgated "Principles of Collaborative Practice," "Minimum
Standards for Collaborative Practitioners," "Minimum Standards for a Collaborative
Basic Training," "Ethical Standards for Collaborative Practitioners," and "Minimum
Standards for Collaborative Trainers." International Academy of Collaborative
Professionals, Standards, Ethics and Principles,
http://www.collaborativepractice.com/t2.asp?T=Ethics (last visited Jan. 30, 2007).
348 Fairman writes that he has "no design on systems design." See Fairman, supra
note 194, at 714. For description of the current CL infrastructure, see supra notes 34-43
and accompanying text.
349 A protocol that may be particularly instructive about ethical problems would be
for professionals to regularly collect feedback from clients. Thanks to Julie Macfarlane
for this suggestion.
350 See supra notes 251-56, 266-70, 290 and accompanying text.
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necessarily vague ethical rule.35' Of course, these are not mutually exclusive
policy options, and one could develop a strategy that includes both direct
educational initiatives as well as new regulation. Logically and strategically,
however, it would make sense to focus first on the educational initiatives and
propose a new rule only if such direct educational initiatives seem
inadequate.
The CL infrastructure is an especially important collection of tools for
the developing CL practice, so policymakers should make particular efforts
to strengthen it. The local practice groups and the broader Collaborative
professional associations are grappling with actual problems and developing
experience-based insights and protocols. The kinds of educational initiatives
suggested here would help develop that infrastructure. By contrast, drafting a
new ethical rule would involve a relatively small number of experts in a
centralized process that would engage a much smaller proportion of the CL
community.352 In the first instance, CL practitioners should have the
opportunity to develop and refine their philosophies and techniques. 353
Professor Fairman notes that CL participation agreements provide some
ethical guidance, but he contends that they are inadequate because they do
not provide a consensus on ethical practice and they do not bind CL lawyers
to an ethical code. "Consequently, the nuanced ethical issues implicated by
collaborative law cannot be adequately addressed. Important questions are
answered with generalities or omitted altogether .... Thus, the participation
agreement is not a substitute for an ethical code for collaborative lawyers. '354
He certainly is correct that participation agreements cannot substitute for an
ethical code for CL lawyers. Since the states already have ethical rules
governing lawyers' behavior, no substitute is needed. 355 Rather, participation
351 See supra Part II.C.5.
352 Cf Lande, supra note 49, at 109-18 (arguing that a dispute system design
process that promotes local participation in policymaking would be more effective in
reducing bad faith conduct in mediation than a process relying on rules drafted by a small
group of experts).
353 Fairman asks, "how will these revisions [to CL participation agreements and
ethical codes] ever take place absent an authoritative model?" and answers this question
by saying that, "[i]n order to facilitate the revision process, Model Rule 2.2 is needed
first." Fairman, supra note 194, at 726. CL practitioners have developed and refined their
agreements and ethical codes in the existing regulatory environment. This Article
demonstrates that a new ABA rule is not needed and would not actually help them
grapple with most, if any, ethical issues.
354 Fairman, supra note 25, at 97-98.
355 Arguing that the general ethical rules for lawyers are incompatible with CL,
Fairman criticizes a provision in the Ethical Standards for Collaborative Practitioners
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agreements (and CL organizations' ethics standards) are useful to supplement
the general ethical rules. 356 Indeed, the courts and bar association ethics
committees have limited expertise and interest in CL and thus would have
difficulty making nuanced interpretations of specific CL practices that are
not governed by the general ethical rules. To the extent that CL participation
agreements and ethical codes do not properly address nuanced ethical issues,
the solution should be to revise the agreements or specialized codes rather
than for the ABA to adopt a new general ethical rule about CL.357 CL
practice is still quite new, and it will take time to develop, including dealing
with novel ethical issues, so it should not be surprising (or disturbing) that
there is not uniformity in CL practice. Indeed, there is great value in having a
diversity of practices to promote innovation and choice, especially in this
early phase of development. 358
The existing policy process is well designed to identify and address
ethical problems, and it should be permitted to work unless and until there is
evidence that it is inadequate and that a new ethical rule is likely to achieve
issued by the International Association of Collaborative Professionals requiring
practitioners to comply with the ethical rules of their disciplines. See id. at 101. I disagree
that there is such incompatibility, as described supra Part III.C. 1 .b.
356 Fairman's proposed rule is not justified as a default rule. See supra notes 146-50
and accompanying text (describing one justification for regulation as providing default
rules when a substantial number of people have actually encountered significant
problems because their ADR agreements were silent or ambiguous about particular
issues). The provisions in Fairman's proposed rule are generally covered in a
combination of the general ethical rules for lawyers, CL organizations' ethical codes, and
CL participation agreements. Practitioners can get much more detailed ethical education
by referring to the International Association of Collaborative Professional's ethics
standards, for example, than by consulting Fairman's proposed rule. See Int'l Acad.
Collaborative Prof., Ethical Standards for Collaborative Practitioners, available at
http://www.collaborativepractice.com/articles/EthicsStandardsfinal.pdf (last visited Jan.
30, 2007).
357 Fairman notes that participation agreements frequently include good-faith
requirements, which I have criticized in mediation and CL rules. See Fairman, supra note
194, at 733. Although I believe that there are significant potential problems with good-
faith requirements, the problems are magnified if these requirements are etched into legal
rules, which have broad applicability and are hard to change. By contrast, if individual
practitioners (or practice groups) include such provisions in their participation
agreements, the effects are limited to those practitioners and their clients. It is easier for
local groups and practitioners than official rulemakers to change provisions if problems
arise. Moreover, based on values of diversity and choice, I endorse practitioners
developing their own approaches based on their own perspectives, even though I may
have a different perspective.
358 See supra Part II.B.
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appropriate policy goals. The current process starts with the foundation of the
general ethical rules governing lawyers, particularly the ABA's Model Rules
of Professional Conduct. 359 Bar association ethics committees (at the
national, state, and local levels) write opinions to provide a common law
gloss on the rules. Much like courts interpreting statutes, ethics committees
confront concrete problems and develop incremental rules based on
experience. Judges sometimes exercise restraint by deferring decisions until
after there has been sufficient opportunity for the issues to "percolate." 360
Thus higher courts sometimes decide not to take cases or decide issues until
enough lower courts have had a chance to consider the issues. Similarly, in
the federal system, the states are considered "laboratories of democracy" that
permit states to choose their own rules and permit federal policymakers to
359 Ethical rules based on the Model Rules have been adopted by all but three states.
See A.B.A., Center for Professional Responsibility,
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/modelrules.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2007).
360 See Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, The Philosophy of
Certiorari: Jurisprudential Considerations in Supreme Court Case Selection, 82 WASH.
U. L.Q. 389, 435-41 (2004) (describing differing views of Supreme Court justices about
percolation of issues in federal courts); J. Clifford Wallace, The Nature and Extent of
Intercircuit Conflicts: A Solution Needed for a Mountain or a Molehill?, 71 CAL. L. REv.
913, 929 (1983) ("When circuits differ, they provide reasoned aiternatives from which
the resolver of the conflict can derive a more informed analysis. The many circuit courts
act as the 'laboratories' of new or refined legal principles (much as the state courts may
do in our federal system).").
Todd Tiberi provides a useful summary of arguments in favor and against courts'
use of percolation. Todd J. Tiberi, Comment, Supreme Court Denials of Certiorari in
Conflicts Cases: Percolation or Procrastination?, 54 U. Prrr. L. REV. 861, 863-69
(1993). Advocates of percolation argue that it results in better decisions because judges
will have more arguments to consider and that weaker arguments would have been
"weeded out" in earlier cases. Id. at 864-66. Opponents of percolation argue that delay in
resolution of legal issues results in inconsistent decisions, unnecessary litigation, and
diminished respect for federal law. Id. at 866-69. Tiberi attempts to test empirically
whether percolation produces better results. He analyzes statutory interpretation cases in
the 1988 term of the U.S. Supreme Court and compares "percolated cases"-defined as
cases with conflicts between circuits-and nonpercolated cases. To measure quality of
decisions, he canvasses reactions of legal commentators, Supreme Court justices' votes in
cases, and whether Congress later "overrode" the decisions. He concludes that
"percolated decisions are not demonstrably better than nonpercolated ones." Id. at 869-
82. One should not put much weight on these findings considering the crude
methodology and the fact that percolated decisions (i.e., where the circuits are split) are
likely to be more controversial than nonpercolated decisions, and so one should not
expect that those decisions would be viewed more favorably. Moreover, the situation that
Tiberi studied is different from the current situation in CL, where the ethics opinions
have minor variations but no clear conflicts. See supra Part III.C. 1 .c.
699
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
consider different states' experiences as experiments to inform decisions on
the federal level.361 In relatively unusual situations, it makes sense to adopt
new rules to deal with new issues or revise old rules to correct problems in
interpretation. In the CL context, the "common law" process of producing
ethics opinions seems sufficient to provide guidance to practitioners, ethics
committees, and courts.362 Professor Fairman has not demonstrated the
inadequacy of the combination of general and specialized ethical policies to
manage CL practice. 363
It would be quite premature for the ABA to promulgate a Model Rule for
Professional Conduct for CL as Professor Fairman suggests. 364 Both the CL
361 Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis is credited with the concept of using
states as laboratories of democracy, writing, "It is one of the happy incidents of the
federal system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a
laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the
country." New State Ice Co. v. Liebman, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
Fairman argues that adopting a Model Rule for CL would still permit
experimentation by states. See Fairman, supra note 25, at 77. That is technically true as
states are free to modify model rules proposed by the ABA. As a practical matter, it
seems unlikely that there would be interested and knowledgeable stakeholders in most
states who would be motivated to engage in the rulemaking process. For most courts and
legislators, this would be a relatively obscure topic that would not merit much .of their
attention. For state policynakers, the virtue of having model rules is that the
policymakers would not need to do much analysis of their own as they can rely on
national experts who have done much more sophisticated analysis than they would be
able to do.
362 Fairman cites my criticism of a point in an ethics opinion to suggest that this
undermines my argument in favor of a common law process in which issues are refined
through percolation. See Fairman, supra note 194, at 722 (referring to my criticism of an
ethics opinion that would prevent CL lawyers from undertaking a CL case if there is a
"significant" risk of impasse). On another point, he characterizes my view as "resolv[ing]
the conflict by fiat." Id. at 722 (referring to my argument that CL lawyers are and should
be considered as advocates rather than neutrals under the ethical rules). However, it is
just such criticism by legal and scholarly authorities that leads to incremental
improvements with experience and reflection. I do not propose enacting a rule to reflect
my views on the subject. Instead, in future opinions, ethical authorities can consider my
argument and adopt my recommendation if they find it persuasive. Fiat is not when
commentators publish criticisms of legal rules or opinions. Real "fiat" is when
policymakers do not undertake a careful policymaking process before adopting binding
rules that provide for real sanctions.
363 See supra Parts HI.C. L.b, III.C. 1.c.
364 Fairman suggests that the ABA should start drafting CL rules now because it is a
lengthy process:
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community and the ABA need much more experience with ethical issues
arising from CL practice before drafting such a rule. The CL community
needs more time to develop its infrastructure dealing with ethical issues. The
ABA has relatively little experience with CL and would be in an odd position
to direct a rule-drafting process on a subject that ABA leaders know
relatively little about. 365 In drafting a Model Rule, the ABA would need to
rely on CL leaders for their experience. Given the CL community's own
institutional interests,366 the ABA would need to be sufficiently sophisticated
Amazingly, it was not until 2002 that recognition of the most basic form of ADR-
use of a third-party neutral-found its way into the Model Rules. There is a lesson to
be learned from the long journey for third-party neutral inclusion into the Model
Rules as Rule 2.4: Even the most basic recognition of the reconceptualization of
lawyer roles takes a long time.
Fairman, supra note 194, at 736. In the twenty-six years between the 1976 Pound
Conference and the adoption of Rule 2.4, the dispute resolution field somehow survived
and grew. Fairman provides no evidence that Rule 2.4 has changed practice at all. Indeed,
focusing on Fairman's goal of education, five years after the adoption of Rule 2.4, it
seems likely that few lawyers or neutrals are even aware that it exists, let alone the
content of its provisions. A better lesson from the example of Rule 2.4 is that adoption of
a rule is and should be a "lagging indicator" that often follows, rather than precedes,
intensive development of professional norms.
365 If the ABA would consider adopting a Model Rule for CL, it might use
Fairman's proposal as a starting point, but it would presumably consult widely and
consider alternative provisions. Certainly there is some knowledge about CL within the
ABA, including by individual leaders of the Family Law and Dispute Resolution Sections
and as reflected by the Family Law Section's publication of a CL manual. See TESLER,
supra note 31. This has not penetrated deeply within the ABA, including its Center for
Professional Responsibility, however. For example, the ABA has not issued any ethical
opinions about CL.
366 Virtually all movements and organizations have self-interests, so it would be
unusual if the CL community did not have its own self-interests. A disturbing example in
the CL community is reflected in a common response to a suggestion that, in addition to
offering CL, collaborative practitioners offer clients the option of using "Cooperative
Law." Many CL practitioners reject this suggestion fearing that clients would "take the
easy way out" by choosing Cooperative rather than Collaborative Law. See Hoffman,
supra note 74, at 4 (noting "fear [by CL practitioners] that clients will opt for the easier,
less onerous forms, rather than embrace the real deal and that, by taking an easier path,
will fail to get all of the attendant benefits of [CL]"). Of course CL lawyers have no duty
to offer clients Cooperative Law and may decline to do so believing that CL is preferable
to Cooperative Law. Nonetheless, the decision not to offer Cooperative Law out of fear
that the clients would make the "wrong" choice reflects an ethical insensitivity to the
serious pressure that some clients feel to use CL or stay in the process. See MACFARLANE,
supra note 59, at 65, 69 (research finding that "[m]any [Collaborative] lawyers promote
the collaborative process to all their potential family clients" and that one of the clients
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to identify and check those interests so that a new Model Rule would protect
clients' interests appropriately. Both the CL community and the ABA are
years away from that level of sophistication in my view.367 Promulgating a
Model Rule for CL risks prematurely fixing a national standard based on an
studied "clearly experienced a form of entrapment"); N.J. Ethics Op. 699, supra note 299,
at 5 (describing risk "that the parties could become 'captives' to a process that does not
suit their needs"). Moreover, it places a higher priority on an interest in the CL movement
to increase the market for CL services over clients' interests in making their own
informed choices about what process best serves their interests. Many CL practitioners
claim that it would be too confusing to clients to offer both options, but that is not
necessarily true (and a disingenuous claim by practitioners with a stated commitment to
promoting client decision-making). See Mid-Missouri Collaborative and Cooperative
Law Association, Choosing Collaborative Law or Cooperative Law,
http://www.mmccla.org/choosingccl.pdf (last visited Jan. 30, 2007) (one-page handout
describing similarities and differences between Collaborative and Cooperative Law).
Given the perceived self-interests within the CL community, policynakers need to
carefully scrutinize claims made by CL practitioners.
367 As Fairman notes, researchers have conducted two studies of CL. Fairman, supra
note 25, at 81-83. Although this is a good start in developing independent assessments of
CL practice, two studies represents a tiny knowledge base. By comparison to research on
mediation, it is a "drop in the bucket." See, e.g., Symposium, Conflict Resolution in the
Field: Assessing the Past, Charting the Future, 22 CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 1 (2004).
Responding to my argument about insufficient current sophistication in the ABA to
draft a new ethical rule about CL, Fairman cites the recommendation by the NCCUSL
Committee on Scope and Program for appointment of a drafting committee on CL. See
Fairman, supra note 194, at 728-29. This is an unpersuasive argument for many reasons.
First, the ABA promulgates the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, not NCCUSL.
Moreover, so far, the NCCUSL effort does not inspire great confidence in its own
expertise. NCCUSL's decision to appoint a drafting committee was based on a one-page
"study" completed by a four-person study committee that conducted two conference
calls. See Study Committee for Collaborative Law, National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Recommendation for Appointment of Drafting
Committee Regarding a Uniform Collaborative Law Act (May 2006) (on file with
author). The Study Committee recommendation includes no factual findings beyond the
facts that CL is practiced in most jurisdictions, there are some statutes and courts rules,
and the International Academy of Collaborative Professionals supports development of a
uniform act. Id. The Recommendation concludes, without any support, that appointment
of a drafting committee is consistent with NCCUSL policy and that a uniform CL act
would "produce significant benefits to the public." Id. The recommendation does not
include, however, any specification of the issues to be addressed in the drafting process.
Id. Although it would be inappropriate for NCCUSL to draft an ethical rule for lawyers, it
may be appropriate for it to draft a uniform statute governing matters such as restriction
of use of CL communications in court under the principles proposed in this Article. See
supra Part II.C.4. Hopefully NCCUSL will exercise sophisticated independent judgment
in drafting such a statute.
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inadequate base of experience. The ABA should intervene only if it finds that
CL practice is generally (1.) causing serious problems to legal clients, (2)
resistant to cure by the CL community itself, and (3) inconsistent with or
inadequately regulated by the current Model Rules of Professional Conduct.
Considering that there apparently have been no formal complaints368 and that
the existing rules seem quite adequate, 369 there is little risk in deferring
development of a new Model Rule until there is a clear demonstration of
need and the ABA's institutional capability to develop sound policy in this
area.
Professor Peppet's proposal also focuses exclusively on enacting new
ethical rules, which he argues are needed to achieve his policy goals because
of the potential for legal sanctions to change lawyers' behavior.370
Specifically, he contends that rules will help lawyers credibly commit to
provide the information needed for interest-based negotiation by risking
serious consequences if they renege on their commitments. 371 This is a more
appropriate use of legal rules than in Professor Fairman's proposal for two
reasons. First, it relies on legal sanctions, which only legal rules can provide.
Second, the rules are designed to protect consumers against
misrepresentation about a key claim in negotiation, namely that the lawyers
would not use puffing and related tactics.
Although the use of rules in Professor Peppet's proposal is justified
under the principles set out in this Article, it is not clear how effective the
proposal would be to change lawyers' behaviors. Professor Peppet identifies
significant reasons why it might not be effective. If lawyers would make the
claims authorized in his proposed rules and then renege, it would often be
hard to determine that they have done so and actually enforce the rules
properly.372 This is particularly difficult because it is so hard to make subtle
determinations about whether, in the context of complex negotiations, a
lawyer has been truthful, disclosed all material information, negotiated in
good faith, or avoided causing substantial injustice. There are not "bright
line" standards for these duties.373 Moreover, Professor Peppet "fuzzes" the
368 See supra text accompanying note 250.
369 See supra Parts III.C. 1 .b, III.C. 1 .c.
370 Peppet, supra note 28, at 497-98.
371 Id. at 521-25.
372Id. at 528-29, 534-35. He writes, "[t]he experiment may fail because of
verification and enforcement problems, but it may not. It is worth a try." Id. at 535.
373 For example, his proposal provides sanctions for lawyers who fail to comply
with obligations undertaken to "negotiate in good faith." Id at 523-24. For discussion of
problems with a good-faith requirement, see supra notes 109-16 and accompanying text.
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line to reduce the risk that the rules would set unrealistic standards:
Although collaborative strategies often involve sharing more information
than more adversarial strategies, collaboration does not mean revealing all
of one's information, preferences, interests, and litigation strategies. Two
collaborating lawyers may agree to work through a decision analysis of
their claims and counter-claims or arrange for a trusted third party to assist
them with valuing their litigation, but they need not reveal their proverbial
cards completely. Similarly, they can talk about their clients' interests
without fully disclosing the strength or relative importance of those
interests.3 74
Even if lawyers could readily determine whether specific negotiation
behaviors violated the rules, a significant proportion of lawyers would
probably be reluctant to file disciplinary complaints to enforce the rules as it
would violate a norm of professional comity.37 5 On the other hand, it is
foreseeable that some lawyers would abuse the rules for partisan advantage
by filing disciplinary complaints to intimidate opposing lawyers. 376 Thus,
Fairman writes, "Even Professor Peppet's proposal-which Professor Lande prefers
over mine-includes a undefined good faith provision." Fairman, supra note 194, at 734.
Although I believe that Peppet's proposal is preferable to Fairman's in some respects, I
argue that use of "good faith" provisions is problematic in both proposals. See supra note
109.
374 Peppet, supra note 28, at 535.
375 Peppet recognizes this possibility and argues that "[i]f the profession can gather
the will to enact a contract-based code, it may have the will to step up enforcement
measures." Id. at 534. This is not necessarily true. It is much easier for rulemakers to
adopt such a general rule than for rank-and-file lawyers to incur the economic and non-
economic costs of filing complaints against members of their legal community in actual
cases.
376 Peppet recognizes this risk and argues that "[i]f a lawyer and her client know that
they have nothing to hide, and they know that they are willing to act honestly in their
negotiations, then the risk of unjustified professional disciplinary sanctions is low." Id. at
536. He argues that lawyers would undertake this risk in particular cases only if they
knew enough about their adversaries and clients to determine that the level of risk is
relatively low. See id. Even if lawyers would believe that they are acting honestly,
complying with the rules, and would be vindicated in a disciplinary process, they may
nonetheless be reluctant to expose themselves to the risk that an adversary would bring a
baseless complaint. Peppet is probably right that most lawyers would generally do so
only in cases where they already had confidence in the lawyers and parties in the
litigation. This dynamic is somewhat inconsistent with the rationale of his proposal,
namely to provide structural incentives for interest-based negotiation where such prior
knowledge is lacking. See id. at 481-84, 497-98. This is not a fatal problem for Peppet's
proposal, but it significantly limits the potential impact.
[Vol. 22:3 20071
PRINCIPLES FOR POLICYMAKING ABOUT COLLABORATIVE LAW
although Professor Peppet's proposal might actually promote more interest-
based negotiation, its reliance on the powerful tool of legal sanctions creates
serious risks of underuse or overuse.
Even if a rule change would be needed to achieve Professor Peppet's
policy goals, it is unlikely to be sufficient considering the traditions of
lawyering deeply embedded in the legal culture that he proposes to change.
His proposal does not consider nonregulatory policy options that might be
appropriate instead of or in addition to his proposed rule changes. That is not
surprising as scholars generally cannot provide comprehensive proposals in a
single article. Developing a more comprehensive strategy would make the
proposal more effective. His proposal relies on lawyers to decide whether to
take advantage of it or not. He writes, "[p]erhaps after a few years it would
be clear that almost all lawyers found these provisions helpful, and they
could be transformed into aspirational default provisions. Perhaps the
opposite would become clear, and few lawyers or clients would make use of
them." 377 Thus, his plan essentially relies on the market with little apparent
promotion or support. It would be much more effective if it were
incorporated in a broader strategy to educate and motivate lawyers to secure
adoption of the rules and, following adoption, to take advantage of them and
address problems that would arise. Ideally, the strategy would be developed
and implemented through active consultation with interested stakeholders.
The CL movement and its infrastructure provide useful models to consider in
developing nonregulatory policies that might be included and adapted in such
a strategy.
4. Potential for Synergy with the Legal System
Both Professor Fhirman's and Professor Peppet's proposals provide for
some synergy with the legal system. Both treat the legal system with
considerable respect and would permit lawyers and parties to continue
operating under the status quo while adding a valuable option for those
interested. Both proposals avoid the extremes of the assimilative and
autonomous approaches. 378 Both contemplate the maintenance of distinctive
models of lawyering using interest-based negotiation, recognizing that a
substantial part of the legal profession-perhaps the overwhelming
majority-would continue using traditional, positional negotiation. And both
recognize the value of maintaining respectful relationships with leaders and
practitioners in the contemporary legal system. Professor Peppet's analysis
377 Id. at 529.
378 See supra notes 186-93 and accompanying text.
705
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
provides a particularly realistic and sympathetic understanding of lawyers
operating in a traditional mode. Although it is tempting for some ADR
proponents to suggest that lawyers and the legal system should follow
principles and procedures at the highest aspirational level, Professor Peppet's
analysis appreciates the practical difficulties that would be involved. Thus he
appropriately proposes that the default rule should be the status quo, where
lawyers are permitted to engage in puffing, rather than expecting most
lawyers to make a sudden major shift in lawyering culture. 379
The dispute resolution professionals who promote and implement ADR
innovations are responsible for maintaining the fundamental values of their
processes, honoring the values of the contemporary system, and being
flexible enough to satisfy needs of practitioners and the public. Both
Professors Fairman and Peppet set a good tone to follow.
V. CONCLUSION
In the three decades since the Pound Conference in 1976,380 ADR has
become institutionalized in the courts, legal profession, and society. It is still
vital, spawning new innovations such as Collaborative Law, Cooperative
Law, and settlement counsel. The challenge for the future is to continue
developing in ways that increasingly meet the needs of the public and society
generally. In my view, this requires commitment to key principles such as the
use of sound dispute system design techniques in policymaking, promotion
of informed decisionmaking by the principals in disputes, openness to
continued innovation, development of comprehensive strategies with sound
use of regulatory and other policy options, and maintenance of appropriate
relationships with the legal system and other social institutions. If the ADR
field follows these principles, it will be more effective in improving the ways
that people handle their disputes.
379 See Peppet, supra note 28, at 516-18, 525-27.
380 Professor Jeffrey Stempel suggests that the 1976 Pound Conference marks the
beginning of the modem ADR movement. Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reflections on Judicial
ADR and the Multi-Door Courthouse at Twenty: Fait Accompli, Failed Overture, or
Fledgling Adulthood?, 11 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsp. RESOL. 297, 309-310 (1996).
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